

## Metadata of the chapter that will be visualized online

Chapter Title	Virtues Impracticable and Extremely Difficult: The Human Rights of Subsistence Diggers	
Copyright Year	2015	
Copyright Holder	Springer Science+Business Media New York	
Corresponding Author	Family Name	<b>Hardy</b>
	Particle	
	Given Name	<b>Sam</b>
	Suffix	
	Organization	UCL Centre for Applied Archaeology
	Address	4 Wartling Drive, Little Common, Bexhill-on-Sea, East Sussex, TN39 4QN, UK
	Email	samarkeolog@gmail.com
Abstract	<p>This chapter reviews how chronic and acute environmental and humanitarian problems, and economic and health insecurity drive the looting of archaeological sites, and how political and legal weaknesses enable and are perpetuated by illicit trading. It considers the logic and effectiveness of shoot-to-kill policing of theft of cultural property, the deterrent effect of armed guarding of cultural heritage sites, and the potential for sustainable cultural economies and community education to reduce cultural destruction non-violently. In the light of evidence concerning the socioeconomic profiles of illicit antiquities diggers in Iraq, Mali, Palestine, Jordan and Niger, this chapter queries the argument that there are never sufficient moral grounds for antiquities digging. It concludes that it is immoral and counter-productive to criminalise subsistence digging when there is no viable economic alternative.</p>	
Keywords (separated by “-”)	Human rights - Illicit antiquities - Iraq - Looting - Mali - Policing - Poverty - Sustainable economies	

## Chapter 14 1

# Virtues Impracticable and Extremely Difficult: 2

# The Human Rights of Subsistence Diggers 3

Sam Hardy 4

*Poverty is a great enemy to human happiness; it certainly destroys liberty, and it makes some virtues impracticable, and others extremely difficult (Samuel Johnson, 7th December 1782, cited in Boswell 1952:494).*

In the bloody and destructive aftermath of the U.S.-led Coalition's invasion of Iraq 5  
 in 2003, cultural heritage workers debated how to prevent or suppress the looting of 6  
 museums and archaeological sites. At the Fifth World Archaeological Congress 7  
 (WAC5), which was held in Washington, DC 3 months after the invasion, the 8  
 destruction and looting of Iraqi cultural property, and the ethical responsibilities of 9  
 archaeologists, were central concerns. Troubled by the explicit statements of some 10  
 archaeologists and the implicit tone of others, I submitted *Proposition 15*. It cited 11  
 the human right to “a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of 12  
 himself and of his family [*sic*], including food, clothing, housing and medical care 13  
 and necessary social services” (UN 1948:Art. 25, Para. 1); and it concluded that 14  
 WAC5 should recognise that “[s]o long as a standard of living adequate for health 15  
 and well-being is not [otherwise] accessible... [a] person has a moral right to ‘loot’” 16  
 (Hardy 2003). It was not passed by the Congress Business Plenary. In subsequent 17  
 discussion some archaeologists and other cultural heritage workers labelled the 18  
 proposition “irresponsible” and a misapplication or misappropriation of human 19  
 rights—for a more detailed, theoretical exploration of the conflicts between 20  
 economic and cultural rights see Hardy (2004). 21

---

S. Hardy (✉)  
 UCL Centre for Applied Archaeology,  
 4 Wartling Drive, Little Common, Bexhill-on-Sea, East Sussex TN39 4QN, UK  
 e-mail: [samarkeolog@gmail.com](mailto:samarkeolog@gmail.com)

22 In this chapter I will review the immediate and long-term causes of illicit digging;  
23 assess the logic and value of cultural heritage professionals' calls to use violence in  
24 order to protect cultural heritage sites from plunder; argue that there is a morally  
25 defensible and practically effective alternative to violence; and query cultural  
26 heritage workers' and law enforcement agents' categorisation and treatment of  
27 subsistence diggers. I contend that it is illogical to categorise subsistence diggers  
28 alongside entrepreneurial and organised criminal looters, and that it is unjust to treat  
29 subsistence digging as a criminal activity.

## 30 **The Causes of Illicit Digging**

31 Apart from the sheer profit motive for entrepreneurial and organised looting, there  
32 are certain underlying, social and economic problems that perpetuate illicit digging  
33 and smuggling, many of which were explicitly identified years ago by the then  
34 National Director of Arts and Culture in Mali, Téréba Togola (2002). They comprise  
35 environmental factors; humanitarian crises; health insecurity; lack of education;  
36 corruption; lack of political will or law enforcement; and (consequent) economic  
37 insecurity. Environmental factors include gradual climate change and desertification,  
38 abrupt natural disasters, and multifactor crises like droughts and famines; victims of  
39 droughts in rural Mali “sometimes tur[n] to looting as a way to survive” (Sidibé  
40 2001:27). Those and other humanitarian crises, like conflicts, worsen existing inse-  
41 curity, as the Tuareg rebellions have done in Mali (Insoll 1993:631). Furthermore,  
42 they create acute needs in local communities and displaced populations; even if com-  
43 munities can manage their own problems, they will often be pushed into chronic  
44 debt, as they have been in Niger (Harding 2012). Health insecurity, through exposure  
45 to disease and/or lack of access to healthcare, can cause or contribute to individuals'  
46 and communities' economic insecurity. Lack of education may contribute to an indi-  
47 vidual's lack of job options; and it may lead to a lack of awareness of the possibility  
48 of sustainable cultural tourism, so that a community with two otherwise equally poor  
49 short-term options may choose to dig (and thus harm a long-term option). Corruption,  
50 and lack of political will or law enforcement, both undermine alternative economic  
51 options, and underpin a flourishing illicit antiquities trade.

52 Economic insecurity—whether in the form of widespread, chronic, deep poverty  
53 or in the form of a general precarity of existence—makes illicit digging either effi-  
54 cient or essential. And the illicit antiquities trade itself can cause economic inse-  
55 curity and undermine basic elements of developing countries' economies: for  
56 example, in Nigeria, farmers who had previously survived on half-a-dollar a day  
57 “let their crops rot because they were too busy digging for terracotta” because it  
58 could fund 2 months' subsistence per piece (Labi and Robinson 2001). Having  
59 established the generic causes of illicit digging, it is now possible to examine pro-  
60 posals to suppress illegal excavations by killing looters and/or by arming cultural  
61 heritage site guards.

## Stopping Looting: Shooting Looters in Iraq

62

Between 1990 and 2003 the United Nations' sanctions, combined with the Ba'athist regime's first non-cooperation then manipulation, devastated Iraqi society. There was a "lack of some essential goods, and inadequate or inefficient use of existing essential goods," primarily clean water, food and medicine (Garfield 1999:1); that problem caused the deaths of "at least several hundred thousand" infants (Rieff 2003) and an equal number of older children and adults; and that measurable outcome was "the tip of the iceberg among damages" (Garfield 1999:34). A clinical professor of public health, David Garfield (1999:37), concluded that the "humanitarian disaster far... exceed[ed]... any reasonable level of acceptable damages;" and that, had the sanctions been imposed as part of a military occupation, the "den[ial of]... adequate access to food and medicine" to more than twenty million civilians would have constituted a war crime. Despite facing the death penalty, "impoverished," "desperate" Iraqis, without "basic necessities" and with "nothing left to sell," were driven to digging up and selling off antiquities (Russell 1996). Furthermore, the sanctions caused cultural budget cuts within Iraq and blocked cultural aid from outside, thus removing sources of protection for archaeological sites and sources of income for local communities.

After the U.S.-led invasion in 2003 localised looting became nationwide mining. It was suspected that the "same international gang" targeted both the National Museum (in Baghdad) and Mosul Museum (Mosul Museum director Bernadette Hanna-Metti, cited in Atwood 2003a); the gang took "what they wanted," then locals took "whatever they could" (Mosul Museum curator Saba al-Omari, cited in Atwood 2003a). Outside urban centres tribally supported, politically protected "[h]eavily armed" antiquities dealers established control of archaeological sites, then "hundreds of farmers" moved in and dug for antiquities, earning money piece by piece (Farchakh Bajjaly 2008:136). Zainab Bahrani (2003) stated that "all of us [archaeologists had] said the top priority [for the Coalition] was the immediate placement of security guards at all museums and archaeological sites;" yet at least some archaeologists agreed with Lieutenant Colonel Richard Long, who had identified the responsibility to preserve archaeology as the last piece in a "mosaic of ensuring food, water, electricity [and] sewage" (Andrews 2003).

Archaeologist Elizabeth Stone had visited Iraq and learned that Coalition soldiers were "reluctant" to confront looters "because" if they intervened "people were going to get killed" (cited in Bennett 2003). A fortnight after WAC5 Stone said either that she "would like to see helicopters flying over there shooting bullets so that people know there is a real price to looting this stuff" (cited in Bennett 2003) or that she "would like to see some helicopters flying over these sites, and some bullets fired at the looters" (cited in Kennedy 2003). Either way her wish was clear as Stone insisted that "you have got to kill some people to stop this" (cited in MacLeod 2003). The World Archaeological Congress (WAC 2003) did condemn these calls to arms as "intolerable" but it was clear that a number of its members did not agree. At the same time, the then Director General of the National Museum of Iraq,

[AU1]

104

105 Donny George Youkhana, had judged that “if they steal from mankind... it is fair  
106 they should be shot” (Lovell 2003). It was also clear that, even if archaeologists did  
107 not think looters ought to be shot, many considered any illicit digging of antiquities  
108 to be a kind of crime against humanity, a “crime against culture,” a wilful destruc-  
109 tion of cultural property, prohibited under customary international law (Francioni  
110 and Lenzerini 2006:36–37). At WAC5 at least one archaeologist had defined the  
111 digging as “genocide.”

112 In fact, the Coalition was “flying helicopters low over archaeological sites, firing  
113 warning shots to shoo away looters” and had been for nearly 2 months when Stone  
114 and Youkhana made their interventions (Atwood 2003b). Moreover, at least “several  
115 looters” had been killed, shot to death at an unnamed archaeological site; and, even  
116 if “rarely enforced,” some antiquities looters were still given the death penalty  
117 (Salman 2008).<sup>1</sup> A US Army captain commented to *Mother Jones* “[t]hat’s all they  
118 [the relevant Coalition units] can do right now.... After one or two incidents like that,  
119 maybe looters will start to get the message” (cited in Atwood 2003b). For a variety  
120 of reasons, diggers and looters did not get that message.

## 121 **Deterring Looting: Armed Guards Around the World**

122 Aside from advocacy for killing suspected looters without trial, there have been  
123 more reasonable and reasoned arguments for armed guards for cultural heritage  
124 sites. Cultural policy scholar Lawrence Rothfield encouraged the arming of site and  
125 museum guards (around the world) to enable them to do the “brutal policing job  
126 required to prevent looters and professional art thieves from carrying away items”  
127 (cited in Hooper 2011). Responding to others’ reporting of his views Rothfield  
128 (2011b) clarified that “no one is encouraging guards to shoot subsistence diggers”  
129 and that the guards would be armed in order to “deter.... mafia-like-organized looting  
130 gangs” who would be “much less likely to attack if they knew the guards were  
131 armed” and supported. While it is true that they would be less likely to attack sites  
132 and museums with armed guards they might not simply abandon the business  
133 entirely. In Peru, a few famous sites like Sipan have twenty-four-hour armed guards  
134 but the rest have none (Nash 1993); so those guards *displace* rather than *prevent*  
135 pillage per se, as looters just hit other, unguarded sites instead.

136 In fact, Iraqi and Egyptian guards *were* armed, but they were “driven off [site]”  
137 by attacks or “threatened with harm to themselves and to their families;” Rothfield’s  
138 (2011a) answer was that they “need[ed] more guns” and/or automatic rifles instead  
139 of handguns. Rothfield (2011a) acknowledged that it was a “stopgap.... [i]n the  
140 absence of police;” but the presence of police is no guarantee of safety. When nine  
141 Afghan police officers confronted an antiquities-looting warlord’s militia at

---

<sup>1</sup> Similarly, despite China’s application of the death penalty, the supply of looted Chinese material has gone from a “trickle” to a “flood,” “especially because” a farmer can get a year’s income for one night shift on an illicit excavation, or for one (good) find (Time Asia 2003).

Kharwar, four of the police officers were killed (Rothfield 2009:25; see also Abdul Samad Haidari, 1st June 2011, cited in la Piscopia 2011). Furthermore, as Italian Army heritage specialist Patrizia la Piscopia (2011) recognised, any time when police could not function would be a time when armed guards could not function either; armed guards would have the same concerns for their own and their families' security and subsistence as police officers.

In theory, in Iraq, archaeological site and museum guards were able to do more—they had automatic rifles—but in practice they were “afraid to kill” because they “fear[ed tribal] reprisals” against their families (U.S. Army Major Eric Holliday, cited in and paraphrased by Atwood 2003a). Even without taking lives in the course of duty, officials' own lives were in danger: when Iraqi customs agents arrested a few antiquities dealers and confiscated the dealers' hundreds of objects the agents' convoy was intercepted and eight of the agents were killed (Farchakh Bajjaly 2008:138). Regardless of the number and power of the weapons an empty threat is no deterrent—arms will only function as a deterrent if they are used (sometimes). The Director of the Norwegian National Museum of Art, Sune Nordgren, refused to arm its guards because that “would only result in thieves outgunning them” (paraphrased by AP 2004). As the French Musée d'Orsay fatalistically accepted “not a lot... can be done” to stop machine-gun-toting gangs (cited in AP 2004).<sup>2</sup> At best, armed guards could be somewhat effective in deterring opportunistic thieves or (very cynically) minimising harm by redirecting thieves' targets from the most valuable cultural heritage to the least. At worst, they could be practically ineffective in fending off organised criminal endeavours *and* they could put themselves and others at great risk (as, by being armed, they would constitute a credible threat to any armed robbers; thus, they would increase the risk of the robbers using violence). At the same time, the split and clash in local community interests could create resentment against cultural security personnel, which would undermine the community's support for cultural security and the police's efforts to gather information on serious organised crime. It would also create an association of cultural heritage sites and staff with state authorities rather than local communities, which could make them political targets in future violence. Therefore, even if guards only ever used their arms in self-defence, there would still be serious concerns about the practical effectiveness of armed guards at cultural heritage sites. States might be better advised to invest in technology to disrupt criminal activity and generate forensic evidence, and in intelligence-led policing to capture and prosecute criminals with the minimum risk possible.

It is undeniable that looting has been *facilitated* or *encouraged* by weaknesses in the system for the protection of cultural property from a lack of documentation or a lack of computerisation of paper documents; to a lack of infrastructure for communication and action; to understaffing—1,200 guards for 10,000 sites (Salman 2008)—and under-equipping of existing staff; to personnel's own financial and physical

<sup>2</sup>For example, the Head of Security at the Swedish National Museum refused to install ‘automatic metal bars that would close to keep thieves inside the museum because thieves “may take a hostage”’ (cited in AP 2004).

183 insecurity, and thus the ease of their corruption or intimidation. It is also undeniable  
184 that looting has been (greatly) *exacerbated* by organised crime groups, paramilitaries  
185 and terrorists, which profited from or funded their activities by smuggling and  
186 trading antiquities (Bogdanos and Patrick 2005:249). Nonetheless, looting has also  
187 been *driven* by poverty and a lack of alternatives. Still, the scale of looting has been  
188 incomparable to the problem before 1990. Demonstrably, war has played an essential  
189 role in the increase in the systematic looting of sites.

## 190 **Reducing Illicit Digging in Mali**

191 According to the United Nations Development Programme, in Mali, 51.4 % of the  
192 population survive on less than \$1.25 a day (UNDP 2011); and, according to the  
193 Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI), 86.6 % endure multidimensional  
194 poverty (Alkire et al. 2011). Locals “concerned only with problems of  
195 survival” engage in subsistence digging (Sanogo 1999).<sup>3</sup> Exploiting that situation,  
196 antiquities dealers employ “[w]hole villages” and even “encampments of immigrant  
197 workers” to strip-mine archaeological sites (Shyllon 2011:139). The villagers and  
198 labourers commonly earn the most meagre wages humanly possible, survival wages,  
199 a day’s work for “the price of a day’s food” (IARC 2001).

200 It is possible that 45 % (Brodie et al. 2000:20), 75 % (Robinson and Labi 2001),  
201 or even 80–90 % (ICOM 2000:11) of Malian archaeological sites have been  
202 plundered. Illicit diggers have struck all four of Mali’s UNESCO World Heritage  
203 Sites: the Tomb of Askia in Gao (Insoll 1993); the Cliff of Bandiagara in the Land  
204 of the Dogons (Hammer 2009; Labi and Robinson 2001); the Old Towns of Djenné  
205 (ICOM 2000:10–11) and Timbuktu, where they looted “thousands of objects” every  
206 year (Duval 1998:8A; see also Brodie 1998). One team of archaeologists has called it  
207 it “a true cultural genocide [un vrai génocide culturel]” (Bedaux et al. 2005:1).

208 There is some hope: a combination of economic development, community edu-  
209 cation, political commitment and law enforcement has had remarkable success in  
210 reducing illicit digging. Communities have established local museums, and thus  
211 protected their cultural patrimony, built community pride and local education, and  
212 provided the infrastructure for a sustainable economy of cultural tourism. By earn-  
213 ing locals’ trust—and thus getting volunteer site guards (Sidibé 2001:27)—and by  
214 recruiting “informants” in villages and running effective investigations of their tip-offs,  
215 Malian authorities have achieved a 75 % reduction in the illicit export of cultural  
216 property (Labi and Robinson 2001); Jenne-Jeno is “no longer looted” (Sidibé  
217 2001:26). This demonstrates that, sometimes, it is possible to reduce illicit digging  
218 even in very challenging environments. However, the current political crisis in Mali  
219 threatens to undo all of this good work and elsewhere communities without such an  
220 alternative have continued and will continue to dig to subsist.

---

<sup>3</sup>There is some evidence of committees of village elders selling their communities’ cultural property in order to fund basic infrastructure (e.g., Hammer 2009).

## The Human Rights of Subsistence Diggers

221

UNESCO's Director of Cultural Heritage, Lyndel Prott, stated in *the UNESCO Courier* that "[a]s soon as the local population is convinced of the importance of cultural heritage they become a site's best curators" (Prott and Bessières 2001:21). And when UNESCO rhetorically asked "what entitle[d] archaeologists to prevent poverty-stricken farmers from looting their ancestors' graves if that enable[d] them to feed their families" it simply answered that "[I]ooting does not feed the looters.... On the contrary, maintaining a site constitutes an economic resource for local populations" (Prott and Bessières 2001:20). An archaeological site *may* constitute an economic resource for a local community, and maintaining an archaeological site *may* produce a local economy, *if* the state directly employs locals as custodians, archaeologists employ locals as custodians or workers, and/or tourists bring money into the local economy. When that happens, then locals will naturally become a site's curators. However, until that happens, those locals will still need a source of subsistence; if locals are digging up and selling off artefacts in order to subsist, that suggests that, so far, the state has been unable or unwilling to provide or support a sustainable subsistence; and sometimes "looting" is the only thing that *does* feed the "looters."

Perhaps in Belize and Ukraine, looting operations are largely side-interests of international drug gangs and mafia (Government of Belize Department of Archaeology 1979:54/114, cited in Gilgan 2001:77; *the Scotsman* 2002); and in southern Italy, looting is largely the preserve of mafia-like specialist gangs that pay mafia clans for permission to loot (Nistri 2011:185–187), while smuggling is largely the preserve of mafia clans themselves (Melillo 2009: 90). Perhaps in Peru, even during crises that leave 70 % in poverty, poor villagers still only "*supplemen[t]*" their incomes with looting (Wilford 1994, emphasis added; see also Nash 1993), rather than *subsist* on digging. Yet in Palestine, where 43 % live in poverty, and "looting grows at the same rate as unemployment," most illicit excavators "dig as a way of surviving poverty" (Yahya 2010:97–98). In Jordan, villagers dig archaeological sites in "a desperate effort to feed their families" (Politis 1994:15; see also Bisheh 2001:115). In Niger, where many sites have suffered 50–90 % destruction by illicit digging, the "guilty" are "the poorest population in the world at the limit of [their] daily survival" (Gado 2001:58).

In Iraq, "all these people [antiquity-diggers]" live on "well below" \$1.25-a-day; and "[*m*]ost of them are not starving" (Farchakh-Bajjaly 2007:51, emphasis added), i.e. some of them *are*. Assyriologist Benjamin Foster, Ancient Near Eastern art scholar Karen Foster and cultural property lawyer Patty Gerstenblith explicitly stated "The money is urgently needed by the extended families of the diggers for basic living expenses and medical supplies. Without it, the mortality rate, especially for infants and children, would climb even higher in Iraq" (Foster et al. 2005:220).

Some archaeologists recognise that "in the current situation," without a viable economic alternative such as agriculture, "forbidding people from looting archaeological sites would mean condemning them to starvation" (Farchakh-Bajjaly 2007:52). Nonetheless, during the discussion of Proposition 15 certain archaeologists asserted

265 that while (other) people “should” have access to their basic human rights when  
266 they had to choose between accessing those basic human rights (through subsistence  
267 digging) and refraining from damaging cultural heritage sites “sometimes the right  
268 [choices were] not the easy ones.” Other archaeologists who acknowledge subsistence  
269 diggers’ struggle for existence still insist that we “should... reject any excuses pre-  
270 sented by the diggers... to justify their actions” (e.g. Yahya 2010:99).

271 I contend that it is illogical to put these subsistence diggers in the same category  
272 as entrepreneurial and organised looters. Unlike commercial looters, subsistence dig-  
273 gers would stop excavating illicitly if they had an economic alternative. Furthermore,  
274 I contend that it is immoral: given the evidence for the necessity of subsistence dig-  
275 ging in Iraq and elsewhere, and given the evidence of a moral, effective alternative to  
276 imprisonment or violence in Mali, I argue that it is unjust to treat subsistence digging  
277 as a criminal activity when and so long as there is no viable alternative economic  
278 means for subsistence diggers to access their human rights to clean water, food  
279 and medicine.

## 280 Ethical Implications

281 In Ricardo Elia’s (1993:69) oft-quoted words “collectors are the real looters.”  
282 Individuals and institutions that purchase illicit material create and maintain a mar-  
283 ket for looted material; they either directly fund or indirectly underwrite looting.  
284 However, even ethical archaeological projects, galleries and museums, which would  
285 neither directly nor indirectly finance the illicit antiquities trade, must be mindful  
286 that they may create trends in collecting culture and thus the antiquities market; they  
287 may expose archaeological deposits to the risk of commodification. In general, ethi-  
288 cal codes require professionals to conserve excavated materials and sites, and to  
289 respect communities’ cultural rights in their work: see, for instance, the (British)  
290 Institute for Archaeologists’ Code of Conduct (IfA 2012), the European Association  
291 of Archaeologists’ Code of Practice (EAA 2009) and the World Archaeological  
292 Congress’s First Code of Ethics (WAC 1990). However, they do not require profes-  
293 sionals to establish local, sustainable preservation programmes, or to support vul-  
294 nerable local communities’ economic rights. (For example, it would be ethical to  
295 import a team, dig down to bedrock, then deposit the finds in a central national  
296 museum store). This creates two tied problems: first, cultural property is preserved  
297 without regard to local communities’ economic needs, which breeds a feeling of  
298 resentment rather than a sense of stewardship; and second, simultaneously, sur-  
299 rounding and connected places’ cultural property is exposed to the attentions of the  
300 antiquities market, which creates an opportunity for unethical collectors to exploit  
301 still-vulnerable communities’ struggle for subsistence. Thus, an archaeological  
302 project may save a site but lose a landscape.

303 Adapting existing principles of archaeological practice to address archaeological  
304 work in extremely economically vulnerable areas, ethical codes should expect cultural  
305 heritage professionals: to assess the economic as well as social and environmental

implications of their work for local communities; to minimise any likely detrimental 306  
 effects of their work on the economic conditions of vulnerable local communities; 307  
 to recognise their obligation to employ and/or train economically vulnerable local 308  
 communities on their projects; and to conserve archaeological sites and material in 309  
 vulnerable areas as sustainable economic resources for the community. 310

**References**

311

[AU2]

Alkire, S., Roche, J. M., Santos, M. E., & Seth, S. (2011). *Mali country briefing*. Oxford, England: 312  
 OPHI. 313

~~Alva, W. (2001). The destruction, looting and traffic of the archaeological heritage of Peru. 314  
 In N. Brodie, J. Doole, & C. Renfrew (Eds.), *Trade in illicit antiquities: The destruction of the 315  
 world's archaeological heritage* (pp. 89–96). Cambridge, England: Macdonald Institute for 316  
 Archaeological Research. 317~~

Andrews, E. (2003, May 26). Iraqi officials say looting of ancient sites continues despite pleas to 318  
 US troops for help. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from [http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/27/ 319  
 international/worldspecial/27LOOT.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/27/international/worldspecial/27LOOT.html) 320

Associated Press. (2004, August 23). Munch art theft stirs debate on museum security. *USA 321  
 Today*. Retrieved from [http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2004-08-23-scream-norway\\_x. 322  
 htm](http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2004-08-23-scream-norway_x.htm) 323

Atwood, R. (2003a, June 4). In the north of Iraq. *Archaeology*. Retrieved from [http://www.archae- 324  
 ology.org/online/features/iraq/mosul.html](http://www.archaeology.org/online/features/iraq/mosul.html) 325

Atwood, R. (2003b, September/October). Day of the vulture. *Mother Jones*. Retrieved from [http:// 326  
 www.motherjones.com/politics/2003/09/day-vulture](http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2003/09/day-vulture) 327

Bahrani, Z. (2003, May 14). Looting and conquest. *The Nation*. Retrieved from [http://www.the- 328  
 nation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20030526&s=bahrani](http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20030526&s=bahrani) 329

Bedaux, R., Macdonald, K., Person, A., Polet, J., Sanogo, K., Schmidt, A., et al. (2005). 330  
 Introduction. In R. Bedaux, J. Polet, K. Sanogo, & A. Schmidt (Eds.), *Recherches archéologiques 331  
 à Dia dans le delta intérieur du Niger (Mali): bilan des saisons de fouilles 1998-2003* (pp. 1–4). 332  
 Leiden, The Netherlands: CNWS Publications. 333

Bennett, W. (2003, July 9). Professor calls for looters to be shot. *The Daily Telegraph*. Retrieved 334  
 from [http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/1435653/Professor-calls- 335  
 for-looters-to-be-shot.html](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/1435653/Professor-calls-for-looters-to-be-shot.html) 336

Bisheh, G. (2001). One damn illicit excavation after another: The destruction of the archaeological 337  
 heritage of Jordan. In N. Brodie, J. Doole, & C. Renfrew (Eds.), *Trade in illicit antiquities: 338  
 The destruction of the world's archaeological heritage* (pp. 115–118). Cambridge, England: 339  
 Macdonald Institute for Archaeological Research. 340

Bogdanos, M., & Patrick, W. (2005). *Thieves of Baghdad: One marine's passion to recover the 341  
 world's greatest stolen treasures*. New York: Bloomsbury. 342

Boswell, J. (1952). *Boswell's life of Johnson* (Vol. 4). London: Encyclopaedia Britannica 343  
 [1791]. 344

Brodie, N. (1998). In the news. *Culture Without Context*, Number 2. Retrieved from [http://www. 345  
 mcdonald.cam.ac.uk/projects/iarc/culturewithoutcontext/issue2/news.htm](http://www.mcdonald.cam.ac.uk/projects/iarc/culturewithoutcontext/issue2/news.htm) 346

Brodie, N., Doole, J., & Watson, P. (2000). *Stealing history: The illicit trade in cultural material*. 347  
 Cambridge, England: McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research. 348

Duval, A. (1998, April 25–26). Treasures of Timbuktu being plundered. *Moscow-Pullman Daily 349  
 News*, 8A. 350

EAA (European Association of Archaeologists). (2009). *Code of practice*. Retrieved from [http:// 351  
 www.e-a-a.org/EAA\\_Code\\_of\\_Practice.pdf](http://www.e-a-a.org/EAA_Code_of_Practice.pdf) 352

Elia, R. (1993). A seductive and troubling work. *Archaeology*, 46(1), 64–69. 353

- 354 Farchakh Bajjaly, J. (2008). Will Mesopotamia survive the war? The continuous destruction of  
355 Iraq's archaeological sites. In S. Peter & B. Joanne Farchakh (Eds.), *The destruction of cultural*  
356 *heritage in Iraq* (pp. 135–141). Woodbridge, England: The Boydell Press.
- 357 Farchakh-Bajjaly, J. (2007). Who are the looters at archaeological sites in Iraq? In L. Rothfield  
358 (Ed.), *Antiquities under siege: Cultural heritage protection after the Iraq war* (pp. 49–56).  
359 Plymouth, MN: AltaMira Press.
- 360 Foster, B., Foster, K., & Gerstenblith, P. (2005). *Iraq beyond the headlines: History, archaeology,*  
361 *and war*. London: World Scientific Publishing.
- 362 Francioni, F., & Lenzerini, F. (2006). The obligation to prevent and avoid destruction of cultural  
363 heritage: From Bamiyan to Iraq. In B. Hoffman (Ed.), *Art and cultural heritage: Law, policy,*  
364 *and practice* (pp. 28–40). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- 365 Gado, B. (2001). The Republic of Niger. In N. Brodie, J. Doole, & C. Renfrew (Eds.), *Trade in*  
366 *illicit antiquities: The destruction of the world's archaeological heritage* (pp. 57–72).  
367 Cambridge, England: Macdonald Institute for Archaeological Research.
- 368 Garfield, R. (1999). *Morbidity and mortality among Iraqi children from 1990 through 1998:*  
369 *Assessing the impact of the Gulf War and economic sanctions*. Notre Dame, IN: Kroc Institute  
370 for International Peace Studies.
- 371 Gilgan, E. (2001). Looting and the market for Maya objects: A Belizean perspective. In N. Brodie,  
372 J. Doole, & C. Renfrew (Eds.), *Trade in illicit antiquities: The destruction of the world's archae-*  
373 *ological heritage* (pp. 73–87). Cambridge, England: Macdonald Institute for Archaeological  
374 Research.
- 375 Hammer, J. (2009, November). Looting Mali's history. *Smithsonian Magazine*. Retrieved from  
376 <http://www.smithsonianmag.com/people-places/Looting-Mali.html>
- 377 Harding, A. (2012, March 26). Niger's complicated hunger crisis. *BBC News*. Retrieved from  
378 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17506421>
- 379 Hardy, S. (2003, June 21–26). Proposition 15: WAC resolution submission on “looting.” *Proposition*  
380 *submitted to the Fifth World Archaeological Congress (WAC5), Washington, DC, USA*.
- 381 Hardy, S. (2004). *Is there a human right to loot?* MA Thesis, University College London, London.
- 382 Hooper, J. (2011, July 10). Arm museum guards to prevent looting, says professor. *The Guardian*.  
383 Retrieved from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/culture/2011/jul/10/arm-museum-guards-looting-war>
- 384 IARC (Illicit Antiquities Research Centre). (2001). Why loot? *Illicit Antiquities Research Centre*.  
385 Retrieved from <http://www.mcdonald.cam.ac.uk/projects/iarc/illicit-antiquities/whyloot.htm>
- 386 ICOM (International Council of Museums). (2000). *Red list: The looting of African archaeological*  
387 *objects*. Paris: ICOM.
- 388 IfA (Institute for Archaeologists). (2012). *Code of conduct*. Retrieved from [http://www.archae-](http://www.archaeologists.net/sites/default/files/node-files/Code-of-conduct-Nov-2012.pdf)  
389 [ologists.net/sites/default/files/node-files/Code-of-conduct-Nov-2012.pdf](http://www.archaeologists.net/sites/default/files/node-files/Code-of-conduct-Nov-2012.pdf)
- 390 Insoll, T. (1993). Looting the antiquities of Mali: The story continues at Gao. *Antiquity*, 67(256),  
391 628–632.
- 392 La Piscopia, P. (2011, July 15). What about a cultural heritage police? *Culture Conflict Cooperation*  
393 [weblog]. Retrieved from [http://www.cultureconflictcooperation.com/1/post/2011/07/what-](http://www.cultureconflictcooperation.com/1/post/2011/07/what-about-a-cultural-heritage-police.html)  
394 [about-a-cultural-heritage-police.html](http://www.cultureconflictcooperation.com/1/post/2011/07/what-about-a-cultural-heritage-police.html)
- 395 Labi, A., & Robinson, S., (2001, August 6). Looting Africa: Theft, illicit sales, poverty and war are  
396 conspiring to rob a continent of its rich artistic heritage. *Time*. Retrieved from [http://www.time.](http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2056125,00.html)  
397 [com/time/world/article/0,8599,2056125,00.html](http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2056125,00.html)
- 398 Lovell, J. (2003, July 9). Museum looters should be shot, says archaeologist. *MSNBC News*. Retrieved  
399 from <http://famulus.msnbc.com/FamulusIntl/reuters07-09-050442.asp?reg=MIDEAST>
- 400 MacLeod, D. (2003, July 8). US archaeologist calls of armed clampdown on Iraqi looters.  
401 *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,994032,00.html>
- 402 Melillo, G. (2009). Involvement of organised crime in art and antiquities: Some remarks from the  
403 Italian perspective. In S. Manacorda (Ed.), *Organized crime in art and antiquities: Selected*  
404 *papers and contributions from the international conference on organised crime in art and*  
405 *antiquities, Courmayeur Mont Blanc, Italy, 12th-14th December 2008* (pp. 90–93). Milan,  
406 Italy: United Nations.

- Nash, N. (1993, August 25). Poor Peru stands by as its rich past is plundered. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from [www.nytimes.com/1993/08/25/world/poor-peru-stands-by-as-its-rich-past-is-plundered.html](http://www.nytimes.com/1993/08/25/world/poor-peru-stands-by-as-its-rich-past-is-plundered.html)
- Nistri, G. (2011). The Carabinieri headquarters for the protection of cultural heritage. In S. Manacorda & D. Chappell (Eds.), *Crime in the art and antiquities world: Illegal trafficking in cultural property* (pp. 183–192). London: Springer.
- ~~Özgen, E. (2001). Some remarks on the destruction of Turkey's archaeological heritage. In N. Brodie, J. Doole, & C. Renfrew (Eds.), *Trade in illicit antiquities: The destruction of the world's archaeological heritage* (pp. 119–120). Cambridge, England: Macdonald Institute for Archaeological Research.~~
- Politis, K. (1994). Biblical Zoar: The looting of an ancient site. *Minerva*, 5(6), 12–15.
- Prott, L., & Bessières, M. (2001). The cost of looting: “Indiana Jones has no future.”. *UNESCO Courier*, 54(4), 18–21.
- Rieff, D. (2003, July 27). Were sanctions right? *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/27/magazine/27SANCTIONS.html>
- Robinson, S., & Labi, A. (2001, June 18). Endangered art. *Time*. Retrieved from <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,130100,00.html>
- Rothfield, L. (2009). *The rape of Mesopotamia: Behind the looting of the Iraq Museum*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Rothfield, L. (2011a, March 7). We're going to need more guns. *The Punching Bag* [weblog]. Retrieved from <http://larryrothfield.blogspot.co.uk/2011/03/were-going-to-need-more-guns.html>
- Rothfield, L. (2011b, July 13). Death to looters! Comment. *Cultural Property Observer* [weblog]. Retrieved from <http://culturalpropertyobserver.blogspot.com/2011/07/death-to-looters.html?scomment=1310605878419#c4192842744862319549>
- Russell, J. (1996, December 30). Stolen stones: The modern sack of Nineveh. *Archaeology*. Retrieved from <http://www.archaeology.org/online/features/nineveh/>
- Salman, D. (2008). Looters destroying ancient treasures. *Iraq Crisis Report*, Number 265. Retrieved from <http://iwpr.net/report-news/looters-destroying-ancient-treasures>
- Sanogo, K. (1999). The looting of cultural material in Mali. *Culture Without Context*, Number 4. Retrieved from <http://www.mcdonald.cam.ac.uk/projects/iarc/culturewithoutcontext/issue4/sanogo.htm>
- Scotsman. (2002, October 13). Archaeology is new target for Ukraine's mafia gangs. *The Scotsman*. Retrieved from <http://www.scotsman.com/news/international/archaeology-is-new-target-for-ukraine-s-mafia-gangs-1-1377655>
- Shyllon, F. (2011). Looting and illicit traffic in antiquities in Africa. In S. Manacorda & D. Chappell (Eds.), *Crime in the art and antiquities world: Illegal trafficking in cultural property* (pp. 135–142). London: Springer.
- Sidibé, S. (2001). Mali: When farmers become curators. *UNESCO Courier*, 54(4), 26–27. Retrieved from <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001222/122266e.pdf>.
- Time Asia. (2003, October 13). Spirited away. *Time Asia*. Retrieved from <http://www.time.com/time/asia/covers/501031020/story.html>
- Togola, T. (2002). The rape of Mali's only resource. In N. Brodie & K. Tubb (Eds.), *Illicit antiquities: The theft of culture and the extinction of archaeology* (pp. 250–256). London: Routledge.
- UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). (2011). International Human Development Indicators: Mali. *United Nations Development Programme*. Retrieved from <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/MLI.html>
- United Nations. (1948). *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*. Geneva: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner of Human Rights. Retrieved from <http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htm>
- WAC (World Archaeological Congress). (1990). First code of ethics. *World Archaeological Congress*. Retrieved from [www.worldarchaeologicalcongress.org/site/about\\_ethi.php](http://www.worldarchaeologicalcongress.org/site/about_ethi.php)

- 460 WAC (World Archaeological Congress). (2003, July 16). World Archaeological Congress condemns  
461 calls to shoot looters. *Iraq Crisis*. Retrieved from [http://www.worldarchaeologicalcongress.  
462 org/site/news/Iraq\\_media\\_release\\_July\\_2003.pdf](http://www.worldarchaeologicalcongress.org/site/news/Iraq_media_release_July_2003.pdf)
- 463 Wilford, J. (1994, July 29). Lost civilization yields its riches as thieves fall out. *The New York  
464 Times*. Retrieved from [www.nytimes.com/1994/07/29/arts/lost-civilization-yields-its-riches-  
465 as-thieves-fall-out.html](http://www.nytimes.com/1994/07/29/arts/lost-civilization-yields-its-riches-as-thieves-fall-out.html)
- 466 Yahya, A. (2010). Looting and “salvaging” the heritage of Palestine. *Present Pasts*, 2(1), 96–100.

Uncorrected Proof

# Author Queries

Chapter No.: 14      0002188712

Queries	Details Required	Author's Response
AU1	"Kennedy 2003" is cited in text but not given in the reference list. Please provide details in the list or delete the citation from the text.	
AU2	Please provide the in-text citation for references "Alva (2001); Özgen (2001)".	

Uncorrected Proof