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Interrogating Archaeological Ethics in Conflict Zones: Cultural Heritage Work in Cyprus.

[N.B.: slim, black-and-white print copy]

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Law Studies at the University of Sussex

By Samuel Andrew Hardy, BA MA MSc

2010
Declaration of authorship

I, Samuel Andrew Hardy, hereby declare that:

This thesis and the work presented in it are my own and have been generated by me as a result of my own original research.

I confirm that:

This thesis has not been and will not be submitted, in whole or in part, to another university for the award of any other degree.

No material has been or will be submitted as part of required coursework at this or any other university.

No material has resulted from collaboration with others, except as specified in the acknowledgements and text.

Where I have consulted the published work of others, this has always been clearly attributed.

Where I have quoted from the work of others, the source has always been clearly given.

I have acknowledged all main sources of help.

The thesis does not exceed the permitted 80,000-word limit.

Parts of this work have been published as:


Signed: SHardy

Date: 30th September 2010
Abstract

Much affected by viewing the Yugoslav Wars' ruins, I resolved to study archaeology in conflict. I wanted to explore archaeology's role in conflict and archaeologists' responsibilities in conflict zones; but unable to conduct such work in Kosova/Kosovo, I went to Cyprus. Drawing together professional documentation and public education, professional and community interactions and interviews, and cultural heritage site visits, I researched the destruction of community places, the looting of cultural heritage, and the coping strategies of archaeologists. The key questions of this thesis are: is it legal and ethical to conduct archaeological work in occupied and secessionist territories? How is public knowledge of cultural heritage looting and destruction constructed? What are cultural heritage professionals' responsibilities for knowledge production during conflict? How ought cultural heritage professionals to combat the looting and illicit trading of antiquities?

I have addressed these questions by concentrating upon cultural heritage workers' narratives of looting and destruction from 1955 until the present in professional discussion and mass education. First, I argue that archaeologists have misinterpreted international law, and through boycotting and blacklisting of rescue archaeology in northern Cyprus, harmed both the profession and the cultural heritage. Second, I argue that cultural heritage workers have been unwillingly co-opted, or actively complicit in the conflict, in the production of nationalist histories, and thus nationalist communities, therefore in the reproduction of nationalist conflict. Third, I argue that cultural heritage workers have knowingly contributed to the conflict and its destruction, through their nationalist policies on the paramilitary-dominated illicit antiquities trade. My conclusions are: that an ethical antiquities policy would cut funding to and thereby reduce conflict-fuelling extremist activity; and that, where they have the freedom to practice it, professional and ethical archaeologies of destruction would promote intracommunal and intercommunal peace.
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0.g. Acknowledgements

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I also want to thank Diana Constantinides, Tom Davis, Vathoulla Moustoukki and my fellow residents at the Cyprus American Archaeological Research Institute (CAARI) in Nicosia; the German Archaeological Institute (DAI) in Athens and Istanbul; friends, colleagues and informants who read chapter drafts and conference papers; readers of and commentators on my research blog, *Cultural Heritage in Conflict*, King’s College London (KCL) Modern Foreign Language Centre and the University of Cyprus (UCY) Department of Byzantine and Modern Greek for their Greek language lessons; the International Center of Hellenic Education – Culture and Vocational Training “Stavros Niarchos” (DIKEPPEE), for their programme of Studies in Greece of the Modern Greek Language and Culture, and the Greek State Scholarship Foundation (IKY) who funded my attendance there; the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) Language Centre in London and the University of Ankara Turkish Teaching Centre (TÖMER) in Taksim, Istanbul for their Turkish language lessons (and Cemal Bey for his tea); and Manchester Language Schools, who let me have a week off work to schlepp back to Britain for my viva.

I cannot acknowledge them as they deserve, but I could not have done my research without my informants. Equally, I could not have borne my fieldwork without my Cypriot father in Nicosia, my factory friends on the road, my Kurdish friends in Famagusta; or frappe and backgammon. I am grateful to those who came on the road with me even if we no longer meet, to those who helped me even though we never met, and to Ali Hüseyinolu for his very-last-minute refinement of the translation of the graffiti in figure 6.

Finally, I would like apologise to everyone en route for my flying visits, particularly the independent traders in New Belgrade, and to thank 46 Salisbury Road; the archaeologists for not excommunicating me for my cultural heritage tendencies; my parea in Brighton, Istanbul and in-between, despite not believing me when I told them where I was; and ta paidia in Giannena, for not bugging out when my eyes did.

Especially thanks must go to Lorenzo, for enduring the dearth of silence and serenity as my computer whirred and whined twenty-four hours a day and I banged my gulliver against a brick wall twenty (and my Kypriaki profora, which is now fairly Elliniki); Irem, for coping with my sometimes unexpected and always chaotic appearances in the City (and my Azeri aksani, which is now distinctly Iranli); Tim, for the enthusiasm-fuelling dinners; and Yiannis Bey, hoca, sanity-saving polyglot voice of reason and karabouzouklis.

---

1 Deutsches Archäologisches Institut.
2 Τμήμα Βυζαντινών και Νεοελληνικών Σπουδών.
3 Διεθνές Κέντρο Ελληνικής Παιδείας – Παράδοση και Επαγγελματική Εκπαίδευση "Σταύρος Νιάρχος" (ΔΙΚΕΠΠΕΕ).
4 Spoudes stin Ellada sto Antikeimeno tis Neas Ellinikis Glossas kai Politismou (Σπουδές στην Ελλάδα στο Αντικείμενο της Νέας Ελληνικής Γλώσσας και Πολιτισμού).
5 Ίδρυμα Κρατικών Υποτροφιών (ΙΚΥ).
6 Türkçe Öğretim Merkezi.
7 Manchester Dil Okulları.
0.h. Transliteration and pronunciation

While I learned some idiomatic Cypriot words and phrases – for example Greek Cypriot “kkelledjis” (in Greek Greek, “kserokéfalos”; in English, “(a) bloody-minded (person)”), and Turkish Cypriot “naipan?” (in Turkish Turkish, “ne yapıyorsun?”; in English, “what are you doing?” or “how are you?”) – diglossic Cypriots tended to speak to me not in their Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot mother tongue, but in their Greek or Turkish mother *land* tongue.

So, I only really heard idiomatic Cypriot accents – like Greek Cypriot “shérka” (in Greek Greek, “chéria”; in English, “hands”) – and sentence structures – like Turkish Cypriot “(onu) düşünüm” (in Turkish Turkish, “(onu) düşünürüm” (rather than the more common Turkish Turkish “(onu) düşünüyorum”); in English, “I think (that)” (rather than “I am thinking (that)’)). Thus, I will only explain my and my informants’ pronunciations of words, and my transliterations of conversations.

My transliterations are not entirely consistent. For example, as the standard Anglicised acronym for the Greek Cypriot Police’s Drugs Combating Service is YKAN, from Υπηρεσία Καταπολέμησης Ναρκωτικών8, I would reproduce its standard Anglicisation as Ypiresia, rather than produce a phonetic transliteration as Ipiresia. Nonetheless, I have tabulated common transliterations and their pronunciations.

---

8 Υπηρεσία Καταπολέμησης Ναρκωτικών.
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<td>a</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Β/β</td>
<td>v</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Γ/γ</td>
<td>g</td>
<td>throaty “g”</td>
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<td>Δ/δ</td>
<td>d</td>
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<td>i</td>
<td>like “i” in “ski”</td>
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### 0.h.i.1. Greek-English letter combinations

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<td>ai like “ai” in “laid”</td>
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<tr>
<td>ΕΙ/ει</td>
<td>ei like “ei” in “receive”</td>
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<td>ΕΥ/ευ</td>
<td>ef/ev like “ef” in “deft”, or “ev” in “ever”</td>
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### 0.h.i.2. Cypriot Greek-English letter combinations

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### Turkish-English letters

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0.1. Intellectual autobiography

Conducting ethnographic research, Northern Irish anthropologist Andrew Finlay (2001: 65) identified himself as a ‘non-sectarian, secular socialist’, and behaved as if others recognised that; but others categorised him as ‘a Protestant’, and altered their behaviour and information. Thus, Finlay (2001: 71) encouraged ‘intellectual autobiography’, to enable readers to compensate for researchers’ and research participants’ identities’ and experiences’ influences upon their practices and interactions. Here, I will briefly present my own intellectual autobiography.

I grew up in a non-religious, white-collar English family. I studied BA Archaeology and Prehistory at the University of Sheffield (2000-2003), where I first engaged with archaeological theory and ethics, and wrote my dissertation on Objective Morality in Archaeological Interpretation: Confronting Injustice in Education.

Excavating in a Greek village in the summers, I visited Balkan cultural heritage sites and was greatly affected when I found a Bosnian War ruin in Sarajevo graffitied, ‘write about us: stop [an]other genocide’. Then, I did MA Cultural Heritage Studies at University College London (UCL), during which I further studied cultural heritage destruction and ethics, and peace education at historic sites, such as the Anti-War Museum9 in Berlin. However, in the shadow of the Iraq War and poor Iraqis’ antiquities looting, my dissertation asked, is there a Human Right to Loot?

I won an ESRC 1+3 MSc/DPhil research studentship, writing up the (2004-2005) MSc research proposal on Placing Cultural Rights: Resolving Conflicts over Cultural Heritage – Querying Cultures’ Rights and Archaeologists’ Responsibilities at the University of Sussex, planning to develop a human rights methodology for archaeology in conflict zones.

After a disheartening feasibility study for research in Kosova/Kosovo, I decided to conduct my fieldwork in Cyprus. During and after Greek language training at the University of Cyprus, I explored the ethics and legality of archaeological excavation in occupied and secessionist territories; but there were problems with access and trust, so I sought an alternative project. Fearing that studying Turkish at a Turkish Cypriot institution would cause me to be blacklisted for supposed recognition of the Turkish Cypriot administration, I attended the University of Ankara’s language school (TÖMER) in Turkey instead. While there, I read up on destruction of cultural heritage in Turkey, and visited places destroyed in historic and recent conflicts, or at risk of destruction through development. There, though, my camera and my governorship10 and gendarmerie11-approved research permit were confiscated by a paramilitary intelligence unit (JİTEM)12 and, after repeated questionings and searches, and straightforward intimidation and instruction, I was compelled to leave south-eastern Turkey. I returned to Cyprus.

Partly because I was committed to making my original project work, and partly because I did not want to reproduce propaganda, or to produce a literature analysis of it, I had avoided researching the destruction of cultural heritage in Cyprus; but my interest newly piqued by the history of destruction in Turkey, I began studying it in Cyprus. Then, finally, when some cultural heritage workers transparently lied to me about the destruction of cultural heritage, and some other cultural heritage workers ignorantly dismissed or denied my claims of that destruction, I found a viable research subject.

My DPhil became a matter of Interrogating Archaeological Ethics in Conflict Zones: Cultural Heritage Work in Cyprus. I not only verified and falsified cultural heritage destruction claims, but I also studied official and unofficial treatments of cultural heritage, the construction of archaeological knowledge and the production of public memory, for example in Representations of a Suppressed UNESCO Report in Histories of Cultural Heritage Destruction (Hardy, 2009c).

9 Anti-Kriegs-Museum.
10 Vâlilik.
11 Jandarma.
12 Jandarma İstihbarat ve Terörle Mücadele (Gendarmerie Intelligence and Anti-Terror).
I had not wanted to repeat or synthesise existing knowledge of the looting of Cyprus; but both intentionally and accidentally, I found and pieced together entirely new and otherwise neglected fragments of information about the intertwined nature of the destruction and looting of Cypriot cultural heritage. I perceived significant flaws in the professional and public understanding of the illicit antiquities trade, and consequently in archaeologists’ evaluations of their professional ethics. I gathered information on, for instance, *Treatment of Cultural Heritage in Cyprus, 1963-1974* (Hardy, 2008b; see also Hardy, forthcoming)\(^{13}\).

While studying destruction material for my thesis, looting research continued to affect my work, as when I discussed *Cypriot Antiquities Rescue from the Turkish Deep State* at the World Archaeological Congress’s International Conference on Archaeology in Conflict (Hardy, 2010). Turkish Cypriot nationalists took advantage of the opportunity to slander and libel me, and to try to trigger a nationalist campaign against me (e.g. Anonymous, 2010; A. Atun, 2010). The TRNC’s (at least at one time) honorary representative who misrepresented my research at the conference, Küfi Seydali (2010), later publicly warned me that, ‘[o]f course, you may continue to deliver your polit[ical]-thriller but you will never be quite sure that I will not be listening to you’.

The anonymous post included long, close paraphrasings of Seydali’s conference comments; and it was in the Turkish Forum, where Seydali is a member of its Senior Advisory Board Committee, and the chairman of its Advisory Board Committee on Issues of Turkish Cyprus and Western Thrace. At the same time, the forum post referred to Seydali in the third person; and there are many word-for-word transliterations of Anonymous’s English in the internet forum one day into Ata Atun’s Turkish in the (Cypriot and international) newspapers the next day. So, it is probable either that Seydali was Anonymous and the forum post was “astroturfing” (fake grassroots campaigning); or that Atun was Anonymous and the forum post was the first draft of his newspaper column, though its anonymous authorship still suggests astroturfing. (If Anonymous were a third person and had sent his forum post to Atun for him to use it, that would still mean that Atun had used it without attribution or acknowledgement.)

In the conference paper, I repeated the victim’s family’s claims that Greek Cypriot undercover antiquities police agent Stephanos Stephanou had been ‘beaten heavily and interrogated’ in Turkish Cypriot police custody (Katerina Liasis, cited by Brennan, 2008), and concluded that Stephanou had been ‘murder[ed]’ by the ‘Turkish deep state’, which ‘operate[d] outside and beyond Turkish state control’ (Hardy, 2010). Anonymous/Atun perverted my words and alleged that I had said that Stephanou was ‘tortured to death by Turkish Cypriot police’ (Anonymous, 2010), ‘polis tarafından… ölene dek işkence yapılmasını’ (A. Atun, 2010). Subsequently, during the abortive media campaign in Turkish Cypriot, Turkish, German Turkish and British Turkish Cypriot newspapers (and online), one Turkish Cypriot nationalist warned me that he planned ‘to inform our Criminal Department of the TRNC Police HQ to interrogate you upon your arrival to North Cyprus’. Naturally, that made me wary to return, either to meet personal contacts or to access published sources for this work, or to conduct further research in the future. Yet that is just one example of the circumstances in which, and the reasons for which, I did this research. Now, it is necessary to explain in detail the background, context, subject and aim of this work.

\(^{13}\) This conference paper is to be published as *Destruction, Theft and Rescue of Archaeological Artefacts in Cyprus, 1963-1974* (Hardy, forthcoming).
1. Theoretical framework

In this thesis, I explore: the politics and ethics of archaeological work in conflict zones, from boycotting and blacklisting to excavation, research and education; and the practice of managing and combating the illicit antiquities trade. The very act of doing the research generated material and understanding: I ran the risk of the black list, and endured state, para-state and (un)professional interference in professional work; I made difficult ethical decisions (and, in some cases, made concessions). Thus, my methodology and practice were not unrealistic, ideal models for others; they were my own informed and continually reformed approaches to subjects, interactions with sources, and presentations of findings. My experiences and actions not only produced new information, and corrected or refined existing knowledge of Cypriot cultural heritage destruction, but also produced, and became, evidence of how to do (or, how not to do) cultural heritage work in conflict zones. This information may help archaeologists who will work with divided communities, in occupied and secessionist territories, or with individuals or institutions that frequently or widely violate human rights. By identifying best practice – and worst – in cultural property protection, I hope to support professionalism in archaeological work in conflict zones. By showing the social and educational roles of negative cultural heritage, both in triggering conflict and in maintaining or restoring peace and coexistence, I hope to encourage and support ethical cultural heritage treatment, and non-forensic human rights archaeology. By examining archaeologists' and antiquities police's efforts to minimise looting and its impact upon scholarship, I hope to improve the effectiveness of those efforts, in order to enhance protection of communities' cultural heritage, and thereby the means with which they understand their past and negotiate their future.

1.a. Interrogating archaeological ethics

Until relatively recently, archaeologists had largely concentrated on political issues and when they had considered ethical issues (the standards, codes, or norms of moral action (Resnik, 1998: 14)), they had concentrated on relationships between archaeologists and Indigenous peoples and between archaeologists and antiquities collectors (Meskell and Pels, 2005: 1; Pluciennik, 2001b: 2-3). Yet, there had long been discussions of professionalism (e.g. Dixon, 1913: 563-564; cf. Wylie, 2002: 28-29), political (mis)interpretation (e.g. Childe, 1933), and the relationship between archaeology and the state (e.g. Jacquetta Hawkes and Grahame Clark in the Conference on the Future of Archaeology, 1943: 64; 70, cited in Evans, 1995: 315), without explicit categorisation of the debates as ones of professional ethics or social responsibility; these disprove declarations that archaeologists had not long considered themselves a public community with public responsibilities (e.g. Knudson, 1984: 251). Since then, there have also been more recent, explicit contemplations of professional behaviour as an ethical activity (e.g. Green, 1984; Vitelli, 1996).

Now, archaeologists, anthropologists, philosophers and others do not only examine relations between cultural heritage workers and communities, and assess the ownership and stewardship of archaeological materials. They also explore gender, intellectual property rights, bioethics, the merits of utilitarian, duty and virtue ethics, and the role of archaeology in war and discord. They weigh professionalist against advocatory archaeological practices, and the responsibility to produce knowledge for society against the responsibility to include communities in the production of that knowledge. (For examples of all of these archaeological ethics, see Pluciennik, 2001a; Scarre and Scarre, 2006; Vitelli and Colwell-Chanthaphonh, 2006; Zimmerman, Vitelli and Hollowell, 2003.)

Yet still, archaeologist Yannis Hamilakis (1999: 62) has complained that 'the politics of archaeological activity itself' – particularly the practice of archaeological work (as opposed to the interpretation of archaeological material) – 'is a topic rarely discussed systematically'. Moreover, despite the expanding literature, and the 'evolving archaeological ethic' (Wylie, 2003: 9), archaeology has variously been placed in a time of crisis (Pollock, 2003), in which the political and ethical choices it makes will be critical to its role in society, or it has been seen to be experiencing its own ethical crisis, over how to combat the illicit antiquities trade (Renfrew, 2000), how to produce and represent
archaeological knowledge (Webmoor, 2007), or how to decide towards what and whom it has responsibilities (Hamilakis, 2003).

Certainly, the discipline of archaeology is currently navigating a course – or, rather, courses – that will set its direction(s) through crucial political and ethical terrains. This may be particularly important, because archaeology is one of the ‘moral sciences’ that enable us to understand what humans do and why (Carman, 2001c: 220). As such, it may be helpful briefly to review past archaeologists’ navigation of professional politics and ethics, in order to understand what they did and why, and which problems and options current archaeologists have.

1.a.i. Linguistic imperialism

These discussions are hindered by languages barriers in international archaeology; and consequently, choices are impaired. Most international archaeological conversations are made in a few “international languages” – first English, but also French and German. Even if neither the authors nor the areas discussed are from the English-, French- or German-speaking worlds, they have to speak in those languages to take part in those conversations. That limits the development of archaeology (Bernbeck, 2008; Hansen, 2008; Kristiansen, 2001), first in the “big three” linguistic research communities, because they cannot access information produced outside of them, then in the other linguistic research communities, because the information has not been translated for them to be able to access it.

Where there are multilingual publications, they may still be primarily written in English, French and German, which even dominate non-European archaeologies, like Egyptian archaeology (Hansen, 2008: 171), with a minority of papers by local archaeologists in their first language; yet, they may nonetheless offer an opportunity both for self-reflection within the powerful archaeological communities and for the marginalised to answer back to the dominant.

Now, there are even smaller archaeological communities’ counter-hegemonic presentations of their – non-Anglo-American – political and ethical debates (e.g. Karlsson, 2004a), not only in order to inform the international debates dominated by British and American archaeologists, but also as an ethical endeavour in and of itself, to dislocate that domination (Karlsson, 2004b: 17), even if they have to compromise and speak in the dominators’ language for both the influential and the marginalised to listen, or merely to be able to hear.

1.b. Archaeology as politics and morality

In the 1980s, postprocessual archaeologists Michael Shanks and Christopher Tilley insisted that ‘archaeology… is always a politics, a morality’ (1987a: 212) and sought ‘a place for the ethical, for values…. the subjective and political’ (1992: xviii). Yet archaeologists had always recognised or, at least, had always been able to recognise that their work was a political and a moral endeavour, even if many often denied it, either naively or deliberately.

For example, in 1905, because professional archaeologists identified Great Zimbabwe as Black African cultural heritage, and therefore identified the land as the inheritance of the Indigenous peoples, they ‘so angered local [Settler] whites’ that they couldn’t work there again for another twenty-four years (Trigger, 1984: 362). Strikingly, this was so even though the archaeologists were themselves racists and actually agreed with the white settlers – their argument was over the quality of the architecture (cf. M. Hall, 1995: 35-38; Trigger, 2006: 196-200): the white settlers thought the Bantu had a “prepubescent” intelligence too low to have built the great site (R. N. Hall, 1909: 13), while the professional archaeologists thought the Bantu had intelligence sufficiently low to have built the ‘infantile… pre-logical’ structures (Caton-Thompson, 1931: 103).

A couple of years after Gertrude Caton-Thompson made that assessment of the Zimbabwe culture and the Bantu community, in the year Adolf Hitler became chancellor of, then dictator over, Germany, Vere Gordon Childe (1933: 410) warned colleagues that, ‘[i]n the name of these [nationalist and racist archaeological] theories men [sic] are being exiled from public life and shut up in concentration camps, books are being burned and expression of opinions stifled’.
Supposedly, postprocessual archaeology was a reaction against anti-political, processual archaeology; and Shanks and Tilley (1992: 63; who defined themselves as postprocessualists) criticised Grahame Clark (whom they categorised as a processualist) for his implicit support for ‘social hierarchy and inequality’ and his ‘right-wing nostalgic longing for a pre-industrial order of cultured elite and contented commons’. Yet, during the Second World War, Clark had declared archaeologists’ responsibility ‘to bring to the common man [sic] everywhere a realization of his inheritance as a citizen of the world…. an overriding sense of human solidarity such as can come only from consciousness of common origins’ (Clark, 1943: 113, cited by Evans, 1995: 316). Shanks and Tilley (1992: 63) declared that his work had ‘nothing to do with critical reflection’; yet, again during the Second World War, Clark had (albeit understandably exaggeratedly) contemplated, ‘[w]e [British] are years behind [in method], but where has it led Germany, and where would it lead us?’ (Clark, 1943: 70, cited by Evans, 1995: 315).

So, in tracing the developing understanding of archaeological work as political and moral work, it is not possible to identify at what time archaeologists first became aware of their political and ethical responsibilities; rather, it is necessary to comprehend archaeologists’ continually developing awareness of their responsibilities, in order to understand the current crisis of responsibility.

In doing so, the discussion frequently comes from or goes to the English-language archaeological research communities of Britain, the United States, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, but this is not (solely) a reflection of linguistic imperialism; the discussion frequently began in or became central to those countries, because of the political and military imperialism and colonialism that they gave birth to or that gave birth to them; furthermore, with larger academic and commercial archaeological communities, they have louder voices in the discussion.

Britain having given birth to colonial settler societies, and the United States having been born as one, Britain and the United States both having continued to practice imperialism and to use archaeology to support those imperialisms, they have thus created problems to which their archaeologists have needed to find solutions.

1.b.i. Culture-historical archaeology

During the development of amateur antiquarianism into professional archaeology, between the middle of the Nineteenth Century and the middle of the Twentieth Century, there was common acceptance of the ‘general validity of a racist approach’ (Trigger, 2006: 35), despite the contrary stances of naturalists like Alfred Russell Wallace and Marxist archaeologists like Childe (Trigger, 2006: 170; 346-348).

In this culture-historical archaeology, archaeologists (including Childe) conceived of cultures as different, homogenous societies, distinguished by their social traditions, and they studied the expansion and contraction, the rise and fall of these societies (rather than internal cultural distinctions, political struggles, etc.).

1.b.ii. Processual archaeology

Appalled by nationalists’ appropriation of archaeology to legitimise totalitarian states, and to explain and justify their violence – exemplified by the Nazis (Arnold and Hassmann, 1995), but also practised by the Soviets (Shnirelman, 1995), the Maoists (Tong, 1995) and others – archaeologists rejected ethnocentric and nationalist interpretation (Trigger, 2006: 35; see also Evans, 1995: 312; Wailes and Zoll, 1995: 21).

Subsequently, processual archaeology developed in the Cold War-fighting United States of the 1960s and 1970s, in which socialist and feminist interpretations were suppressed because of fear of McCarthyist purges of “anti-Americans” (Pauketat and Loren, 2005: 11; see also Patterson, 1995: 104-105). It conceived of culture as adaptation to the environment, and environmental change as the primary cause of cultural change (Binford, 1962: 318; 1964: 439).

Since it intended to make archaeology scientific, processualist archaeology reduced being ethical to being scientific (Pluciennik, 2001b: 1). Processualists rejected any politicisation of archaeology –
or, rather, 'fully aware' of archaeology's political nature, they 'systematically denied' it anyway (Díaz-Andreu, 1995: 39) – and adopted supposedly value-free, scientific analyses of economic and ecological processes, the hidden values and unavoidable politics of which were exposed by postprocessualist archaeologists (Kohl and Fawcett, 1995b: 14-15).

1.b.iii. The archaeology of slavery, racism, repression and resistance

Pushed by the Civil Rights Movement, pulled by Charles Fairbanks' plantation archaeology – excavations of sites of slavery – and supported by the 1966 (U.S.) National Historic Preservation Act, African American archaeology began in the late 1960s, contradicting the dominant processual archaeology's anti-political position; but it was only recognised as a subdiscipline when consciously political, postprocessual archaeology emerged from Britain in the 1980s and 1990s (Ferguson, 1992: xxxv–xxxix).

As archaeology is inherently political, both in its practice and in the knowledge that it produces, there is no choice between political and apolitical archaeology; there is only a choice between which politics is practiced and produced. Every time we study and present material evidence of inequality (of race, class, gender, sexuality, etc.), we choose between two alternatives, as characterised by Terrence Epperson (1999: 103) in his research into sites of racist repression and resistance: ‘we can either continue to recreate and re-enact “race,” or we can join in the anti-racist struggle’. Kristna Jennbert (2004: 328) held the similar opinion that ethics was a matter of ‘dignity, fairness and responsibility’.

1.b.iv. Postprocessual archaeology

This political, postprocessual archaeology insisted that archaeological work was always already a political enterprise (Shanks and Tilley, 1987a: 212; see also Tilley, 1989: 105), because artefacts were not natural data, like fossils, but materials produced and manipulated by actors influenced by and actively negotiating their social, cultural, economic and political circumstances, and those artefacts were subsequently interpreted by archaeologists situated in their own circumstances (Shanks and Tilley, 1992: 107-111). So, the “archaeological record” was not a fossil record of ethnic groups’, ecological populations’ or economic classes’ struggles, but evidence of human social practice. For her part, philosopher Linda Patrik (1985: 55-56) proposed that archaeological evidence could be conceived of as both a “historical record” of expressions of individuals’ and groups’ thoughts and actions, and a “fossil record” of the systems within which they thought and acted – or indeed as no form of “record” at all.

In some forms, however, this political postprocessualism embodied an absolute relativism that conceived of all interpretations as equally true because none was true, because all archaeological interpretations were merely political negotiations. Bruce Trigger (1995: 263) complained that they aimed ‘to disempower political and intellectual elites by affirming the relativism... (... Shanks and Tilley, 1987a, 1987b...’), but that they freed the elites to manipulate the past and at the same time disabled their victims, who needed the truth to achieve equality and social justice; moreover, he pointed out that, regardless, ‘[i]t is absurd to maintain that there are no empirical limits to the manner in which archaeologists can responsibly interpret their data’ (Trigger, 1995: 265).

In a revised edition of one of the texts that Trigger had criticised, in the new preface and appendix responding to the criticisms, Michael Shanks and Chris Tilley (1992: 256) insisted that they believed that ‘the past is real,... not just our fiction’, and it is true that they had previously stated that ‘some pasts are inferior to others’ (1992: 245-246); but their criteria for choosing between those pasts appeared to be archaeologists’ ‘biases, slants, values, politics, projects and aspirations’ (1992: xviii), and they had accepted ‘multiple pasts produced actively in accordance with ethnic, cultural, social and political views, orientations, and beliefs’ (1992: 245).

Shanks and Tilley explicitly rejected ‘a correspondence theory of truth, i.e., the notion that propositions are either true or false by virtue of the state of the world’ (1992: 244), and imprisoned ‘knowledge and truth’ in ‘language games which play with and represent “reality”’ (1992: 261),
wherein “Reality” in quotation marks means “what is believed to be real” (Collin, 1997: 70 – original emphasis), rather than what is real.

While they appealed for it ‘not to be taken in a grossly literal reading’, they did state (and reiterate) that ‘we must choose between alternative pasts on political grounds’ (1992: 256 – emphasis added), or, in other words, that we cannot choose between alternative pasts on empirical grounds, that there were no empirical limits to archaeological interpretation after all, or at least that those empirical limits were minimal. Archaeologist David Anthony (1995: 88) warned that, ‘[i]f we abandon our [empirical] standards..., we abdicate any right to exclude explanations that promote bigotry’.

The coincidence of social, political and economic developments and communities’ intervention with the intellectual, political and personal interests of archaeologists (which were also in part products of those developments) led to more archaeologists considering the politics and ethics of their work explicitly.

1.b.v. Nationalist, colonialist and imperialist archaeologies

Archaeological theorist Bruce Trigger (1984) identified three major types of archaeology – nationalist, colonialist and imperialist – rooted in the situations in which the discipline grew in each place; the most common form is nationalist archaeology, conducted to build national unity and pride, to claim political and geographical sovereignty, or to undermine class conflict (Trigger, 1984: 356-360).

Colonialist archaeology is practiced by colonial settler communities to excuse control of colonised land, or subjugation or displacement of colonised people (Trigger, 1984: 360-363). Anti-colonialist and anti-capitalist archaeologies explore not only the systems of capitalism and colonialism, but also the existence of capitalist and colonial relations before the birth of those systems, making sense of simultaneous and separate processes of demographic, economic, cultural and political colonialism, historicising contemporary power relations (e.g. Lyons and Papadopoulos, 2002).

Imperialist archaeology is performed by internationally dominant states to naturalise their dominance (Trigger, 1984: 363-368). Contrary, disruptive, anti-imperialist archaeologies analyse modes of domination, exploitation and resistance, experiences of inequality and identity, and their transformation through social action (Miller, Rowlands and Tilley, 1989; see also Bond and Gilliam, 1994; McGuire and Paynter, 1991).

As part of these anti-imperialist archaeologies, Susan Kus (1995 [1989]: 153) proposed ‘an archaeology of bread and circuses’, ‘to understand... how and at what cost the state is willing and able to “buy” the consent of its members, and... if and when an official ideology of “social contract” and “social praxis” can be employed for the unofficial goals of protest and revolution’.

Indeed, to Trigger’s (1984) three alternative archaeologies, Neil Silberman added ‘an “archaeology of protest” that springs from forces that oppose the nation-state’ (1995: 261 – original emphasis), from the archaeology of slave resistance and rebellion (Singleton, 1985), to the archaeology of anti-nuclear, anti-Cold War activism (Schofield and Anderton, 2000), to the archaeology of anti-capitalist struggle and class war (Faulkner, 2005; Ludlow Collective, 2001).

1.b.vi. Academic freedom, human freedom

The eleventh Congress of the International Union of Prehistoric and Protohistoric Sciences (IUPPS) was due to be held in Southampton in England in 1986, but as the struggle against Apartheid in South Africa and Namibia intensified, trade unions, activists and archaeologists got involved to prevent the participation of South African and Namibian cultural heritage workers, in order not to appear as if they recognised the regime or accepted its practices.

The local council insisted upon a boycott of the Apartheid regimes and the local archaeologists agreed, but the IUPPS and other archaeological organisations, such as the Society for American Archaeology (SAA), denounced the boycott for denying academic freedom (Gero, 2000). As
American Archaeologists Against Apartheid pointed out, their colleagues’ objections to the boycott were illogical, because Apartheid denied academic freedom both within and outside South Africa and Namibia (Patterson and Kohl, 1986: 319). The local archaeologists proceeded to hold the first World Archaeological Congress (WAC).

Conference organiser Peter Ucko (1987: 5) insisted that ‘to discuss the issue of academic free speech [was] almost an obscenity in the context of South Africa, where the majority of the population lack[ed] far more fundamental freedoms than that of discussion’. This was an argument for a political, ethical archaeology grounded in human rights, with an understanding that human rights frequently conflicted, but that they could not be considered equal and relativised, that there was a hierarchy of human rights, determined from human need, and that some civil, political, economic, social and cultural freedoms were more fundamental than others.

While it was still often referred to as “politics”, the actual substance of the debate was manifestly ethics, ‘the weight given to… academic freedom vis-à-vis other human rights’, ‘the principle of human rights in an institutionally racist society versus the principle of academic free speech’ (Ucko, 1987: 224; 226), ‘the social responsibility of the profession’ (Neal Ascherson, cited by Ucko, 1987: 239). While which politics and which ethics archaeologists practiced was and is still strongly contested, that they promoted a politic and an ethic could no longer be denied. Therefore, now, it may be helpful to study responses to ethical dilemmas in archaeologies of nationalism, violence and destruction.

1.c. Politics and ethics of archaeology

1.c.i. Nationalism

One of the most productive fields of enquiry has been the relationship between archaeology and nationalism (cf. Atkinson, Banks and O’Sullivan, 1996; Díaz-Andreu and Champion, 1996; Kohl and Fawcett, 1995a; Meskell, 1998), which has been consolidated by archaeologies of ethnicity (e.g. Jones, 1997), cultural identity (e.g. Graves-Brown, Jones and Gamble, 1996), and “difference” and social exclusion (e.g. Hubert, 2000).

Although archaeologists diverge over whether nationalist archaeology can ever be acceptable, ‘ethnically inspired archaeology’ for multiculturalist movements and anti-colonial struggles (Kohl and Fawcett, 1995b: 5; see also Trigger, 1995: 277; Wailes and Zoll, 1995: 22), or whether nationalism is always ‘offensive…, linked to the instinct of aggression’ (Fleury-Ilett, 1996: 201), they have converged on the need to challenge exclusive, supremacist misinterpretation.

After archaeologists’ confrontation with Apartheid, the Soviet Union dissolved and its Balkan and Caucasian successor states descended into conflict or collapse: archaeologists saw that nationalist interpretations of archaeology excused and encouraged ethnic cleansing (Kohl and Tsetskhladze, 1995: 169), and ‘[m]emories, real and imagined, sustain[ed] the civil conflict… as much as any weapon’ (Kaiser, 1995: 99).

Aware that nationalist archaeological interpretation fuels the fires of conflict and war (Kaiser, 1995: 99; Kohl and Fawcett, 1995b: 11; Silberman, 1995: 249; 256), and that nationalist archaeologists are even driving some of the conflicts (Chernykh, 1995: 143), anti-nationalist archaeologists challenge both the ‘nationalist crazies’, the ‘little fascists’ whose myths encourage conflict (Chernykh, 1995: 147; see also Kohl and Fawcett, 1995b: 4), and the relativists whose rejection of standards facilitates it (Anthony, 1995: 85; Chernykh, 1995: 148; Kohl and Tsetskhladze, 1995: 169). They insist that there are both empirical standards for evidence (Kohl and Fawcett, 1995b: 5; Silberman, 1995: 251; Trigger, 1995: 265), and ethical ‘minimum universal standard[s]’ for interpretation (Kohl and Fawcett, 1995b: 8 – original emphasis); and that archaeologists bear a moral duty to implement both (Anthony, 1995: 93; Silberman, 1995: 251; Trigger, 1995: 279).

Historian Eric Hobsbawm considered that it was nationalist thought and action that imagined the nation and established the state (1992a: 10), and that ‘historians are to nationalism what poppy-growers in Pakistan are to heroin-addicts’ (1992b: 3), but archaeologists Philip Kohl and Clare Fawcett (1995b: 13) felt that, sometimes, historians and archaeologists more closely resembled ‘the
pushers of these mind-bending substances on urban streets, if not the mob capos running all stages of the sordid operation’.

Archaeologists found their professional, political and moral obligations united in responsible archaeology (Anthony, 1995: 93; Kohl and Fawcett, 1995b: 18; Silberman, 1995: 251; Trigger, 1995: 278): because nationalist archaeology misunderstood the nature of the archaeological record (Trigger, 1995: 273), archaeologists who fulfilled their professional responsibility by disproving nationalist myths also fulfilled their political and moral responsibility by invalidating the justification for nationalist violence.

Coinciding with at least some parts of Indigenous archaeology (cf. Zimmerman, 1997: 93), anti-nationalist archaeology judged that it could be both professional and ethical, by documenting even politically inconvenient archaeological evidence, which could be misused to begin or prolong the persecution of a disadvantaged community, but simultaneously challenging any misuses made (Trigger, 1995: 278).

Although archaeologist Jean-Paul Demoule (2002: 18) observed that some archaeologists played ‘a very active, and sinister, political role’ in Nazi Germany, anthropologist Bettina Arnold and museum worker Henning Hassmann (1995: 73) noted that many ‘were unwilling or unable to do anything’. Some archaeologists have cautioned that these matters should remain matters of personal choice (Lilios, 1995: 68; Price, 2004: 54) and the complexities of individuals’ positions and the public invisibility of some of the private pressures they endure affirm that caution.

At the same time, however, not all archaeologists are equally limited or pressured; some operate relatively freely and independently; and these differences within the profession can be productive. Some of my information and support came from unfree archaeologists, who told me things I could not have learned myself in my peripheral position, and who said things through me that they could not have said themselves (while keeping their central position).

1.c.ii. Conflict archaeology, forensic archaeology

Helle Vandkilde (2003: 128; 136) felt that archaeologists had either ignored or idealised violence until the wars of the 1990s made it impossible to do either, whereupon it quickly became a subdiscipline in its own right. This led to increased work in twentieth-century conflict archaeology (e.g. Schofield, Johnson and Beck, 2002; Schofield and Cocroft, 2007), including a study of the United Nations Buffer Zone in Cyprus as primarily cultural heritage of the Cold War (Kyriakides, 2007), rather than as equally or primarily cultural heritage of the intercommunal conflict.

While a distinct subdiscipline of archaeology (beyond the scope of this thesis), what could be categorised as a form of twentieth-century conflict archaeology is the forensic archaeological excavation of mass graves, human rights archaeologies of “institutionalised” human rights abuses (Ferllini, 2007). Forensic human rights archaeology actually began a decade before archaeologies of violence, in investigations into human rights abuses committed during the 1976-1983 Dirty War in Argentina (Juhl, 2005: 24), but it too became established after the wars of the 1990s, when the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia (hereafter, ICTR and ICTY) employed Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) to excavate mass graves in Rwanda, Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina (Hunter and Cox, 2005: 160). It is now so distinct and so established that it has become the subject of anthropological enquiry, in “archaeographies” of forensic archaeology (e.g. Crossland, 2002).

The bicomunal Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus (CMP) is supported by the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team (EAAF) that first dug at the human rights mass graves investigations in Argentina, but the excavations in Cyprus are humanitarian exhumations to find out what happened to those who went missing during the conflict (CMP, 2010: 1) and to return the dead to their families for burial, rather than forensic excavations to identify crimes and their perpetrators.

15 Equipo Argentino de Antropología Forense.
While forensic archaeology involves unique and incredibly complex considerations of ethics and negotiations of politics, relevant to this discussion of the responsibilities of archaeologists in conflict zones is the point that forensic archaeological evidence makes it ‘impossible... to claim that these recent holocausts never existed’ (Saunders, 2002: 113).

Without ignoring or downplaying the political and ethical minefield within which forensic human rights archaeology operates, forensic archaeologists’ humanitarian focus on the recovery of lost bodies, and/or their legal focus on the search for evidence of crimes, somewhat protects their work (if not their results) from political abuse. Nonetheless, ultimately, forensic archaeology’s standards are achieved and upheld because of forensic archaeologists’ principles, their personal rejection of and their institutional independence from political influence.

The value of forensic archaeology in disproving denials of ethnic cleansing could be extended to conflict archaeology more generally. It is telling that, despite the practice of twentieth-century conflict archaeology and mass grave exhumations in Cyprus, and archaeologies of the medieval abandoned villages (e.g. Grivaud, 1998), there has been no archaeological investigation of the modern “abandoned” villages, the villages from which Cypriots were expelled by militaries and paramilitaries, and indeed in and around which they were massacred and dumped in mass graves.

Archaeological heritage manager John Carman (2001c: 220) has advocated a “moral” archaeology to enable us to comprehend and critique violence. This moral archaeology can be seen in work like Novak’s (2006) identification of domestic violence in the archaeological record but, as Novak (2006: 239) noted, ‘as early as 1910, Elliot-Smith and Wood-Jones attributed healed cranial and forearm fractures in Nubian female skeletons to wife beating’.

Carman did say that this “moral archaeology” was ‘not to impose prescriptions on others... but to open us up to the alternatives available to us’ (2001c: 237), so it might otherwise be called an “archaeology of morality”, but he also called upon archaeologists to revive the experience of ‘bloody slaughter’ in order to ‘reverse’ the memorialisation of the First World War that had obstructed critique of that war (2001b: 2; 3), and other contributors to Carman’s (2001a) volume insisted that ‘violent behaviour... demands a moral response’ (Tarlow, 2001a: 141), so perhaps what was called for were “moral archaeologies of morality”, the study of past moral worlds from different moral perspectives, united by their long-term, socially-contextualised interpretation of material evidence of violence. Conflict archaeologists both metaphorically and literally dig up hidden wrongs.

Indeed, while the mass grave exhumations are archaeology of the Cyprus Conflict, there is no modern conflict archaeology in Cyprus: there is study of ancient warfare, but not of modern; there is study of medieval village abandonment, but not of modern. Nevertheless, despite the lack of cultural heritage research into the conflict, there are massive (frequently, cultural heritage worker-written) political campaigns about the destruction of cultural heritage in the conflict. In this study, I will use the results of conflict archaeology research to query the historical narratives of the communities, professionals, and institutions who discuss cultural property destruction, and I will use the experience of conflict archaeology research to comprehend the practice of archaeology in Cyprus. Thence, balancing archaeologists’ responsibilities and freedoms, I will explore the ethics of archaeological work in Cyprus.

1.c.iii. Destruction

Cultural heritage has always been attacked, damaged and destroyed in conflict and long-established logics of destruction – profit, revenge, subjugation – remain. Yet the rise of nationalism gave birth to increasingly violent, exclusive identity and interest groups, who sought to establish ethnically homogeneous territories and for whom, because all territories have been historically heterogeneous, ‘[n]othing less than the destruction of past historical identities [was] needed’ (Chapman, 1994: 122). Indeed, ironically, it is partly as a result of the recent invention of ethnic identity that wherever it is imagined is “pure” is in fact ethnically mixed.
As international relations scholar Martin Coward (2009: 43) explains, the nationalist destruction of cultural heritage constitutes ‘urbicide’, the destruction of the possibility of the knowledge of past heterogeneous community, and of the possibility of the future existence of heterogeneous community. Thus, while all sites of communal life may fall victim to urbicide, because ‘what is determinative of ethnicity is history, or rather specific parts of the past as they exist in the present’ (Kaiser, 1995: 116 – original emphasis), cultural heritage sites are particularly vulnerable, especially those sites that were built before the emergence of ethnic identity, which almost inevitably visibly embody the heterogeneity violent extremists wish to eliminate.

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall (one of the relatively few occasions on which the destruction was popular internally and internationally), Babri Mosque in Ayodhya has been torn apart, the National Library in Sarajevo has been bombed and burned, the Old Bridge in Mostar has been blasted, Joseph’s Tomb in Nablus has been smashed, the Buddhas in Bamiyan have been blown up and the National Museum in Baghdad has been ransacked.

In addition to the many, many thousands killed, raped or disabled and the millions displaced in the wars in the former Yugoslavia (Rechel, Schwalbe and McKee, 2004: 540), thousands of homes, monuments, civilian buildings, religious buildings and museums and galleries were deliberately damaged or destroyed (Riedlmayer, 1996: 88; Šulc, 2001: 162). In the 1998-1999 war, 70,000 of Kosovo’s 500,000 homes were reduced to rubble and 207 of its 609 mosques were damaged or destroyed (Herscher and Riedlmayer, 2000: 111-112); and in the postwar strife between 1999 and 2004, another 730 homes (UNMIK, 2005: 1), and 156 of its around 1,400 Orthodox churches were damaged or destroyed (Philp, 2007). Occupied Iraq’s descent into civil war was “announced” by the bombing of al-Askari Mosque (Ghosh, 2006; North, 2006).

Supported by conflict archaeologist John Chapman (1994: 122), anthropologist Joel Halpern (1993: 6) identified ‘a need for an ethno-archaeology of architectural destruction’, which would document the logic and practice of urbicide. While Halpern’s (1993) original call for action was only rarely answered directly (e.g. Brown, 1998: 71; Chapman, 1994: 122; de Condappa, 2006: 6), Chapman’s (1994) example was followed by others (e.g. Coningham and Lewer, 1999: 857), and its establishment as a field of study is clear in Juliana Nairouz’s (2008) ethnoarchaeology of clearance in Palestine and Yannis Stavridopoulos’s (2008) research into the destruction of Slavic monuments in Greek Macedonia. My research has involved study of architectural destruction, and does address two interrelated crises: the dilemma over knowledge and respect; and the dilemma over professional responsibilities and humanitarian duties. However, unfortunately, there is insufficient space to present a history of cultural heritage destruction in Cyprus.

1.d. Archaeology in crisis

1.d.i. A crisis of rescue and loss

Archaeology professor Lord Colin Renfrew (2000: 15) found antiquities looting to be the greatest threat to archaeology, but he also found the antiquities collecting that drove the looting to be aided and abetted by archaeologists and other cultural heritage workers, thus constituting a crisis in the profession. Cultural heritage workers were split between those who believed that by working with antiquities collectors, they could rescue information that would otherwise be lost, and those who believed that by working with antiquities collectors, they would encourage the antiquities trade and lose even more information.

“Looting” is a greatly debated term, which could be used, for example: by dominant society to refer to those locals’ excavations that are profit-driven and, under state law, illegal (Atwood, 2006; Braden, 2006); or by Indigenous peoples to refer to archaeologists’ excavations that are, in community opinion, immoral (Deloria, 1992: 595-596; Ferguson, 1996: 71). While some categorise most of what is commonly referred to as looting as “theft”, and reserve “looting” for those acts of theft committed in states of emergency or anarchy, still “looting” retains its everyday meaning of “extensive and unselective theft”, a synonym for ransacking, plundering, and pillaging.
Criminologists Simon Mackenzie and Penny Green (2007: 2) define looting as ‘taking antiquities illicitly from the ground, or from their place as an integral part’ of an ancient site, for whatever reason. Despite being cited by Mackenzie and Green, archaeology professor Lord Colin Renfrew (2000: 15 – emphasis added) appears to have a slightly more refined definition of looting as the ‘illicit, unrecorded and unpublished excavation of… antiquities for commercial profit’, which seems to acknowledge a distinction others have made between collecting as a ‘hobby or family activity’ and the ‘looting industry’ (Atwood, 2006: 34). Nevertheless, both archaeologists and cultural policy experts speak of the ‘looting’ of the Iraq Museum (e.g. Polk and Schuster, 2005; Rothfield, 2009).

Depending upon the time and place, the activity judged most destructive may vary between looting (Renfrew, 2000: 15), agriculture and development (Ali and Coningham, 2001: 30; Canouts and McManamon, 2001: 99-101); but undocumented digging is destructive, and whenever collectors’ craving for antiquities is fed by looters (and forgers), knowledge – the very possibility of knowledge – of local and global pasts is lost (Renfrew, 2000: 9; see also Gill and Chippindale, 1993). Rich individuals take advantage of poor ones and rich nations amass the heritage of poor ones, leaving them still poorer economically and the world poorer socially and culturally.

Aside from individuals and institutions with their own financial interests in perpetuating the illicit antiquities trade (Watson, 1997), some cultural heritage workers and institutions fund it by purchasing antiquities that are unprovenanced (without a collecting history), unprovenenced (without proof of scientific recovery), or definitely looted (Lundén, 2004: 220-226; Watson and Todeschini, 2006). Some professionals and institutions collude in it by doing work on private and public collections of unprovenienced antiquities that increases the value of those collections, thus incentivising collecting (and its consequent looting); and in the cases of some universities and museums, by purchasing unprovenienced antiquities, which incentivises, funds and underwrites looting (Renfrew, 2000: 16; see also Lundén, 2004: 226-234; Muscarella, 2000: 12-15).

Mayan antiquities specialist Clemency Coggins (1998: 56) more sharply rendered the illicit antiquities trade as

the bargain employment of a gang of impoverished looters in a remote country, the devastation of a cultural heritage, a happy collector and an enriched dealer, and finally, perhaps, a tax-deductable role for the object in the local museum, where the citizenry gets to subsidize the entire operation.

There have now been wide debates between collectors and dealers of antiquities, and archaeologists and conservators (e.g. Tubb, 1995; Robinson, Treadwell and Gosden, 2006). Echoing archaeologist Ricardo Elia’s (1993: 69) observation that ‘collectors are the real looters’, Renfrew (2000: 74) has rightly insisted that ‘it should become widely understood and agreed among academics… that it is unethical and immoral to aid and abet the sale of illicit antiquities’, whether by authenticating collected objects as geographically, chronologically and culturally-located archaeological artefacts, by publishing or citing unprovenienced antiquities as exemplary and instructive finds, or by purchasing unprovenienced antiquities (or receiving them as tax-deductable gifts).

Archaeology professors Arlen Chase, Diane Chase and Harriot Topsey (2006: 24) believed that ‘[r]esponsible museums and individuals’ had now recognised that obligation not to aid and abet the illicit antiquities trade; yet the loss of cultural heritage continues, and some powerful and respected public museums and cultural heritage workers continue to aid and abet the trade. However, Cyprus is not only an exemplary victim of the illicit antiquities trade; it is also an exemplary practitioner of disastrous antiquities policy, as I will reveal in my discussion of looting and rescue during the conflict.

1.d.ii. A crisis of professional responsibilities and humanitarian duties
Surveying archaeologists’ actions before and during the war on Iraq, Yiannis Hamilakis (2003: 107) concluded that there was an ‘ethical crisis in archaeology’, because of the ‘principle, now codified in the codes of ethics of most Western archaeological organisations, that our primary ethical responsibility is the advocacy for and stewardship of the archaeological record’, rather than advocacy for the communities who produced and inherited that cultural material. Agreeing, in principle, with Hamilakis’s (1999: 70) prioritisation of ‘the present and the “public” over ‘preservation of past material remains’, archaeologist Kostas Kotsakis (1999: 98) observed that precisely in order to challenge inequality and injustice, ‘archaeologists… need the grounding of material evidence’ that is being eroded daily.

In certain emergency situations, archaeologists may suffer a crisis over conflicts between communities’ cultural and economic rights. Konstantinos Politis (1994: 15) observed that they ‘had difficulty in condemning the villagers of Safi [in Jordan] for robbing ancient sites in a desperate effort to feed their families’ (even if, eventually, cultural heritage tourism could be a solution to both problems (cf. Politis, 2001: 267)). Nevertheless, in many situations, the question is not whether or not it is responsible and just to protect cultural heritage, but how cultural heritage may be presented responsibly and justly. Archaeologist of capitalism Mark Leone (1999: 7) conceived of archaeological materials as ‘levers for freedom’, which would provide us with information on the nature of unfreedom, inequality and injustice, in order to be able ‘to argue to those in a dominant position that the evils of the world are their fault’ (see also Leone and Potter, 1999).

Near Eastern archaeologists Susan Pollock and Catherine Lutz examined the political role of cultural heritage during the UN-mandated war to end Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait in 1991 and the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003. Pollock and Lutz found archaeological material commodified as economic resources and fetishised as precious objects of intrinsic value even without their cultural meaning (1994: 276), and archaeological knowledge used to justify war (1994: 274). Shanks and Tilley (1987a: 191) complained about critical archaeology that was ‘political but without any politics’, which tried to correct bias, but not to change society. However, often it is situational or informal: there is no polemic; there is no specific political, or ethical; but there is professional, situational opposition to commercialisation, nationalism and militarisation, subsumed under a generic archaeological responsibility (e.g. Kohl and Fawcett, 1995a). Pollock considered that archaeologists’ responsibilities went ‘well beyond’ compelling the destruction of cultural property, to challenging nationalist and other exclusionary uses of archaeology, even at the risk of being ‘used as an expert to espouse viewpoints with which one adamantly disagrees’ (2003: 122). It is those diverse responsibilities I wish to explore.

1.d.iii. A crisis of knowledge and respect

Timothy Webmoor (2007) believed that archaeologists were in crisis because they had to choose either to make scientific interpretations or, as for instance the World Archaeological Congress’s First Code of Ethics required, to ‘recognise indigenous methodologies for interpreting… indigenous cultural heritage’ (WAC, 1990: Art. 6). Considering the problem to be primarily epistemological (Webmoor, 2007: 227-228), Webmoor (2007: 237) proposed a pragmatic archaeological epistemology, a ‘Darwinian/naturalized’ – or, alternatively conceived, a Capitalist/marketised – knowledge, wherein the ‘causal constraints of reality’ would spontaneously “select” truths in the ecosystem/market of ideas, so that ‘broadly useful truths serving the practical needs of society w[ould] emerge’. He gave the example of archaeologists ‘universally utiliz[ing] the map despite [it] being a relative (i.e. “western”) medium… [b]ecause our experience with maps is that… they work’ (Webmoor, 2007: 235 – original emphasis).

Yet this expected “natural selection” is ill-conceived; there is no “blind watchmaker”; it is a matter of ethics – and external reality – after all. Nationalists use ethnic cognitive maps to guide their divisive and destructive behaviours, because their experience is that those maps work. Archaeology cannot simply ‘meet a democratic range of purposes’, including ‘economic benefits’ and a ‘contribution to national identity’ (Webmoor, 2007: 238), when public truth is not established by mere reality. “Useful truths” are consciously selected by those striving to gain or maintain profit and...
power, deliberately misrepresenting what is useful as truth in order to enrich or empower themselves or their communities, and simultaneously in order to disenfranchise and disempower others.

The causal constraints of reality are contrary to and subjugated to the practical needs of powerful interest groups within society: cultural heritage with propaganda value is appropriated (Michael, 2003: 81-82; Silberman, 1995: 259; Stritch, 2006: 183); cultural heritage with commercial value is commoditised (Michael, 2003: 81; Silberman, 1995: 259); and unprofitable or inconvenient negative heritage is ignored (Knapp and Antoniadou, 1998: 33; Silberman, 1995: 260).

How to balance knowledge and respect is not an idle question: for example, the Aboriginal Australian Barunga-Wugularr community in Jawoyn Country insists that archaeologists ‘must listen to and accept the directions that they are given’ (Wynnjoroc, Manabaru, Brown and Warner, 2005: 326; see also Smith and Wobst, 2005: 392). An Indigenous American cultural heritage institution, the Hopi Cultural Preservation Office, ‘severely restricted the dissemination’ of the results of an archaeological survey ‘because its Hopi advisers objected to a “public release which would make [the report] available for scholarly research outside the auspices of the Hopi tribe” (Tarlow 2001[b]: 253)’ (Cooper, 2006: 132).

Indeed, the World Archaeological Congress Committee on Ethics’ (WACCE, 2007) Draft WAC General Code of Ethics requires that ‘[p]ermission should be obtained from the affected community or communities’ for research and publication, and concomitantly that ‘[s]hould permission be refused that decision is final and should be respected’. Those articles may be expected to be accepted, because they are derived from principles accepted in the World Archaeological Congress’s (WAC, 2006) Tamaki Makau-rau Accord on the Display of Human Remains and Sacred Objects, but in the Draft General Code, archaeologists would have to get permission to display any object, to document or publish any data or representations.

While communities recognised by the Tamaki Makau-rau Accord ‘may include, but [are] not limited to, ethnic, racial, religious, traditional or Indigenous groups of people’ (WAC, 2006), materials claimable under the Accord are limited to human remains and sacred objects, which somewhat restricts the potential for bigots’ and extremists’ exploitation of the Accord; yet, by (apparently) giving any affected community veto over any archaeological work, WAC may empower nationalists to suppress work that exposes their lies and proves their violence. Archaeologists Claire Smith and Martin Wobst (2005: 394) believed that archaeologists had an ‘obligation’ to promote Indigenous peoples’ agendas, but they went beyond even that with their hope that archaeologists’ agendas would ‘look indistinguishable from the agendas of the societies with whose past they work’ (see also Webmoor, 2007: 238).

As the role of archaeology in nationalism, violence and destruction clearly demonstrates, archaeologists’ cooption may lead to attacks upon, rather than the consolidation of, the ‘social justice and human rights’ Smith and Wobst seek to promote. It is, of course, understood that Smith and Wobst work in an Australian context, and that they do not mean to open up archaeology to political misuse, but as prehistoric archaeologist David Anthony (1995: 85; 88; 93) explained, supporting or lending credibility to “harmless” myths (like eco-feminists’ misinterpretations of prehistory) provides a platform and a legitimacy to harmful ones as well.

The World Archaeological Congress currently adopts situational ethics (cf. Smith, Meskell, Tomii and Huber, 2007). As Knudson (1984: 244) characterised, working up from the moral consensus established by UNESCO’s 1970 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, a situational ethicist assumes the benefit of cultural heritage conservation, then makes ethical choices on a case-by-case basis, ‘pragmatically and relatively’.

Yet this “pragmatic”, “relative” approach is generating contradictions in WAC policy and practice, and divisions in its membership, some of whom fear its ‘co-opt[ion]’ by multinational corporations (Haber, 2009a: 5; Ronayne, 2008b). For example, WAC accepted funding for and help in organising a conference from the Irish National Roads Authority (NRA), an employer a WAC member accused of unprofessional practices, some of which went unreported by other archaeologists.
who ‘fear[ed] being sacked, blacklisted, or bullied out of their profession’ (Ronayne, 2008b; for details, see also Ronayne, 2008a).

Despite WAC’s commitment to Indigenous rights and social justice, when Rio Tinto Zinc (RTZ) sought a relationship with WAC, WAC applied for (and received) funding from RTZ (Smith, 2008), a company accused of Indigenous Papuans’ ‘human rights violations and… environmental damage’ (Wardhana, 2007). WAC considered acting as ‘trusted brokers’ between the mining company and the affected communities, and ‘censored’ a journal article of a member of its own Committee of Ethics (Haber, 2009b: 41), Alejandro Haber (2009a: 5), who argued that WAC should instead be ‘[n]etworking local resistances’ to RTZ.

It is notable that, even before these controversies, President Claire Smith (2007) had said herself that, ‘[i]f we are to tackle the challenges of a more ethical globalisation, we have to integrate a human rights framework into our practices and policies, with a consequent emphasis on shared responsibilities’. It may or may not be ethical for archaeologists to make individual, situational agreements with disadvantaged communities; but as historical archaeologist Sarah Tarlow (2001b: 256) observed,

far right and neo-Nazi groups could employ the WAC Code of Ethics as legitimating their own racially exclusive and discriminatory political claims…. [T]he principle that, for example, “the indigenous cultural heritage rightfully belongs to the indigenous descendants of that heritage” (WAC principle 5) is one which they would certainly recognise and espouse.

Indeed, it could be said that to require nationalists’ consent for archaeologists’ work would be absurd, because relationships between archaeologists and nationalist communities should be problematical; it could be said that archaeologists should expect nationalists to object, even if they should still try to work with nationalists, if for no other reason, then because it would make anti-nationalist work easier and more effective.

Archaeological work may be designed to benefit communities financially as well, as it is in Belize (Bawaya, 2006: 159), and may also be used to reinforce community unity and pride, as it has been in anti-colonial struggles and decolonising processes, like in Egypt (Trigger, 1995: 272), but it is archaeologists’ responsibility to protect and promote the truth (Anthony, 1995: 88; 93), and any economic or political utility must be subservient to and derived from historical truth. As virtue ethicist David Cooper (2006: 133) observed, archaeologists cannot promote both their own genuine beliefs and others’ contradictory genuine beliefs, because it is inaccurate and insincere (see also Wylie, 2003: 5). Anyway, if they do not interpret the material evidence faithfully, there do not need to interpret the material evidence at all; thus, they do not need, indeed, they cannot continue, to be archaeologists.

Anthony (1995: 93) insisted upon a ‘[s]ocial responsibility’ to tell truths and disprove lies. Anthropologist and museologist Larry Zimmerman, who elsewhere advanced communities’ sometimes superior claims to stewardship of cultural heritage (cf. Zimmerman, 1989), concurred with Anthony. Zimmerman (1997: 92) defended ecological archaeological explanations of the massacre and scalping of most of the inhabitants of an Indigenous American village – as the culmination of a conflict over scarce resources between the fourteenth-century ancestors of the Sioux and the Arikara tribes – because it was archaeologists’ responsibility to challenge inaccuracies in anyone's history. Zimmerman (1997: 93) also explained, however, that archaeologists had an equal responsibility to avoid creating contrary stereotypes; so, in his case, they had to break down the stereotypes of both the “Noble Indian” and the “Savage Indian”.

Where cultural heritage workers cannot fulfil their social responsibilities, they may be morally obliged to refuse either to conduct research or to publish (at least some) results. Archaeologist Joseph Winter’s humanistic ethic often resembled the professional ethic, wherein being scientific was being
ethical, but Winter insisted that archaeologists ‘not compromise those [others’] rights in our attempts to obtain knowledge for the greater good of humanity’ (1984: 45), and that ‘[t]he scientific method... cannot decide which ends should be met and which alternatives should be used’ (1984: 44). This could be taken as a justification for the boycott of or non-cooperation with certain individuals and institutions, or the choice not to conduct certain research or publish certain results, as archaeologists may have to refrain from producing knowledge in order not to violate, or cause or contribute to the violation of others’ rights. Yet again, archaeologies of nationalism, conflict and violence with many equally-affected communities are not as straightforward as Indigenous archaeologies with individual or few primarily-affected communities.

If an archaeologist cannot get permission from one victim community to conduct research within another (perceived aggressor) community and thus refuses to work (say, with that community’s institutions), they may be complicit in the violation of that community’s cultural rights and in the collective punishment of a community not responsible for the acts of extremist elements or state structures. And if an archaeologist cannot get permission from one affected community to publish research into another (victim) community and thus refuses to publish (say, evidence of the victim community’s suffering at the hands of extremist elements or state structures within the uncooperative community), they may be complicit in the violation of that community’s cultural rights and in the denial of gross human rights abuses.

Archaeologist Paul Healy (1984) categorised ethical responsibilities to host governments, to foreign scholars and to the foreign public; and though he did recognise ‘undue [academic or financial] pressure’, nonetheless he rejected “pragmatic” agreements to unethical contracts as ‘complicity through cooperation’ (1984: 126). He appeared to accept that local archaeologists might be forced to ‘adhere rigidly to... the “party line”’, and warned foreign archaeologists that the consequences of a moral stand might be the loss of the contract, or, more seriously, ‘trouble’ for local partners of foreign teams (1984: 126), in which case, foreign archaeologists’ duties to their research partners might effectively render them as unfree as those local partners. Having reviewed the historical development of archaeological politics and ethics, and identified the ethical crises of contemporary archaeology, I will now explain my contribution to archaeological politics and ethics.

1.e. My contribution to archaeological politics and ethics

In my exploration of bicomunal cultural heritage work, I delineate how ethical and legal cultural heritage work can be conducted in divided societies, and how archaeologists use the law to realise or prevent that work. Examining the ethics and legality of rescue archaeology in occupied and secessionist territories, I identify the different types of archaeology being done in northern Cyprus, and scrutinise the archaeologists’ ethical and legal defences for their work. In doing so, I expose the effects of the boycott and black list upon the Cypriot archaeological profession and its scholarship. Researching archaeologists’ and other cultural heritage professionals’ work upon cultural heritage sites, and writings about those places, I uncover cultural heritage work that has hidden damage and destruction, and archaeological writings that have denied violence by omission or commission. Investigating looted antiquities’ rescue from their looters and smugglers, and from the art market, I reconstruct the process and impact of antiquities policy. Through that reconstruction, I am able to determine the practical consequences and ethical validity of the policy, and to work out ethical alternatives.
2. The Cypriot context

2.a. A brief history of Cypriot community and conflict

Cyprus is an independent Eastern Mediterranean island in the European Union (see map 1). It is a tight-knit community, where the village or neighbourhood is important and the family is central; strangers may receive exceptional hospitality or may be abruptly excluded, but if they are accepted into a circle of friends, they will experience familial closeness. Before it was a product economy of farming villages, mining villages, and port towns; now it is a service economy with a large tourist market in mountain villages, historic towns, seaside resorts and ancient ruins. Yet it is also a historic site of power struggles, population movements, community change, and mass violence. Decades after acute and chronic intracommunal, intercommunal, and international violence, the island remains divided and occupied, its peace kept by the United Nations (see map 2); thus, it is an ideal site for the study of cultural destruction and archaeological ethics.

Map 1: continental map of Cyprus
Culture has become so politicised in the conflict that it is difficult to summarise even prehistory; nevertheless, a very basic historic outline will show just how politicised culture has become. Nationalist historians teach their own community’s ‘continuity and tie to territory’ as ‘historically and scientifically proven’, but others’ identities as ‘fictitious, mythical, and a product of propaganda’ (Constantinou and Papadakis, 2001: 134). A historical geography of the Cypriot community will expose how inaccurate nationalist beliefs are; and an outline of the Cyprus Conflict will provide the skeleton on which to put the flesh of my research.

2.a.i. A historical geography of the Cypriot community

Possibly twelve thousand or more years ago, South-West Asian crop-and-stock managing communities visited the island (cf. Steel, 2004: 24; Vigne et al., 2009: 16135); certainly they settled it by 11,700-10,500 B.P. (cf. Croft, 2002: 173; Vigne et al., 2009: 16136), and they developed a distinct culture. By 4,800-4,300 B.P., there was new interaction and influence between Cypriot and South-West Asian farming communities (Steel, 2004: 117); and by 3,650 B.P., Cyprus was integrated into the Eastern Mediterranean economy (ibid.: 143).

2.a.i.1. Mycenaean Hellenisation?

Hellenist nationalists argue that Cyprus was colonised by Greeks first, and the Cypriot people has remained Greek ever since (cf. Bryant, 2004: 194). Both local and foreign philhellenes have ‘widely accepted’ the great change between 3,250 and 3,050 B.P. (or 1,300-1,100 B.C.E.) as proof of Aegean Mycenaean’s aggressive invasion, colonisation and Hellenisation of Cyprus (Leriou, 2002: 3). And the philhellenes’ archaeological claims work as political claims: if the Mycenaean community Hellenised the island, Cyprus is Greek. ‘Cyprus is Greek for 3000 years’ has become a slogan for nationalist organisations like the Cyprus Action Network of America (CAN, 2009), and nationalist community groups like Cyprus is Greek on Facebook. In fact, archaeological evidence demonstrates ‘hybridisation’ of international cultures, not Hellenisation of the Cypriot community (Steel, 2004: 193). Nonetheless, Greek archaeologist Anastasia Leriou (2002: 18) has accepted that a depoliticised, de-ethnicised archaeology of Late Bronze Age cultural change ‘cannot be achieved’: archaeologists can only ‘open’ the historical narratives, and thus the community’s opportunities to understand themselves in non-nationalist ways.

2.a.i.2. Many rulers, myriad communities
In his comprehensive four-volume *History of Cyprus*, British historian George Hill (1940; 1948a; 1948b; 1972) documented the evolution of the Cypriot community. The many, mixed and hybridised cultures of the island, which Hill recorded, refute both communities’ nationalists’ claims of the Hellenisation or Turkification of Cyprus. Passing over the Persian-Phoenician and Hellenistic Egyptian Ptolemaic powers’ later arrivals on and irregular or partial rules in the first millennium B.C.E., from the beginning of Roman rule in 58 B.C.E. until the end of British rule two millennia later in 1960 C.E., Cyprus was a subject of foreign rule, overwhelmingly of one or another greater power, and it was a victim of those greater powers’ games. Throughout two millennia of Cypriot subjection, the greater powers and/or the Cypriots occasionally indulged in internationally standard forms of mass violence, typically during or immediately after changes in regime (or attempts to change it).

Cyprus also became home to many communities (as it had become home to a Jewish community in the Ptolemaic period), for many reasons, from slavery to trade to refuge. (Some, like soldiers, would have been temporary residents; but when the temporary community is 12,000 men for 30 years, as it was for the Syrian Emirate’s Arab garrison, inevitably some would have had relationships with locals and settled.) Under Roman rule (58 B.C.E.-395 C.E.), Christian Armenians arrived. During the Byzantine and Islamic period (395-1185), there came Aramaic Christian Mardaites, Muslim Arabs, Jacobites, Syrian Christians, diverse refugees from iconoclastic violence, Maronites, more Armenians, and Catholic Latins. There was no significant population change during the brief tyranny of Isaac Comnenus (1185-1192).

By the beginning of Frankish rule (1192-1489), British historian Sir George Hill (1948a: 1) found ‘no trace’ of any permanent Arab Cypriot community, but he did find Arabic place names, like Kantara and Komi Kebir (ibid.: In2), and there are other even more obvious places like the Rock of the Arab16 in the Kyrenia mountains, and sites like the Mosque of the Arabs17 in Nicosia, and the Christian-and-Muslim-venerated Church of St. Arab18/Mosque of the Arab19 (Papalexandrou, 2008: 268). Accordingly, the Arab Cypriots may have assimilated into another community. Nevertheless, later Frankish Cypriot raids captured and imported ‘Saracens’ (probably Syrian Arab Muslims) (Arbel, 2000 [1993]: IX – 161), so even if the old Arab community had been assimilated, there was a new Arab presence; and at least some of the Greek and Jewish slaves traded through Cyprus were freed there (Arbel, 2000 [1993]: IX – 156-157; 158). Apparently, the Orthodox Syrians assimilated into the Greek Orthodox community. During Frankish rule, Latin Catholics and Armenians continued to come, and the Armenian Cypriot community converted from Orthodoxy to Catholicism; furthermore, many Venetians, Genoese, Pisans, Catalans, and Germans arrived, as did Palestinian, Syrian and Armenian Franks. There were Bulgarian, Greek, Romanian Greek and Tatar ‘slaves, serfs’ (Hill, 1948a: 390); and ‘Black Genoese [freed slaves]’ remained (Hill, 1948a: 10n3), including ones from Sudanan and Ethiopian communities, Circassian and Tatar communities (Arbel, 2000 [1993]: IX – 165; Jennings, 1987: 290-292). Under Venetian rule (1489-1571), ‘Arnauits [Albanians]’ came (Hill, 1940: 260), whom the British imperial commissioner of Limassol, Lord-Lieutenant Roland Michell (1908: 751), identified as a syncretic Christian-Muslim community; they built a mosque in Limassol, Arnaout Mesjidi. Macedonians, Coptic Egyptians, Ethiopians/Nubians, and Roma came too, at least some of whom were Christian (cf. Jennings, 1993: 394).

2.a.i.3. Ottoman Turkification?

Following the Greek Cypriot nationalists’ Mycenaean foundation myth, there is the Turkish Cypriot nationalists’ Ottoman foundation myth: Turkist nationalists argue that Cyprus was conquered by Turks last, and the Cypriot land has become Turkish since then (cf. Bryant, 2004: 196). There was

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16 Arap Taşı.
17 Araplar Camii.
18 Agios Arabis (Ἄγιος Άραπης); or Ekklesia Agiou Arapi (Εκκλησία Αγίου Άραπη); more recently, it has been named after Saint Therapon (Agios Therapon (Άγιος Θεράπων)).
19 Arap Camii; more recently, it has been called Turabi Tekkesi.
a Cyprus is Turkish Party (KTP); there is a Turkish Cypriot nationalist Facebook group called *Cyprus is Turkish since 1571*; Turkish nationalists consider Cyprus Turkish soil since 1571\(^{21}\) (Melis, 2008); and regardless of the fact that it was British soil from 1878 until 1960, and independent thereafter, 'Cyprus is Turkish, will stay Turkish'\(^{22}\) (ibid.; cf. Bryant, 2004: 196-197, on logics of both communities' claims). Turkish nationalist journalist Sadi Somuncuoğlu (2010) believed that 'the statement that "Cyprus is Turkish [since 1571]" is not a slogan; it is a sociological, historical and cultural fact'.

Ironically, the evidence for Ottoman liberalism is evidence against the Turkification of the island. In 1566 and 1569, Orthodox Christian Cypriots had unsuccessfully invited Ottoman conquest (Kyrris, 1973: 155); then, through the course of 1570-1571, the Ottoman Empire conquered the Venetian Empire's Cypriot colony. In 1571, Venetian Senator Giacomo Diede acknowledged that Cypriots had endured 'slavery', then sneered that they had helped the Ottoman army because the Cypriots 'flatter[ed] themselves that they might find better luck under a new master' (cited in Cobham, 1908: 92; see also Inalcık, 1973: 119-120; Kyrris, 1973: 157); indeed, Pałos Castle was captured by Bulgarian, Greek and Tatar serfs/slaves (Arbel, 2000 [1993]: IX – 161). Still in the Twentieth Century, before serious intercommunal conflict developed, even Greek Cypriot nationalists publicly recognised that the Ottoman Empire had 'saved' the Greek Orthodox community (legislative councillor Ioannis Kyriakides, 18th June 1903, CO 69/17: 347, cited in Nevzat, 2005: 49).

Like every other contemporary military, the Ottoman army committed atrocities, here against the Latins and collaborating Orthodox. (Naturally, I do not defend such barbarous acts. I merely note that they were standard practice for keeping power at that time; they were not automatically evidence of a desire to eliminate other communities.) The Ottoman administration also expelled or converted its Latin enemy (the expelled including thousands of enslaved Venetian soldiers (Jennings, 1993: 240)), and converted Latin churches to Ottoman mosques. Yet the Ottoman Empire freed the (predominantly Orthodox Cypriot) serf-slaves – more than 80% of the population – and restored the Cypriot Orthodox Church (Jennings, 1993: 240; Spyridakis, 1963: 54-55): the Cypriot Orthodox archbishop became the both spiritual and political leader of the island, the ethnarch, the 'real Governor', who ignored the Ottoman governor, the muhassil (Lacroix, 1853: 82, cited in Cobham, 1908: 463; see also Kyrris, 1973: 155); and the ethnarch had an ally and equal in the Orthodox Cypriot interpreter and tax officer, the dragoman (Luke, 1973: 79; see also Nevzat, 2005: 62-64).

The primary social divisions were class conflicts, not religious tensions (Pollis, 1979: 49-50): the local religious (majority Christian) and imperial administrative (majority Muslim) elites fought amongst themselves for power over the poor, and Christian and Muslim peasants struggled together against the oppressive elites (Kitromilides, 1977: 40). Indeed, the harsh repression of the Greek Cypriot revolution of 25th March 1821, for example, was not standard Ottoman policy; it was the Muslim Cypriot administrators' opportunistic attack on their rivals, the Cypriot Orthodox Church (Koumouvides, 1973: 149-150).

After the Ottoman conquest, not 30,000 (e.g. Spyridakis, 1963: 54), but fewer than 4,000 Ottoman military forces stayed on the island (cf. Jennings, 1993: 214). In order to replace the Black Death-depleted, war-ravaged population, and the displaced Catholic Cypriot communities, thus to improve the economy (*not* to Turkify the island), both Muslim (Kızılbaş Alevi Türkmen) and Christian Ottoman communities were resettled there (Hill, 1972: 18-20; Jennings, 1993: 214: 232; Nevzat, 2005: 50-52). Girolamo Dandini visited the island in 1596 and 1597 and estimated its entire Muslim population as 12,000-13,000, 'most' of whom were converts, *not* settlers (1685 [1656], cited in Cobham, 1908: 182). (Corroborating that number, Joannes Cotovicus visited the island in 1598 and

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20 Kıbrıs Türk tür Partisi.
21 ‘1571 den... Türk topragıdır’ (Melis, 2008).
22 ‘ Kıbrıs Türk tür, Türk kalacak’ (Melis, 2008).
23 ‘ Kıbrıs Türk tür’ sözü bir slogan değil; sosyolojinin, tarih ve kültürün belirlediği bir gerçek’ (Somuncuoğlu, 2010).
1599 and estimated its male Muslim population as 6,000 (1619, cited in Cobham, 1908: 197); in addition, those numbers seem to fit with tax records (Jennings, 1993: 197.).

Under Ottoman imperial rule (1571-1878), individuals were categorised by religious community24, and treated differently because of that differential treatment. There was a trend towards conversion to Islam, but it was evidently not simply a sign of fear and oppression, not simply a cover for secret Christianity (crypto-Christianity), because there was also Muslim-Christian conversion. Correspondingly, the syncretic Christian-Muslim Linobambaki25 Cypriot community grew under Ottoman rule; by the end, there were more Linovamvaki Cypriots than Latin Cypriots (cf. Baker, 2003 [1879]; Michell, 1908: 754; see also Bryant (2004: 65), whose archival research suggested the Linovamvaki community was ‘about twice’ as large as Baker’s and Michell’s guesstimates of 1,200-1,500). (Again, it cannot have been mere political or economic convenience, because while the Linovamvaki community shrank under British rule, nevertheless it continued to exist.)

Ottoman Jews settled on the island (e.g. Jennings, 1993: 224). Also, the island continued to be a site of exile, as liberal Babist sect Muslims were relocated there, and similarly Muslim Circassians. Likewise, it was a place of exile or escape for political communities; for example, first Turkish reformists escaping Ottoman rule, then Ottoman revivalists escaping Turkish rule, fled to the island (An, 2005b: 10-11; Bryant, 2004: 33). The Mevlevi Muslim community continued through the British period, but by the end, Islamic historian Charles Beckingham (1957a: 82) saw no Bektaş, Kadiri or Nakşbendi Muslims, and heard that the Babist Muslims had assimilated into the Turkish Cypriot community. British historian Sir George Hill (1972) did not note any significant population change under British imperial rule (1878-1960); but obviously a British colonial community was established. Like the Ottoman Empire, the British Empire was international and multicultural; for instance, the first British occupation troops were Indian Army soldiers (Borowiec, 2000: 20).

2.a.i.4. British divide and rule?

A large majority of Greek Cypriots greatly blame, and a majority of Turkish Cypriots somewhat blame, British colonial government’s (1878-1960) policy of divide-and-rule26 for the Cyprus Problem (cf. Hadjipavlou, 2007: 354); the policy’s influence is noted in Greek Cypriot government documents (e.g. ROCMOI, 1999: 3), and Turkish Cypriot school textbooks (e.g. Samani, Oğuz ve Baki, 2006: 19, cited in Vural and Özuyanık, 2008: 148). That could seem counter-intuitive, since British colonialism ended the religious divisions of Ottoman imperialism, under which Christians had to pay special taxes, wear certain clothes, and obey other religion-specific rules (cf. Nevzat, 2005: 53n151). Moreover, historiographers have referred to a British colonial ‘refusal’ to recognise Greek Cypriots as ethnically Greek (Michael, 2005: 4), and historians have recorded that individuals were categorised as religiously-X or linguistically-Y Cypriots, but not as ethnically-Z Cypriots, or as geographically-Cypriot Greeks or Turks (cf. Demetriadou, 1998: 176).

Certainly, in the Legislative Council, there were Christian Cypriots and Muslim Cypriots, alongside British colonials.27 However, in official documents, British Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies Winston Churchill identified ‘Greek’ (and ‘Moslem’) populations (1907, cited in Akgün et al., 2005: 10), and British Governor Ronald Storrs (2006 [1932]: Para. 60) identified (‘Greek Orthodox’ and ‘Turkish’ villages. Indeed, in an official memorandum, British Colonial Secretary Arthur J. Dawe explicitly acknowledged not only the existence of “[t]he Divide and Rule System”28 but also its

24 Millet.
25 Phonetically, it is transliterated “Linovamvakoi (Λινοβάμβακοι)”, which means Linen-Cottons/Linsey-Woolseys (two different materials woven into one); sometimes they were categorised as Crypto-Christians.
26 In Greek, “diairei kai vasileve (διαίρει και βασιλεύε)” in Turkish, “böl ve yönet”.
27 Between 1878 and 1882, the council had a British government majority with an appointed Cypriot minority; then it had an elected Cypriot majority between 1882 and 1931 (9 Christians, 3 Muslims, and 6 Britons between 1882 and 1925; 12 Christians, 3 Muslims, and 9 Britons between 1925 and 1931; cf. Beckingham, 1957a: 69); after the October 1931 riots, an appointed Advisory Council was established in 1933.
dependence upon ‘keeping alive the racial hostilities’ between ‘Greeks’ and ‘Turks’ (CO 883/8, 29th April 1929: 105, cited in Nevzat, 2005: 335). So, ethnic identities were officially recognised, if only for the British Empire to be able to exploit them, in order to perpetuate the colonial occupation. Cypriots’ religious, linguistic and ethnic identities were conflated; and religious leaders were confirmed as ethnic leaders.

Nevertheless, Cypriots could defeat divide-and-rule: the Legislative Council’s nine/twelve Christian Cypriots and three Muslim Cypriots could form a majority against its six/nine British colonials. Indeed, the Cypriot members did vote together in their economic interests (An, 2005a: 1), or two Turkish Cypriots would support the British minority, but one would absent, thereby protecting the Greek Cypriot majority (Nevzat, 2005: 124); thus, they defeated British colonial policy. At the very least, the Cypriot councillors forced the British Empire either to be inventive, to incite nationalist demands for intercommunal non-cooperation (cf. An, 2005a: 1), or to behave straightforwardly, to impose its will through Royal Order (e.g. Storrs, 2006 [1932]: Para. 5). On other occasions, the logic of divide-and-rule would be disproved by intracommunal divisions, as one team of both Christians and Muslims against the British would align themselves against another team of both Christians and Muslims allied with the British (Nevzat, 2005: 124). The Turkish Cypriot councillors voluntarily supported the British colonials when and ‘[p]robably because’ Greek Cypriot proposals for reform included demands for enosis (Demetriadou, 1998: 337).

The British colonial administration wanted universal non-nationalist education on the island (Bryant, 2004: 161); yet even after the Greek Cypriot uprising of 1931 elicited repressive colonial policy, the colonial authorities only interfered in education after ‘provocation’ (ibid.: 164). Education continued to be controlled by nationalist institutions; Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot school textbooks were official Greek and Ottoman/Turkish school textbooks (An, 2005b: 10; Bryant, 2004: 162). During this period, first the Orthodox Church, then also the Ottoman Empire, and later the Turkish Republic, as well as activist communities, managed or funded institutions, clubs, societies and newspapers, which promoted Christian Hellenism, Islamic Ottomanism, or secular Turkism.

So, the Greek Orthodox Church and its allies trained Orthodox Cypriots as Cypriot Greeks, ‘apostles of the Great Idea’29, the unification of Cyprus (and all other supposedly Greek territories) with Greece (Foni tis Kyprou30, 2nd March 1901, translated and cited by Bryant, 2004: 144). Similarly, Ottomanist institutions, like the Unity and Progress Club (ITC)31, trained Muslim Cypriots as Muslim Ottomans (cf. An, 2005b: 10-11). Then, after the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of the Turkish Republic, schooling from the ‘motherland….. Turkey’, educated Muslim Ottomans as Cypriot Turks (Söz, 19th March 1931, translated and cited by Bryant, 2004: 176). Implicitly acknowledging the diversity of the community while trying to eliminate it, school signs urged children, ‘let’s talk Turkish’32 (cited in Beckingham, 1957b: 170). Turkish Cypriot nationalists ‘reproached’ Galinoporni’s hoca for praying with local Orthodox priests and its villagers for offering the priests hospitality, because their ‘behaviour contradicted those who declare[d]’ coexistence impossible (Eleftherotypía, 5i Aprilíou 1958, translated and cited by S. Theodoulou, 2001).

Unlike in India, where British colonial authorities precisely classified, controlled and concretised minute differences within the country riven by religion, ethnicity, language, and caste (e.g. Cohn, 1996: 55; 100; 110), it appears that in Cyprus, the authorities carelessly conflated diversity. At the same time, local nationalist communities actively intimidated individuals into conforming to appropriate sets of identities, exemplified by the need for Linovamvakoi to become either Greeks or Turks (cf. Bryant, 2004: 64-66). Thus, the Ottoman Empire’s Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians became the British Empire’s Greek Cypriots, and the Ottomans’ Ottoman/Turkish-speaking Muslims became the Britons’ Turkish Cypriots; the Armenian, Latin and Maronite Catholic communities maintained their existing ethno-religious community identity.

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29 Η Μεγάλη Ιδέα (Η Μεγάλη Ιδέα).
30 Η Φωνή της Κύπρου.
31 İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti, in Ottoman Turkish; in Republican Turkish, Birlik ve İlerieme Derneği.
32 ‘Türkçe konuşalım’ (Beckingham, 1957b: 170 tarafından belirtilen).
By the end of British rule, more than 570,000 Cypriots lived in six towns and 619 villages (cf. maps 3a-8); 77.1% of the population were Greek Cypriot (including the constitutionally-recognised minority communities, which consisted of 4,000 Armenian Cypriots, 1,100 Latin Cypriots and 2,752 Maronite Cypriots), 18.2% were Turkish Cypriot (including the unofficial minority communities, which comprised an unknown number of Linovamvakoi and 520 Roma), and 4.7% were Other (e.g. British) (cf. Cucó, 1992: 17). Notably, massive cultural, linguistic and religious diversity had been reduced to seven ethno-religious communities. All communities have diverse origins; recognition of a community's diversity is not denial of that community's existence and identity; indeed, the denial of that community's diversity is a denial of that community's identity.

Place names like Arab Village (an Arabic-speaking Syrian Maronite settlement (Beckingham, 1957b: 169)), Syrian Village, and Circassian Village demonstrate that, for generations, minority communities identified and/or were categorised primarily as those religious, linguistic, geographical or cultural minorities. While many minority communities may have shrunk through emigration (like Jewish Cypriots, the last of whom died in Cyprus in 1960 (Roman, 2001: 29)), many minority Cypriots must have stayed and, over generations, assimilated into the remaining community groups.

So, the Greek Cypriot community includes people of Coptic Orthodox and Syrian Orthodox ancestry; the Turkish Cypriot community includes people of Babist Muslim and Muslim Circassian ancestry; the Latin community will include individuals of Palestinian, Syrian and Armenian Frankish ancestry; the Armenian and Maronite communities will include individuals of Mardaite ancestry; and the Linovamvaki community will include some of Arnaut descent; furthermore, all of the recognised communities will include people descended from converted members of all of the other communities; and there was and is intermarriage.

British colonial authorities contributed to the simplification of identities through their passive failure to recognise differences within and between Greek-speaking, Orthodox and Hellenic communities, and within and between Ottoman/Turkish-speaking, Muslim and Turkic communities; the British also contributed through their active attempts to distance the recognised “Greek” and “Turkish” communities from each other. However, Cypriot nationalist movements consciously denied or erased diversity within their own community, and actively estranged each community from the other. Indeed, divisive colonial structures only functioned during divisive nationalist activity: when one Cypriot nationalist movement promoted its nationalist ideals, it caused the other community’s representatives to use the British system to protect their own nationalist aspirations. Thus, instead of compromising, or uniting in an anti-colonial struggle, both communities struggled against both the British occupiers and their Cypriot neighbours.

33 Including the communities in the British Sovereign Base Areas (BSAs), 77.7% were Greek Cypriot, 18.1% Turkish Cypriot, and 4.2% Other (Cucó, 1992: 17).
34 (Klepini/)Arapköy.
35 Syrianochori/Siryanohor.
36 Tzerkezoi/Çerkezköy.
Map 3a: village map of peninsula, Famagusta district (from ROCDLS, 1960).
Map 3b: village map of plains, Famagusta district (from ROCDLS, 1960).
Map 4: village map of Kyrenia district (from ROCDLS, 1960).
Map 5: village map of Larnaca district (from ROCDLS, 1960).
Map 6: village map of Limassol district (from ROCDLS, 1960).
Map 7: village map of Nicosia district (from ROCDLS, 1960).
2.a.ii. An outline of the Cyprus Conflict

Having explored the evolution of the Cypriot community, it is possible to chart the implosion of that community. Now, I will outline the development of the Cyprus Conflict, to provide a framework for understanding the detailed historical discussion in later chapters.

As the Hellenist nationalist campaign developed, there were intercommunal disturbances late in the Nineteenth Century, and intercommunal riots early in the Twentieth Century; but afterwards, the tension eased quickly. In time, however, Hellenist nationalist elements in Greece and Cyprus formed a secret Greek/Greek Cypriot para-state; in parallel, Turkist nationalist elements in Turkey and Cyprus established an equivalent, secret Turkish/Turkish Cypriot deep state.

On 1st April 1955, the Hellenist para-state began a paramilitary campaign for enosis, union with Greece, which Colonel George Grivas's National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) led. Consequently, the Turkist deep state began a paramilitary campaign for taksim, partition of the island, which Volkan, later reformed as the Turkish Resistance Organisation (TMT), led. Initially, the Hellenist para-state waged a terrorist campaign against the property and personnel of the British colonial state (EOKA's victims including the colony's Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot personnel). In response, the Turkist deep state conducted a violent campaign against the property of the Greek Cypriot community, to discourage their nationalist support, and to encourage the nationalist activity.
of the Turkish Cypriot community. Soon after, both paramilitaries began silencing the moderate voices within their own communities; then they started attacking each other’s communities.

On 7th June 1958, TMT committed a fake EOKA attack to excuse a violent “reaction”, causing two months of intercommunal violence, during which thousands of Cypriots were driven from their homes. Eventually, there was a Greek Cypriot-Turkish Cypriot ceasefire on 4th August 1958, a Greek Cypriot-British ceasefire on 9th March 1959, and the birth of the independent Republic of Cyprus43 on 16th August 1960; however, neither the enosist Hellenist para-state nor the taksimist Turkist deep state accepted independence.

The paramilitaries continued to plot and, on 21st December 1963, the Hellenist para-state, through the EOKA successor paramilitary named the Organisation44, nicknamed Akritas, provoked a clash then started nearly nine months of intercommunal violence, in which about 200 Greek Cypriots, but about 25,000 Turkish Cypriots, became refugees. The United Nations Peacekeeping Force In Cyprus (UNFICYP) arrived on 13th April 1964, but a ceasefire was only agreed on 10th August, after a Greek Cypriot paramilitary attack on strategic Turkish Cypriot villages so severe that the Turkish military intervened.

In the following years, political violence – overwhelmingly right-on-left – continued, but intercommunal peace prevailed. In Greece on 21st April 1967, the para-state held a coup and established a military junta, the Regime of the Colonels. Then in mid-November, the Greek Cypriot paramilitary provoked a clash. The clash provided an excuse for the Greek Cypriot National Guard to attack strategic Turkish Cypriot villages between 15th and 19th November. Turkey threatened to intervene militarily, so the Greek Junta removed then National Guard leader Grivas from the island. Subsequently, on 29th December, the Turkish Cypriot leadership declared itself a transitional administration until the achievement of a lasting peace. In 1971, an enosist faction of the Greek Junta/para-state and former EOKA leader Grivas started building underground army EOKA B, which started fighting President Makarios’s government in 1973.

On 15th July 1974, the Greek Junta-backed Greek Cypriot paramilitary held a coup against the Greek Cypriot government. On 20th, the Turkish deep state directed the Turkish Cypriot paramilitary-assisted Turkish military invasion of Cyprus; on 22nd, there was a Greek/Greek Cypriot-Turkish/Turkish Cypriot ceasefire, and on 23rd, both the Greek junta and the Greek Cypriot coup regime fell. Nevertheless, between 14th and 16th August, the Turkish military conducted the second phase of its invasion and occupied the northern Cypriot territory still held today. The vast majority of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots on the “wrong” side fled or were forced to move to the area under their own ethnic group’s administration, and the Green Line between the communities remained closed.

On 13th February 1975, the Turkish Cypriot transitional administration declared itself the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC)45; and on 15th November 1983, it made the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)46, which the United Nations judged invalid and illegal. Hence, the Turkish Cypriot community has endured political non-recognition, and economic and cultural embargo. Interfering with or preventing access to money, materials, education/training, and support, the cultural embargo has threatened not just the contemporary condition of cultural heritage in northern Cyprus, but the very capacity of cultural heritage workers in northern Cyprus to be able to conserve or restore historic buildings. There have been decades of negotiations, bicommunal programmes, and the opening of the Green Line on 23rd April 2003; there have been successive peace plans, including the most recent failure of the United Nations’ Annan Plan on 24th April 2004; and there was a period where both sides’ administrations were controlled by political parties historically opposed to conflict and division; yet that period is over, and Cyprus remained divided, its communities estranged. The power and freedom of pro-
reunification movements questioned, the political will of both communities doubted, high-level
gossip is about resignation to partition.

2.b. Cypriot archaeology

Professional archaeology evolved in parallel with the Cyprus Problem. Antiquarians,
archaeologists and institutions bent, broke, or cheated the regulations of the Ottoman and British
administrations, in order to excavate, collect and/or trade as many artefacts as possible (e.g. di
Cesnola, 1991 [1878]: 66; 120-127; 146-148; 171-176; cf. Given, 2001: 255; 259; Jerome Farrell, 1909,
archaeologists were influenced by the conflict, and how they influenced it.

2.b.i. Historiography

The historiography of Cypriot archaeology is important, because it explains Cypriots’
understandings of their histories and identities, and thus the influence of archaeology upon
community relations and conflicts. During the British colonial period, the experience and
expectation of nationalism became so naturalised that cultural heritage workers interpreted all
material remains as the remains of ethnic groups, and presumed ‘exclusive and antagonistic.... racial
rivalry’ between any two ethnic groups (Given, 1991: 185). Colonial officials and archaeologists
ignorantly misinterpreted or knowingly misappropriated archaeological evidence to prove their
empire’s right to rule Cyprus (Given, 2002: 420).

According to archaeologist Michael Given (1998: 11-15), following British colonial policy, British
colonial archaeology passed through three stages: an initial, colonial Orientalist belief in a primitive,
Oriental Cyprus in need of domination (1878-1900); a subsequent, popular philhellenic recognition of
an educated, Hellenic Cyprus, which logically undermined the British Empire’s claim to the right
(and need) to rule (1900-1930); and consequently, a unitary Cypriotist desire to suppress
archaeological evidence that could be appropriated by divisive nationalists (1930-1960). In their
Orientalist belittlement of Cypriots, British imperialists obsessed over the “degenerate” Aphrodite
goddess cult and her assimilation into “primitive” Cypriot tradition as the Milk-Giving Virgin\(^47\), but
that generated evidence for the Hellenist narrative of Greek cultural continuity (cf. Given, 2002: 425-
426), even though she was actually a syncretic Near Eastern-Cypriot goddess introduced to Greece
(Webb, 2003: 15). The united Near Eastern-Cypriot origins of Aphrodite recognised, she is still the
Greek Cypriot government’s and Greek Cypriot archaeologists’ symbol of the birth of 3200 Years of
Cypriot Hellenism (e.g. Hadjisavvas, 2003; Papadopoulos, 2003).

In their Cypriotist attempt to suppress ethnic nationalism, British colonial authorities promoted a
fabricated ancient, indigenous ‘Eteocypriot’ ethnic group (Given, 1991: 186), which would establish
the historical reality of a Cypriot nation and thus the political justification for a (still colonised)
Cypriot state. Yet the myth of the Eteocypriot nation was assimilated into the myth of the
Mycenaean invasion (Leriou, 2007: 19): British Empire-licensed archaeologists narrated an ancient
history of an indigenous Cypriot nation assimilated into a colonising Greek nation (e.g. Gjerstad,
1948: 432-433); and thus the Cypriot community was supposedly scientifically proved to be Cypriot
Greek. Since then, the process of the Hellenisation of Cyprus has been questioned (e.g. Catling,
1973), but both publicly and academically, the reality of the Hellenisation of Cyprus remains
fundamentally unchallenged (Leriou, 2002: 3-4; 2007: 3-4; 22-23; e.g. Karageorghis, 2003). So,
archaeologies of Cyprus remain Hellenist nationalist archaeologies.

2.b.ii. Participation

\(^{47}\) Η Αφροδίτη (η Παναγία η Αφροδίτισσα); she is venerated as the Milk-Giving Virgin, i Galaktariotissa (η
Γαλακταριότισσα).
Participation in the production of knowledge may be as instructive as historiography, because it reveals the influence of Cypriots' relations and conflicts upon the profession. The four most important (potential) splits in the profession are between communities of class, politics, gender, and ethnicity; but since the former two are not (significant) splits, I will focus upon the latter two. Gender inequity in Cypriot archaeology has been systematically analysed (cf. Webb and Frankel, 1995); unfortunately, the most significant, ethnic inequity has not. There has been no specific study of the history of ethnic participation; nonetheless, it is possible to reconstruct that history from notes within various archaeological and historical studies, and information in certain professional documents.

There are no data on the class origins or political allegiances of Cypriot archaeologists; but enough can be known to exclude them as professional splits. As for class, archaeology has always been a middle-class profession elsewhere (cf. McGuire, 2008: 100-101; 104; Trigger, 2006: 19-20), and it is possible to affirm that (indirectly) in Cyprus. On the data available, despite access to free university education in their respective “motherlands”, the vast majority of Cypriot archaeologists achieved their highest degrees elsewhere, primarily Britain and France (cf. Alphas and Pilides, 2008: 43); the ability to pay for that education indicates middle-class status. As for politics, it could be impossible or unethical to discuss archaeologists’ allegiances, because they are unknown or private; but fortunately, it is ultimately unnecessary. The consistently nationalist narratives of Cypriot archaeology show that no non-nationalist archaeologists have successfully changed the historical understandings that the profession teaches to the public. (Even Eteocypriotism eventually consolidated Hellenist nationalism.) So, even if there are non-nationalist Cypriot archaeologists, the Cypriot archaeological community functions as a nationalist community. The significant splits are in gender and ethnicity.

It was and is common for women to work on archaeological sites in Cyprus; but for a long time their presence was largely as workers. Mirroring the patriarchal domestic division of labour, normally, men were archaeologists, technicians, supervisors, foremen and excavators, and women were spoil transporters, cooks, caretakers and cleaners (cf. Hogarth et al., 1888: 164; Karageorghis, 1999a: 49-51); men produced, and women disposed of their waste. Historically low participation by women as archaeologists – ‘rather than... direct discrimination’ – led to consequently few publications by female archaeologists (Webb and Frankel, 1995: 96). But their low participation was caused by previous direct discrimination, and continued indirect discrimination. Cypriot women were discouraged from becoming archaeologists, and female archaeologists were discouraged from working in Cyprus: while the first female dig director in Crete was Harriet Boyd Hawes in 1900 (Allsebrook, 2002: 94), the first female dig director in Cyprus was Joan du Plat Taylor in 1938 (Bolger, 2003: 201); du Plat Taylor had also been the first female government archaeologist – Cyprus Museum Assistant Curator – in Cyprus in 1932 (cf. Åström, 1971: 30). Nevertheless, women have formed a numerical majority in the Department of Antiquities since 1995 (Alphas and Pilides, 2008: 30-31; by their ages, they have also made up the majority of the profession since about then). In simple numbers, females appear to have finally achieved approximately equal participation (cf. Webb and Frankel, 1995: 95-97 – figs. 2-4; see also Bolger, 2003: 206 – table 8.1), but they are under-visible in co-authored and collaborative work (cf. Bolger, 2003: 209-211 – tables 8.4-8.6). In addition, women are still under-represented in the senior levels of the profession (cf. Webb and Frankel, 1995: 98; 100 – fig. 6). Furthermore, proportionally, Cypriot women’s publication has actually declined (from about 1 in 3 between 1969 and 1979 to about 1 in 5 between 1981 and 1991; cf. Webb and Frankel, 1995: 97 – fig. 4). Moreover, there are huge divisions within the discipline: crudely, women tend to do things, men tend to do theory; and within artefact studies, women tend to do pottery and archaeobotany, men tend to do metals and archaeozoology (cf. Bolger, 2003: 207 – tables 8.2-8.3; see also Webb and Frankel, 1995: 101).

Domestic burdens weigh more heavily on women than men, and they interfere with archaeological fieldwork even more than with other disciplines’ work (Webb and Frankel, 1995: 103), so they limit female archaeologists even more than they do anthropologists, let alone other academics, and push women into flexible – but insecure and unsupported – jobs within the industry, like artefact studies. Nonetheless, women are most disadvantaged by “avoidable” inequities; their
roles include the ‘dishwashing’ (Dommasnes, Kлеппе, Мандт and Нæсс, 1998: 119), the essential but ‘invisible service[s]’ (Karouzou, 1984: 27, translated and cited by Nikolaidou and Kokkinidou, 1998: 248), which are either not published at all, or used unaccredited within others’ works, or written by the women then published by the institution (e.g. museum catalogues). This phenomenon is most easily seen in the work of academic couples, where the men were the well-known dig directors, and the women were the ‘largely unacknowledged’ “dig wives”, who administered the excavations as well as their homes (Dever, 2004: 162). Also, women’s cumulative disadvantage generates additional stress that further inhibits their work (Webb and Frankel, 1995: 104). Perhaps most perversely, women’s under-recognised or completely unacknowledged excavation-digging and artefact analysis enables men’s career-advancing dig-directing and theoretical observation (ibid.: 104). Nevertheless, women are relatively well-represented in Cypriot archaeology, compared with women in other countries’ archaeologies; and they are very well-represented within Cypriot archaeology, compared with Turkish Cypriots.

Given the Hellenist nationalist narrative of Cypriot archaeology, under-representation of Turkish Cypriots in the profession might be expected. However, while early Ottomanist ideology had dismissed cultural histories from the pre-Islamic Age of Ignorance48, from the middle of the Nineteenth Century, European Classical studies and archaeologies within the Ottoman Empire piqued Ottoman intellectual curiosity (Erciyas, 2005: 180-182). Furthermore, the subsequent, early twentieth-century nationalist Turkish History Thesis49 argued that the ancient Turkish nation was the founder of Civilisation, ancient Turkish culture was the ancestor of every succeeding one in Anatolia/Turkey, and therefore that the modern Turkish nation was the inheritor of all historic cultures in Anatolia/Turkey (Erciyas, 2005: 181-183; 186-187). An adopted daughter of then President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and a co-founder of the Turkish Historical Society, Ayşê Afet İnan narrated the modern Turkish nation’s continuous Anatolian ancestry ‘from Hittites until today’ (9th January 1936, cited in İnan, 2005: 141, translated and cited by Baysal, 2007: 20-21). While still suffering the 1980 coup regime’s ban on political participation, former Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit argued that the medieval Turkish Seljuk state ‘internalised... Greek..., Byzantine’, and other cultures in Anatolia, and that these ‘roots’ grew the ‘tree’ of the modern Turkish nation (1984: 21, translated and paraphrased by Konuralp, 2009: 110). This historical narrative led to active Turkish practice of Hellenist archaeology and history at least since the 1930s (cf. Erciyas, 2005: 183-185). Nevertheless, the Turkish Cypriot community became estranged from Cypriot archaeology.

Foreign scholars knew and studied (an albeit Oriental(ised)) Cyprus for its role in ancient Greek and biblical histories (cf. Karageorghis, 1999a: 18; Leriou, 2007: 6-7). Their presence, archaeological focus and colonialist narrative were unexceptional; it occurred throughout the Middle East and North Africa (Trigger, 2006: 73). What was exceptional and significant was the impact upon the internal Cypriot ethnic composition of the profession. First of all, it is notable that Cypriots were incorporated at all, whereas, for example, neither Egyptians nor Iraqis were brought into those British colonies’ professional archaeological communities in significant numbers (Trigger, 2006: 73). Furthermore, the ancient-Greek-speaking Christian Classical scholars tended to live and work with co-religionists, with whom they could communicate – Greek Cypriots (Şevketoğlu, 2000a: 122), so the Cypriots who were introduced to archaeology tended to be Greek Cypriots. Different educational systems compounded this social exclusion: university study of archaeology required school study of ancient Greek and Latin, which were unavailable in Turkish Cypriot schools (Karageorghis, 2007: 47), so no Turkish Cypriots who were interested in archaeology were able to train as archaeologists. Thus, already before independence, archaeology became a Greek Cypriot profession (albeit with many foreign archaeologists visiting for excavation, survey and other work). For example, in the first Annual Report of the Director of Antiquities, Cyprus (ARDAC) in which all senior colonial archaeological staff were listed, all except one – 1936-1960 antiquities director A. H. S. “Peter” Megaw – were already Greek Cypriot (cf. Megaw, 1953: 2); the only subsequent senior non-Greek

48 Jahiliyya.
49 Türk Tarih Kurumu.
Cypriot staff were two British colonial appointments, 1954–1968 Curium Excavation director Joseph Last and 1955–1959 Cyprus Survey director Hector Catling (cf. Megaw, 1954: 2; 1955: 2). In a comprehensive survey of Who's Who in Cypriote Archaeology (albeit only of those still active in 1971), there were no Turkish Cypriot archaeologists at any level anywhere; the only Turkish cultural heritage worker listed was Istanbul museum curator Haluk Kökümr Ergüleç, because he published a study of Cypriot sculpture in the city’s museums (cf. Åström, 1971: 32). The Turkish Cypriot community was completely excluded from the Cypriot archaeological community.

Furthermore, the Cyprus Conflict pushed Turkish Cypriots out of those cultural heritage professions in which they had worked. From 1955, the Greek Cypriot paramilitary campaign caused the British authorities to form an auxiliary police of increasing numbers and improved pay. Since the British colonial state and the Turkish Cypriot community depended upon each other to defeat the campaign for enosis, the British colonial auxiliary police was almost wholly Turkish Cypriot (O’Malley and Craig, 1999: 21–22; 35–36). EOKA attacked Greek Cypriot “traitors” and infiltrated the security forces, so Greek Cypriot officers had to leave the police, and colonial authorities did not trust those who stayed; simultaneously, colonial authorities used severe collective punishment, so the Greek Cypriot community increasingly chose to support EOKA (Borowiec, 2000: 37). At the height of the EOKA campaign and intercommunal violence in 1958, the antiquities department’s two (and only) Turkish Cypriot craft workers – and even their potential colleagues/replacements – joined the police (cf. Megaw, 1958: 4; 6). By the end of 1959, three of the department’s nineteen craft workers were Turkish Cypriot (cf. Megaw, 1959: 6); and despite some difficulties in staffing, there evidently continued to be Turkish Cypriot monument custodians and museum assistants (cf. Megaw, 1958: 6; 1959: 7). Yet, after the eruption of intercommunal violence in 1963, all Turkish Cypriots left government employment (Karageorghis, 2007: 47).

Nonetheless, other publications show that there were still a few Turkish Cypriot cultural heritage workers. Turkish Cypriot teacher Hakkı M. Atun (1973) was able to present and publish research on Ottoman Cypriot cultural heritage (in a Greek Cypriot-run conference and book), but he was only able to continue work because he was employed at a Turkish Cypriot institution, the Turkish Lyceum; likewise museum worker Çevdet Çağdaş (1973), because he worked at the Cyprus Turkish Museum. Contrastingly, now known for his 1990 history of the Turks in Cyprus, then Ahmet C. Gazoğlu was ‘exile[d]’ between 1967 and 1973 for taking an ‘active role in representing the rights of the Turkish Cypriots’ during the intercommunal violence (Sentürk, 2003). While proportions of ethnic participation in non-archaeological cultural heritage professions are unknown, Hakkı Atun, Çağdaş and others’ publications suggest that Turkish Cypriots were not actively excluded from the professional community; nonetheless, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot professionals were estranged by the intercommunal conflict.

One of the most fascinating – and potentially one of the most significant – quirks in the development of the discipline was triggered by the events of 1974. The fighting during the Turkish army’s invasion, and the displacement facilitating the Turkish army’s occupation of northern Cyprus, made displaced northern Greek Cypriots the greatest victims within their community. Since then, official policy has pressed northern Greek Cypriot refugees to ‘always feel like refugees’ trapped in ‘non-places’ (Papadakis, 2006: 11; 10). There is a ‘common nationalist discourse’ in which Greek Cypriots refuse to cross the Green Line to the north, because ‘crossing means recognizing the illegal’ Turkish Cypriot administration (Dikomitis, 2005: 8; 9); and refugee communities are exceptionally active in pressuring others not to cross either (Loizos, 2008: 65). Indeed, one of the Famagusta refugee archaeologists, Tasoula Georgiou-Hadjitofi (2000: 229), claimed that ‘[a]s a Cypriot, a refugee from Famagusta, I speak for the people of Cyprus’, and said that their greatest loss was their loss of cultural heritage.

Historically, Cypriot archaeology had focused upon northern cemeteries. Thus, in the same way that an extremely disproportionate number of Greek Cypriots were familiarised with and employed in archaeology in comparison with Turkish Cypriots, so a (less extremely) disproportionate number of northern Cypriots were engaged in archaeology in comparison with southern Cypriots. (Echoing this, a disproportionate number of foreign archaeologists had professional and emotional connections with northern Cypriot sites, archaeologists and communities.) Necessarily, after 1974, work was
concentrated on southern settlements (Knapp and Antoniadou, 1998: 32). Attempting to give work to displaced persons, and to help them cope with the catastrophe, antiquities director Vassos Karageorghis (2007: 111) re-employed ‘all’ of the archaeologists and support staff, and ‘many’ of the labourers (possibly all of them, too, except for Turkish Cypriot labourers trapped on the other side of the Green Line; and, more grimly, any casualties). Thus, a disproportionately large element of the Greek Cypriot archaeological community became a refugee community (and since displaced persons constituted more than a third of the entire Greek Cypriot community, it is plausible that refugees formed the majority of the Greek Cypriot archaeological community). In the next section, I discuss how this imbalance in participation affected the practice of archaeology in postwar Cyprus.

Recently, a European Commission project profiled the contemporary archaeological profession in the Republic of Cyprus (cf. Alphas and Pilides, 2008). At least 52 archaeologists and 15 archaeology students (and 437 support staff) are employed in southern Cyprus (ibid.: 26; 199): 69% of the archaeologists are women (ibid.: 29; in contrast, women are only 29% of the support staff (ibid.: 58)). Through a continued civil service system of promotion by length of service, older male archaeologists had continued to control the Department of Antiquities despite the younger female majority. Equally though, through that same system, female archaeologists have now inherited the antiquities department; its director is female, as are (through an open system of promotion) the vice-chair of the University of Cyprus Department of History and Archaeology and the chair of its Archaeological Research Unit. The project team’s review of ethnic diversity, however, was flawed: it was in fact a count of nationalities, so it only identified 41 (79%) of archaeologists as ‘Cypriots’ (ibid.: 37), and therefore did not reveal Armenian, Latin, Linovamvakoi, Maronite, Roma or Turkish Cypriots’ participation or non-participation. (Greek Cypriot archaeologists told me that a few Turkish Cypriot archaeology students had volunteered on Greek Cypriot excavations.) Probably primarily due to the Greek language proficiency requirements, 8 of the 11 non-Cypriot archaeologists are Greek (ibid.: 37). Foreign excavations and surveys vary from year to year, but currently, at least 21 foreign teams bring at least 99 professional archaeologists, 201 archaeology students, and 44 support staff to the island (ibid.: 186; but their gender and ethnic balances were not documented).

There has been no similar study of the archaeological profession in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and it is incredibly difficult even to estimate. Gender and ethnic ratios are unknown; Eastern Mediterranean University’s Archaeology and Art History Department’s staff seems mostly male, but it has had at least two female chairs, and the TRNC Department of Antiquities and Museums has had at least one female director. The TRNC’s poverty might imply a disproportionately smaller northern Cypriot archaeological community; but the TRNC has invested in higher education as a driver and financier of development (Bıçak, 1995: 165; 167). Turkish language proficiency requirements would imply ethnically-restricted participation in the work of the TRNC antiquities department. Yet English-language instruction at northern Cypriot universities has enabled not only Turkish, but also European and American archaeologists’ participation in academic archaeology. (Equally, it has enabled one Greek Cypriot media scholar to work there; but no Greek Cypriot archaeologists have done so.) At least four universities – Cyprus International University (CIU)50, Eastern Mediterranean University (EMU)51, (private) Girne American University52, and Near East University (NEU)53 – teach archaeology and cultural heritage. However, northern Cyprus’s denial of southern Cypriots’ access between 1974 and 2003, and a Hellenist professional boycott and black list of TRNC-associated professionals and institutions since 1974 (discussed below), as well as continuing international economic embargoes and travel restrictions upon northern Cyprus since 1983, have all greatly limited participation in (as well as the functioning of) the archaeological profession (Şevketoğlu, 2000a: 2; 116; 2000b: 53–54; 55–56).

50 Uluslararası Kıbrıs Üniversitesi (UKÜ).
51 Doğu Akdeniz Üniversitesi.
52 Girne Amerikan Üniversitesi.
53 Yakın Doğu Üniversitesi.
So, trying to account for all uncertainties, the island’s permanent professional archaeological community is probably fewer than 70 archaeologists and 35 students (and 600 support staff). They are not only geographically but administratively divided by ethnicity, and they are almost as completely divided since the opening of the borders as before. Despite being a numerical minority since 1995, men continued to dominate the profession until this year; and they still have undue influence over theory and methodology. Women now dominate the profession numerically and structurally; but they still do more than their fair share of work, for less than their fair share of recognition and reward. Having explored who works in Cypriot archaeology and what they teach the Cypriot community, it is worth reviewing how the Cyprus Conflict directly affected the practice of archaeological work.

2.b.iii. Work

Archaeology during the Cyprus Conflict can be split into four phases: 1955-1959 mid-conflict archaeology, 1960-1963 inter-conflict archaeology, 1964-1974 mid-conflict archaeology, and 1974 onwards post-war (but not post-conflict) archaeology. The changes in archaeology between 1955 and 1974 were the severe but temporary results of, or responses to, anti-state and inter-communal violence. However, the war of 1974, and archaeologists’ reactions, had terrible consequences for archaeology.

2.b.iii.1. Archaeological work in the midst of conflict, 1955-1974

From the beginning of the EOKA campaign, cultural heritage workers faced ‘[d]isturbed political conditions,... terrorism and... a state of emergency’ (Megaw, 1955: 3; see also Megaw, 1956: 4; 1957: 4; 1958: 4; 1959: 6). While work on one site was disrupted by British security forces’ militarisation of Kyrenia Castle (and their use of it as a detention camp), in fact a record five foreign teams worked in Cyprus in 1955 (Megaw, 1955: 3; 6); but in 1956, obstructed by the conflict on the island (and the Suez Crisis war of Britain, France and Israel on Egypt), no foreign teams excavated, and local teams were limited (Megaw, 1956: 4; 8). In reprisal for a communal riot, EOKA assassinated the Turkish Cypriot museum custodian of Kolossi Castle (who had not even been involved in the riot), and in reprisal for cooperation with the colonial antiquities department (in the restoration of his monastery), EOKA assassinated the Greek Cypriot abbot of Chrysorogiatissa Monastery, Epiphanis Georgiades (Megaw, 1956: 4). More historic sites were militarised (again as part of the Suez Crisis as well as the Cyprus Conflict), and some places were damaged in security searches for EOKA paramilitaries, arms and equipment (ibid.).

In 1957 and 1958, one foreign team restarted its excavation and the local archaeologists extended their work, but otherwise the problems persisted and worsened (Megaw, 1957: 4; 1958: 4). Then, in the ‘lawlessness’ of 1958, communal riots forced the closure of two museums and the halt of some conservation and restoration work (Megaw, 1958: 4; 6); for example, Famagusta’s Greek Cypriot staff could not work at all during the summer peak of the unrest; and its repeatedly damaged Church of Agios Georgios Eksorinos was walled up; Turkish Cypriots displaced from their homes sought refuge at historic sites and thereby damaged them (Megaw, 1958: 4).

Then antiquities director A. H. S. Peter Megaw (1958: 6) acknowledged that ‘all staff’ endured ‘grave strains’ during the emergency, but that was too much of an understatement: then assistant curator Vassos Karageorghis (2007: 58) recently observed that (exclusively) Greek Cypriot archaeologists and workers endured ‘curfews, interrogations and maltreatment’. Nonetheless, where Turkish Cypriot cultural heritage professionals and labourers remained, bicomunal cultural heritage work returned in 1959 (cf. Megaw, 1959: 6-7); and the arrival of peace and independence in 1960 enabled an increase in cultural heritage work, and in communities’ cooperation with cultural heritage professionals (cf. Dikaios, 1960: 5; 1961: 5; 1962: 5).

The 1955-1959 Archaeological Survey of Cyprus (or Cyprus Survey) had been designed to produce a comprehensive list of cultural heritage sites, a Sites and Monuments Record (SMR) (Hector Catling, 9th May 2002, interviewed by Cadogan, 2004: 18); but the conflict prevented the record’s
production. Expected since the end of the previous outburst of violence (cf. Megaw, 1959: 10), the eruption of intercommunal violence in 1963 and the consequent enclaving of many Turkish Cypriot areas prevented the antiquities department's archaeological survey branch from accessing many cultural heritage sites and museums (cf. Karageorghis, 1964: 3); conflict-driven looting forced the survey branch to function as a rescue team (Hadjisavvas, 2004: 38; 40). However, while sites and museums in enclaved areas continued to be inaccessible, and foreign excavations were initially reduced to a couple of trial runs (cf. Karageorghis, 1964: 3-4), local and foreign excavation work rapidly returned to normal and even expanded (cf. Karageorghis, 1965: 3; 1966: 3; 1967: 5; 1968: 3; 1969: 3; 1970: 3; 1971: 3; 1972: 3; 1973: 3-4). This boom in excavation, too, was a product of (a different) conflict: the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War drove foreign archaeologists out of Israel and Palestine and into Cyprus (Davis, 1989: 166). Notably, this exodus included Dr. Paul Lapp, who refused to excavate in the West Bank under occupation (ibid.); likewise, other archaeologists have refused.

2.b.iii.2. Archaeological work across lines of conflict, 1974-present

All archaeological and other cultural heritage work in northern Cyprus was then 'violently interrupted' by the 1974 coup and invasion (Karageorghis, 1974: 3), and has remained so because of the Turkish army's occupation. Three foreign teams completed excavations, but three finished early, and nine never started (ibid.: 7-8). Sites and museums in northern Cyprus became inaccessible to the island's entire professional archaeological community (ibid.: 4; though formerly enclaved Turkish Cypriot areas in southern Cyprus became accessible (Karageorghis, 1975: 7-8)); and the Cyprus Museum, in the south but close to the Green Line, was evacuated (Karageorghis, 1974: 4; it remained closed for two years (Karageorghis, 1976: 10)). Greek Cypriot antiquities director Dr. Vassos Karageorghis and Turkish monument inspector Prof. Ekrem Akurgal tried to work together to monitor the condition of monuments in the occupied areas, but the Turkish ambassador made it impossible and, later, internal Turkish politics left Akurgal powerless (Karageorghis, 2007: 119; 150). Still, (at least some) foreign archaeological teams who had been working in the north inspected their occupied archaeological sites there, and UNESCO made a (restricted) sample survey of cultural heritage sites across the island (Karageorghis, 1974: 4; 3). (I discuss the UNESCO survey in much greater detail in the chapter on the Subversion of Scholarship, in the Bowdlerisation of Jacques Dalibard's UNESCO reports (5.a.).)

No foreign teams who had been working in the north before the war did so again afterwards (Karageorghis, 1975: 10). The Greek Cypriot antiquities department threatened them and their colleagues with international blacklisting for digging in the north (cf. Karageorghis, 2007: 118), and gave them licences to dig other sites in the south instead (Karageorghis, 1976: 3). Soon, there were more teams digging in southern Cyprus than there had been digging throughout Cyprus before the invasion (ibid.: 6-7). Indeed, the Republic of Cyprus Department of Antiquities allowed an American academic association, the American Schools of Oriental Research (ASOR), to establish the island's only foreign archaeological school (and at the time, its only academic archaeological centre), the Cyprus American Archaeological Research Institute (CAARI), in order to organise and support the massive foreign presence (Davis, 1989: 169; Harris, 1989: 159; Karageorghis, 1978: 3), which still now outnumbers the local archaeological community (Alphas and Pilides, 2008: 186). In contrast, northern Cyprus lacks even the most basic tools of cultural heritage protection, like an underwater archaeological site inventory (Harpster, 2008: 8). The legal context of cultural heritage work in northern Cyprus, and archaeologists' careful appropriation of international law, have created massive practical and ethical difficulties in archaeology in Cyprus.

2.c. International law

In order to understand the changes in cultural heritage work from 1974 onwards, it is necessary to understand the international law which Cypriot archaeologists have used to direct the development of their discipline. Parts of customary international law applicable to all, the 1899 and
The 1907 Hague Conventions respectively require occupying powers to 'protect' and 'safeguard' 'real property', that is immovable property, buildings (IUHPC, 1899: Ch. V, Sec. III, Art. 55; 1907: Ch. V, Sec. III, Art. 55). The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO, 1999) has stated that the 1954 (Hague) Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict required that powers 'occupying territory must preserve cultural property in that territory'. Yet in the relevant clause of the 1954 Hague Convention, which was carefully thought-out but poorly worded, the Intergovernmental Conference on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict only required an occupying power to 'support the competent national authorities' cultural property protection, and to conserve war-damaged sites 'in close co-operation with such authorities' (ICPCPEAC, 1954a: Ch. I, Art. 5). The Convention did not explicitly allow the occupying power to work independently. So, the national authorities of an occupied territory could refuse to do any cultural heritage work in the occupied territory, and then argue that international law prohibited the occupying power from doing even emergency work.

In its subsequent, carefully-worded but poorly-thought-out New Delhi Recommendation, UNESCO urged an occupying power to 'refrain from carrying out archaeological excavations' (1956: Art. 32). The 1956 Recommendation explicitly banned an occupying power from conducting archaeological site preservation, which the 1954 Convention had implicitly required. So, the occupying power could not do emergency archaeological work (theoretically, not even with the consent, or indeed upon the request, of an occupied power). As I will demonstrate, the Hellenist archaeological community ignored customary international law, and used the letter of the 1954 law and 1956 guideline, rather than their spirit, in order to shut down all archaeological activity and most heritage work in northern Cyprus.

Since 1999, the ICPCPEAC's Second Protocol to the Hague Convention has more judiciously required occupying powers to 'prohibit and prevent... any archaeological excavation, save where this is strictly required to safeguard, record or preserve cultural property', and that cultural heritage work 'shall, unless circumstances do not permit, be carried out in close co-operation with the competent national authorities' (1999: Ch. 2, Art. 9 – emphases added). The 1999 law enabling occupying powers' rescue archaeology and heritage conservation did make the letter of the law embody its spirit; but it was too late for Cyprus. In 1983, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) had declared itself independent; and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC, 1983) had declared the 'purported secession... legally invalid'. The occupied territory of northern Cyprus became an illegal entity, which the Security Council required 'all States not to recognize' (ibid.). As I will show, the Hellenist archaeological community also used the 1983 Security Council Resolution against the secession of the TRNC to prevent any archaeological activity and most heritage work in northern Cyprus. I will also examine significant exceptions that reveal archaeologists' careful appropriation of international law, and that bring into question both their use of the law and the ethics of consequent, contemporary Cypriot archaeology.
3. Methods and methodology

Archaeology is a powerful metaphor for correcting historical propaganda, for exposing crimes and righting wrongs. Greek Cypriot anti-nationalist photojournalist Tony Angastiniotis observed that ‘leaders must have control of the sources’ in order to ‘hide their wrong doings’ (2005: 13), their ‘propaganda machine[s]… burying unpalatable truths deep beneath the ground’ (2005: 31); and that communities must ‘dig the past’ in order to uncover those unpalatable truths (2005: 13).

I work on the methodological assumption that, although historical truths exist, any representation of those truths must select which facts to present, and in which context. Yet some histories deliberately limit their source material and their interpretative framework (or simply lie) in an unprofessional and unethical way, in order to advance an individual and/or community cause. Consequently, other histories are incidentally limited by their access to data, and their freedom to explain that information. Nonetheless, there has been ‘little attention’ to either methods or methodologies in historical archaeology (Archer and Bartoy, 2006: 1).

As a feminist as well as a human rights archaeologist, I practice a ‘human rights methodology: “promoting change by reporting the facts”’ (Thomas, 1993: 83, cited by Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 45; see also Nelson, 2004: 11-14). Like Angastiniotis, I dig up the past to reveal wrong doing and to disrupt propagandists’ control of information, to give communities the tools to reconstruct their own histories. A key tool I need to give my readers, then, is an understanding of how I did my research, how I produced this history of archaeologists’ treatment of historic sites, of social violence against community places, and of the illicit trade in cultural objects; and why I did it in the way I did.

Although the development of theories and the collection of data happen and influence each other simultaneously, primarily theory-driven archaeology may carelessly include, exclude, or interpret data in a way that unjustifiably affirms the original theory (Archer and Bartoy, 2006: 5-6).

I did not have a personal, political or professional interest in validating or falsifying any particular claim. Working with a body of literature and in a community of knowledge riddled with as many myths as truths, I could not presume the truth of any claim (even one of a trustworthy source). I used theory and methodology to prepare for data collection, used the data to revise my theories and methods, and used the most appropriate theories to explain the documented events, practices and processes.

Still, even visible, physical evidence could be misleading; and uninterested professional sources could be mistaken. Not only did I partially refine or wholly disprove some non-nationalist professionals’ evidence-based claims; but also nationalist locals occasionally corrected my non-nationalist source-led interpretations. (Anthropologists ‘typically exclude’ everything they consider to ‘undermine the[ir] credibility’ (Argyrou, 1999: S30); but I believe that honesty – to the point of the inclusion and discussion of points of confusion, error and self-censorship – demonstrates credibility, and thereby earns trust in claims of fact.)

Before I discuss my methods and methodologies, it may help to explain what materials I studied, and with which professionals I conducted my research.

3.a. Cultural heritage, and cultural heritage workers

Archaeologists study the material remains of past human activity, the objects, buildings and landscapes produced, reproduced and reworked by individuals, groups and institutions, as well as all of the other material residues of those actions. While the discipline began as the study of the ancient past, it has broadened its horizons to look at all of the human past, up to the present (as even the events of moments ago have entered the contemporary past).

Public archaeology or community archaeology is that archaeology done in the public sphere, with citizens, communities and interest groups, civic institutions and the state, negotiating economic and political conflicts (Ascherson, 2000: 2; Merriman, 2004: 1-5; Moser et al., 2002: 220; Schadla-Hall, 1999: 147).
Cultural heritage workers may talk about “archaeological heritage”, “cultural heritage” and/or “cultural resources”. Sometimes, they use the terms interchangeably; other times, they distinguish between archaeological sites and historic buildings, or between tangible heritage like objects, buildings and landscapes, and intangible heritage like music, dance and language (Carman, 2002: 14-16; King, 2005: 83-87).

Here, thus, while “archaeologists” are those who primarily study the material remains of past human activity, “cultural heritage workers” comprise: archaeologists; architectural historians and historical architects; anthropologists, ethnographers and sociologists; conservators; community stewards; civil servants; and others. Those workers sometimes occupy more than one position, or move between those fields, or work outside their discipline’s boundaries, and, furthermore, may categorise each other differently.

I myself trained and worked in archaeology, then trained and worked in cultural heritage, then trained as a social researcher and conducted this socio-legal research into archaeology and cultural heritage, partly using archaeological and architectural survey techniques and historical and ethnographic research methods.

Friends, colleagues and locals and I myself found it difficult or impossible to “place” me within one professional community or another and, much like ascriptions of ethnic identity, I was often categorised negatively. I was not Greek Cypriot, not Turkish Cypriot; I was English, but I was not very English. I was not a historian, not an anthropologist; I was an archaeologist, but I was not really an archaeologist.

My otherness influenced interactions, and variously denied or gave me access to information. My position has been introduced in my intellectual autobiography and will be further explained in the methodology, and the resulting opportunities will be explained in the methodology and during the presentation of my data.

3.b. Sources

3.b.i. Library research

Library research is immediately difficult, because publications of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus are neither published as widely, nor published in as many languages, nor stocked in as many libraries, as publications of the Republic of Cyprus. For example, I only heard about the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Presidency Political and Cultural Researches Department’s 54 (TRNCPPCRD, 2006) Erasing the Past 55 just before I left the island in 2008; and I only heard about Hasan Fehmi’s (2003) Our Remaining Assets in the South 56 afterwards, when I had no prospect of going to northern Cyprus to be able to find it.

Library research is even more difficult because the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is not internationally recognised, so TRNC publications are not internationally recognised, and archaeologists understand TRNC publications cannot formally be cited (e.g. Gordon, 2008: 12n31; Knapp and Antoniadou, 1998: 34n1). Furthermore, frequently, those publications simply cannot be found outside northern Cyprus, or at least outside Cyprus; for copies of the Journal of Cyprus Studies delivered to southern Cyprus after I left the island (albeit published the year I arrived), I had to read unpaginated and sometimes corrupted articles on electronic library websites.

There are few published sources other than propaganda, however, that discuss – or even acknowledge – these and other practicalities. Thus, there are few corroborating sources for the claims of my contacts. When I comment upon the practicalities of work in a divided society, I am commenting only upon the practicalities, not upon the cultural heritage workers who have publicly recognised them.

54 Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı Siyasi ve Kültürel Araştırmalar Bölümü.
55 Geçmişi Silmek.
56 Güneyde Kalan Değerlerimiz.
Sometimes sources only identified “a church” or “a mosque”, occasionally by describing their location, but that was not always helpful, because many street names have been changed; for example, some southern Cypriot streets are now named after people and places from ancient Greek mythology, like the Street of Lord Ali in Nicosia, renamed after 1974, when almost all the Turkish Cypriots were dislocated to the north (Greek Cypriot coffee shop owner, cited in Philippou, 2005: 104; see also Papadakis, 2005: 169), and some northern Cypriot streets are now named after ‘Turks who fell in battle’ (Ormancıoğlu, 1977: 4).

3.b.i.1. Newspaper sources

Throughout the conflict, there have been media reports of destruction of community places, most easily seen in their collations within propaganda. Naturally, reports of violence against Greek Cypriot places are collated in Greek Cypriot propaganda (e.g. ROCPIO, 1997) and reports of violence against Turkish Cypriot places are collated in Turkish Cypriot propaganda (e.g. TRNCSCS and TRNCDAM, 1986). Still, there are interesting differences. Official, semi-official and unofficial Greek Cypriot propaganda all used international sources like the (London) Times and the New York Times more than Turkish Cypriot ones like Olay and Ortam, all of those far more than Greek Cypriot sources; and they concentrated on the destruction of Greek Cypriot places.

Similarly, unofficial Turkish Cypriot propaganda preferred international to Greek Cypriot sources, and Greek Cypriot to Turkish Cypriot ones; equivalently, it focused on the destruction of Turkish Cypriot places. Official Turkish Cypriot propaganda, however, seemed to favour Greek Cypriot sources, like the Cyprus Mail and the Cyprus Weekly, and, almost exclusively, focused upon refuting Greek Cypriot accusations or reflecting them back upon the Greek Cypriot side.

Partly because I moved around frequently and couldn’t build a newspaper archive myself, and partly because wherever I was, I could not easily or affordably access the paper copies of the majority of relevant newspapers, I largely depended upon electronic archives. Beyond general reading of British, Cypriot, Greek and Turkish newspapers, I mined the British Library archives of the Guardian (1821-2003) and the Observer (1791-2003), the Times (1788-2010) and the New York Times (1851-2006), and identified hundreds of potentially relevant stories (amidst hundreds more keyword matches). I searched for articles including the keywords:

“Cyprus”, “bomb”/“bombed”, and “home”/“homes”;
“Cyprus”, “burned”/“burnt”, and “home”/“homes”;
“Cyprus”, “destroyed”, and “home”/“homes”;
“Cyprus”, “bomb”/“bombed”, and “house”/“houses”;
“Cyprus”, “burned”/“burnt”, and “house”/“houses”;
“Cyprus”, “destroyed”, and “house”/“houses”;
“Cyprus”, “bomb”/“bombed”, and “village”/“villages”;
“Cyprus”, “burned”/“burnt”, and “village”/“villages”;
“Cyprus”, “destroyed”, and “village”/“villages”;
“Cyprus”, “bomb”/“bombed”, and “church”/“churches”;
“Cyprus”, “burned”/“burnt”, and “church”/“churches”;
“Cyprus”, “destroyed”, and “church”/“churches”;
“Cyprus”, “bomb”/“bombed”, and “mosque”/“mosques”;

57 Ali Ağa Sokağı.
58 Odos Tembon (Οδός Τεμπών); Tempea/Tempi (το τέμπεα/τα τέμπη) was a valley in which Greek soldiers tried to stop a Persian invasion in 480 B.C.E.
“Cyprus”, “burned”/“burnt”, and “mosque”/“mosques”; “Cyprus”, “destroyed”, and “mosque”/“mosques”; “Cyprus or “Cypriot”, and “antiquities”; and “Cyprus” or “Cypriot”, and “looting”.

Unfortunately, I did not have the time to search the Greek-language and Turkish-language Cypriot newspapers’ archives, or the English-language Cypriot newspapers’ entire paper archive; but I searched for online archive articles including the keywords “antiquities” and “looting” (and other variations on the root “loot”) in the Cyprus Mail between 2000 and 2010 and in the Cyprus Weekly between 2002 and 2010 (and official, professional and public citations of those articles).

Notably, when he searched Greek Cypriot media, Greek Cypriot investigative journalist Makarios Drousiotis (2008) did not find ‘one article, one voice of protest, or even one piece of information about the 527 houses totally destroyed, or the 2,000 houses damaged in 103 mixed or Turkish Cypriot villages in the first half of 1964’.

Facing the same dilemma I did during my interviews, when journalist Marion Stuart (2008) questioned the pseudonymous Greek Cypriot refugee “Costas”, she rightly protected his identity; but, thus, she did not identify which Greek Cypriot refugee-occupied ‘village halfway between Larnaca and Limassol’ had ‘razed to the ground’ 55 Turkish Cypriot homes in 1976, of which only the ‘piles of rubble…. remain’.

Naturally, there were relevant articles that appeared more than once, and different articles discussing the same violence against property. There were also articles that discussed another form of violence against property (e.g. British colonial forces’ destruction of EOKA bases; EOKA sabotage of British colonial property); there were articles that were irrelevant (e.g. EOKA bombings of British military personnel in a village or near a home, church or mosque; Palestinian paramilitary attacks upon Israeli state property in Cyprus; paramilitary activity in places with Cypriot names in Northern Ireland; even archaeological excavations of Cypriot antiquities). Also, there were very relevant articles that had been damaged in the digitisation process (e.g. Young, 1974: 21). Still, I found hundreds of possibly important articles.

3.b.i.2. Online sources

Alongside other official, professional and community sources, online sources were both important and convenient. Online news enabled access, and facilitated continuous access, to sources I would not have had otherwise; so, for example, Cypriot newspapers could be read in a British village and vice versa. Community forums, discussion lists and weblogs produced their own information, reproduced or highlighted other sources, and eased intercommunal, international conversations about them.60

As I will explain later, in conjunction with my research blogging, community forums functioned to inform, refine and correct my interpretation. Online community sources also proved communities used the sources and made the claims I said they did: by creating a(n electronic) “paper trail” of opinion from propaganda and archaeologists to the public, they validated my choices of sources for analysis. When I could not repeat informants’ claims without identifying the informant or generalising the claim to the point of meaninglessness, online community sources provided an alternative source for certain claims, or for analogies for those claims.

60 The alternative would have been spending all day every day trawling through and discussing the newspapers in a coffee shop with a highly mixed clientele, when it can be difficult to find a coffee shop where members of different political communities mix, let alone ethnic communities. Moreover, when a politically mixed coffee shop is found, the opportunities are as limited as the customers are moderate. For instance, I would have been very unlikely to meet one of my key informants on the illicit antiquities trade – a Greek Cypriot nationalist – in a mixed coffee shop.
3.b.ii. ‘He’s a Turkish friend!’

Thus was the exclamation of a historian of Cyprus when I claimed that the Turkish Cypriot village of Aybifan (Ayios Epiphanios) had been destroyed, but my only citable sources were ‘TRNC sources’, (although I had first learned of Aybifan from an archaeologist in southern Cyprus).

I grounded my work in archaeological and historical and, to a lesser extent, architectural, ethnographic, political and legal studies, but they came from a very wide range of primary and secondary sources, from official and semi-official site biographies to the testimonies of refugees from those sites; obviously, while I hoped that it would give me as extensive a knowledge as possible, for some audiences, the very fact that I had consulted certain sources undermined my claims to knowledge or even to the capacity for knowledge.

What all of my sources had in common were primarily scholarly questions of the context, knowledge (authority, reliability and verifiability) and identity or voice (and language) of sources and their representation and weight in my work, which I will look at in relation to my published primary and secondary sources. There were also primarily ethical questions about interpersonal presentation, reception and interaction with research participants, which encompassed honesty with, anonymity for and attribution to them, which I will look at separately.

All works are researched and written by authors at particular times in particular linguistic, social, cultural, religious, political and economic communities, which influence what information those authors have access to in the first place and which information they choose to use, as well as how they interpret and present or suppress that information; it may be obvious, but it is particularly important to remember this when studying the history and historiography of violently divided societies.

One of the greatest limits upon what information authors have access to in the first place is their membership of linguistic communities. During the Ottoman and British occupations, international antiquarians and archaeologists were dependent upon their own knowledge of ancient, standard (Katharevousa) or Cypriot Greek or locals’ knowledge of their languages, as very few knew Ottoman or later standard (Istanbul) or Cypriot Turkish (Şevketoglu, 2000a: 122). Still now, very few international (or, indeed, Greek Cypriot) archaeologists know Turkish.

Moreover, with many of the knowledgeable locals of all communities having been made refugees, there was an incidental bias in my sample and weakness in my data, as the information was simply inaccessible. With what felt like a far higher proportion of Turkish Cypriots and “Turks” willing to talk with me (or a far higher proportion of Greek Cypriots and “Greeks” unwilling to talk with me), there was a further bias in my sample and weakness in my data, as I was fed or starved of information.

The problem was worsened by the disproportionate amount of weak information and the number of irredeemably “interested” sources I dealt with in the South: sometimes, I would receive what could have been interesting leads, but for their clear desire to scapegoat one person or another; yet, even when I already had circumstantial evidence supporting the scapegoat, most of the time, the scapegoats did not trust me to talk with me to clear their own name.

In the North, the widespread willingness to talk with me provided a greater proportion of detailed information from relatively disinterested sources, which enabled me more often to confirm or dismiss allegations and insinuations; still, it also increased the number of false leads and cold trails.

3.c. Informed consent

Since critical information frequently emerged in casual conversation, and the conversation often started spontaneously, I could not practically get written, informed consent for all the information gathered; however, my vaguely-local-looking, somewhat-language-speaking otherness normally caused the curious discussants to ask even before I could tell them. Finding my way in Larnaca, in my first days on the island, one elderly Greek Cypriot woman went through a process of telling out
loud, rhetorically asking me, ‘are you a kalamaras [literally, one who writes with squid ink, a scholar; metaphorically, a Greek]? No, you’re not. Are you a Turk? No!...’ I was often asked if I was a “Charlie (diaspora Greek Cypriot)”, or his Turkish Cypriot equivalent.

Searching for a mosque in Korakou, near the end of my fieldwork, a local Greek Cypriot gave me directions then, on my return, told me the history of the site and smilingly asked me, ‘is this all going in your report?’ We discussed my project over coffee, so he knew my background and my intentions, and I had his permission to use his information. Refugee anthropologist Ruth Krulfeld (1998: 22-24) doubted informants’ ability to give free, informed consent when they do not own and cannot control researchers’ subsequent use of their information; but there must be a trust between researchers and researched, and my informants (and non-informants) displayed their trust (and distrust), and carefully controlled what they told me (or did not). (I explain my anonymisation and inclusion/exclusion of personal sources’ information later.)

Krulfeld (1998: 31) practiced ‘negotiation and equal control’ with researched communities, in order to restore equality to the relationship between researcher and researched, and to protect and promote the human rights of the researched, but also warned against researchers ‘being exploited... for personal and political interests’.

Community archaeologists Stephanie Moser et al. (2002: 231) wanted ‘local people’ to ‘decide what should be displayed and what stories should be told’ (Moser et al., 2002: 231); but if locals decided in Cyprus, refugees’ abandoned cultural heritage – and its pillage, reuse, damage and/or destruction – would commonly not be presented. Moser et al. (2002: 232) acknowledged ‘tensions’, ‘disagreement[s]’ and ‘conflicts’ in the process, but they did not consider the sheer impossibility (let alone undesirability) of agreeable work with extremist locals.

Krulfeld’s partners emerged through her conversation with the community, and ‘agreed’ to the collaborative ethnographic research (1998: 32); but my research was not an act of ethnographic description, and I could not collaborate in my informants’ common presentation of false beliefs, or deliberate disinformation, as historical facts. It would have been a false community control, if I had selected partners who agreed with me; and if I had selected partners who disagreed, it would not have worked at all. Furthermore, I interacted with nationalists, non-nationalists and anti-nationalists, in various communities, in all six towns and nearly a third of the 619 villages in Cyprus, on different parts of my work. Working with differing partners across the island could have torn the project apart, while one small group of nationalists could have hijacked the project.

3.d. Language and voice

Particularly in the light of Swedish archaeologist Håkan Karlsson’s (2004b: 17) challenges to English linguistic imperialism (see also Bernbeck, 2008; Hansen, 2008; Kristiansen, 2001), I must recognise that I do not have advanced knowledge of either of the other two dominant academic languages, French and German; and, while I conducted my research in Cyprus, I cannot speak either Greek or Turkish fluently.

Still, it must be noted that my non-fluency sometimes gave me access to more information than I would otherwise have had, because I was identifiable other and outside the conflict, so some parties to the conflict felt free to talk with me. Indeed, while unthinkingly or uncontrollably mixing Greek and Turkish could negatively affect conversations with nationalists, doing so with enclaved Cypriots or refugees was often normal, or even desirable.

Struggling to hold a conversation in Turkish with elderly dialect-speakers, I let a Greek word slip out; the local Turkish Cypriot confirmed that I could speak Greek, but the refugee continued to speak Turkish, until his local friend hit and reminded him, ‘eh, you speak Greek!’ In another village, a mischievous Turkish Cypriot refugee pointed out some nationalist homes nearby, then, despite my speaking normally in Turkish, he cheerfully shouted everything in Greek.

61 «Είσαι καλαμαράς; Όχι, δεν είσαι. Είσαι Τούρκος; Όχι!»
Government and professional sources claimed ultimate authority, but their claims were so frequently unreliable – even deliberately inaccurate – that I could never accept any allegation without corroboration. Even photographic evidence was no guarantee of the accuracy of the accompanying claim.

Some of my personal contacts were entirely reliable, but gave me information I could not verify myself; furthermore, anonymous sources, whether local or professional, gave me information that I could present to others, but that those others could not verify themselves; moreover, community sources, like villagers, often lacked authority within the professional community. In some cases, I knew people for years, but never gained their trust, or indeed gave my own; in other cases, a few seconds' initial joking established a lasting rapport.

I discussed treatment of cultural heritage not only with people whom I had sought out for my work, or who had sought me out, whom I would call "research participants", but also with people independently commenting on these issues in community forums, on my, their and others' blogs, and elsewhere. I would include these independent commentators with other "primary sources", although the differences between them sometimes disappeared, as the authors of primary sources became research participants, or research participants later published primary source material.

As some research participants requested that I did not cite them publicly, there were even occasions where research participants requested that I did not cite their public works. Once, I removed a citation because the participant feared someone monitoring my work finding them, their interpreter or their informant through me. On another occasion, I was allowed to cite their public work, and they privately explained the context of the production of the work, but I was not allowed to cite the source of my understanding.

Occasionally, where an informant was not in a position to make the argument themselves publicly, I found published academic sources and used them as proxies or analogies, so that I could demonstrate the argument by reference to a confirmable case without exposing the informant's dissent.

3.e. ‘In peacetime, I'll be your friend but in wartime, I'll shoot you between the eyes’

Research participants came from a wide range of backgrounds and held an equally wide range of opinions. Sometimes the relationship between me and my research participants was friendly and strong, but often it was argumentative or confrontational. Even key informants and I would disagree strongly: they would object to some of my sources, data and interpretations and I would challenge theirs, but they would continue to supply me with information and I would continue to promote it. I cannot cite it properly without identifying one of my sources, but in the very same hour he supplied me with data (knowing that my work was bicommunal and cross-border), one key informant also put the details of another professional doing cross-border work (in a different discipline) on the internet and encouraged compatriots to warn both that professional and his colleagues to work only with their own side, or to suffer (collective) boycotting and blacklisting. Occasionally, like the end of the active relationship with the Grey Wolf who gave this section its title (about a month after the quoted conversation), contact was openly aggressive and broken under the threat of imminent violence.

The identities of my sources' authors and the types of my sources range very widely, from colonial male archaeologists' excavation data, to postcolonial female artefact specialists' analyses and collaboratively-written site reports, to conversations with currently practicing archaeologists, to the personal testimony of locals at and refugees from the sites being researched and blog comments by members of the diasporas of the affected communities. Discussions with archaeologists were difficult to direct, partly because of personal awkwardness, partly because of professional sensitivity, and partly because of the sheer scales of the problem and the propaganda about it. Conversations with archaeologists were always off-site, physically and discursively, normally over coffee, and frequently away from other archaeologists. Nevertheless, they were still difficult to conduct because, whether I chased after sensitive information with direct questions, or whether I worked around to it through
roundabout chat, I felt awkward; I was being either impolite or untruthful. Conversations with locals were normally on-site or nearby, while those with refugees were normally at or by other communities’ cultural heritage sites; because they were chance, site-specific encounters, I was more comfortable in them, even when my companions and I argued, or when they blatantly lied to me.

3.6. ‘Gossip, rumour and hearsay’

The conceptions of my working practice as ‘sitting in kafeneia talking to old men’ and of my working material and product as ‘gossip, rumour and hearsay’ are worth addressing. They were friendly jokes between archaeologists about the ethnographic methods employed to investigate sensitive subjects and inform archaeological analysis, but they had currency because people who were understandably unconvinced by word-of-mouth and people who refused to believe or knew but refused to recognise discomfitting truths tried to dismiss, deny or discredit the material as gossip, rumour or hearsay. There was a reassuring ring to the occasional appellation of “Other-lover” – ‘Greek-lover’, ‘Turkish friend’, etc. – when I talked about my findings; however, as Ted Honderich (2005) noted, just because both sides say you’re wrong doesn’t mean you’re right.

The evidence-based approach to the destruction of community in Cyprus was foundational to my research, as it enabled me to distinguish inconvenient facts from indefensible fabrications, to begin to fashion a ‘chronicle of events’ and so the ‘parameters within which any interpretation must fall’ (Eltringham, 2004: 157 – original emphasis). Positively, official, archaeological – archaeologists’ – narratives were fundamentally relevant to this research; and negatively, it was very difficult to win Cypriot and international archaeologists’ and locals’ trust in order to access unofficial narratives; therefore, I took many of my leads from the states’ and their allies’ histories of the destruction of cultural property. It was only by verifying or falsifying these accounts that I could take cultural heritage sites’ biographies out of the “gossip tense(s)”.

At the same time, however, when I did get leads from archaeologists and their publics, they were given informally or off-the-record, so I anonymised them or, when I couldn’t mask them sufficiently, chose not to present them; once, I was even given a lead with the caveat that I was being told it because, if I did repeat it, no-one would believe me anyway. This put the inherently piecemeal material that I was gathering informally in the category of hearsay, rather than evidence and left it open to dismissal and denial or even shrewd accusations of untrustworthy, unprofessional or dishonest, unethical work. Again, it was only by visiting and documenting sites that I was able to assess the stories I was told and find evidence for or against them; moreover, it was only by doing this that I could bodily and materially demonstrate my commitment to truth and justice, which shrewd detractors sought to discredit.

The importance of ‘gossip, rumour and hearsay’ in my work also cues up one of the ethical problems that I faced myself early on: how could I gossip and protect archaeologists’ confidentiality (and acknowledge their help)? As for acknowledging archaeologists’ help, I can only hope that those who did not need to remain anonymous appreciate my policy of anonymising all those who spoke with me informally, in order to prevent anyone from being identified by a process of elimination. As for both gossiping with archaeologists and protecting their confidentiality, it is a little more complicated.

There was gossip and counter-gossip, false gossip to trace the webs of rumours and even false gossip to dispel false rumours. To get gossip, I had to give it; if I hadn’t shared my gossip, or hadn’t expressed an(y) opinion on others’, I would have been cut out of the circle. To get or to give gossip, I had to be friends with some archaeologists and acquaintances of some others; apart from inserting me into a convoluted, ever-changing web of relationships (of friends and enemies, allies and rivals), which I was always (and still am) trying to get to grips with, it meant I had somewhat ready-made obligations and expectations of trust (and distrust).

Further complicating ‘gossip’ was the ‘interview’, which different people used as shorthand for anything from a casual chat about cultural heritage to a formal question-and-answer session about Cypriot archaeological ethics and which, regardless, was normally seen as a topic of ‘publicly private
conversation” – more gossip. Occasionally, I needed to talk over particular points of one's interview with a trusted other, either because I didn’t have the requisite knowledge of the site, region or period, or because I needed to “test” how one statement or another sounded to someone from outside the discussion, or (after due consideration) to gain access to people who would otherwise have been inaccessible. Moreover, sometimes the people I had gossiped with on the condition that the information remained between us would object to me telling other people the same thing that I had told them, because they were concerned that those other people were somehow dangerous gossips. (That was sometimes based upon a misremembering of or a misunderstanding about what was confidential and what was public, sometimes upon an unawareness of my deliberations and my, I believe, judicious use of that information; sometimes, it simply felt as if the person from whom I had sought confidentiality felt hurt by my apparently casual use of the information with untrusted others.)

Plus, besides the existing alliances and rivalries that I was assimilated into, while gossiping with some friends or acquaintances about some others, I and the people I was gossiping with were being gossiped about by those others; gossiping and being gossiped about affected my professional identity and who would talk with me. Repeatedly, it was gossip that influenced who would tell me about ethical dilemmas that they or others had faced and who would listen to my presentations of the destruction of cultural heritage; people would prejudge whether I, my data and my interpretations were genuine or uninformed, misinformed or disingenuous.

Because I could not realise my ambition of (public) community archaeology, I did not spend as much time as I had expected ‘sitting in kafeneia talking to old men’, or standing by garden fences talking to old women, or even sitting in pubs talking to archaeologists; instead, working towards (professional) community archaeology, I spent most of it doing library research, or performing site inspections, or simply trying to talk to archaeologists. It was over coffee that many of the unusable or unverifiable pieces of information were shared. Amongst friends and friends of friends and displaying knowledge and sensitivity, I could earn people's trust; there was an unspoken understanding when I started a conversation with, ‘since we’re not at work, I can ask you this…’.

It was also in social situations that I was most vulnerable to innocent or malevolent criticism, as those who assumed I was repeating unfounded hearsay and those who knew I was not could make unreasonable demands of me; I was undone more than once by the deceptively simple request to ‘prove it’, when my personal sources were anonymous and my material evidence was elsewhere.

I sabotaged myself twice over by anonymising my sources as, first, archaeologists would assume that it was a smokescreen behind which to hide inadequate research or political bias and, second, acquaintances who feared being mistaken for my sources would start rumours at key nodes in the networks alleging that they were indeed my sources, but that I had misrepresented them.

3.g. Site selection, inspection, documentation, construction and representation

Working alone, I did not have the collective expertise or work-hours of a survey team. I did not use formal survey methods, or have a structured survey methodology, because I did not conduct a proper archaeological survey; I visited and inspected valuable (important, unusual, or contested) sites, their research value determined by sites’ historical significance, public and/or professional concern.

I conducted “non-proportional quota sampling”, where I focused on documenting what had been damaged or destroyed (rather than what had not), but tried to record buildings representative of every condition present at the site (including what had not been damaged or destroyed) (Orton, 2000: 21).

I did, rarely, clean soil off partially-submerged material to reveal their surfaces, as I did with the inscribed concrete slabs at Pano Koutraphas; I did not expose non-durable materials and, if I had done, I would have covered them up again. On one occasion, on finding several pieces of the same artefact (fragments of a plate at the old town of Van), I gathered them together in order to photograph them; they were all from within a two square metre area. At no time did I collect any material; recording was primarily photographic and secondarily written.
Throughout the course of my doctorate, I have maintained a research blog, evaluating sources, archiving raw data, appealing for information, discussing developments, and enabling access to academic papers. Blogging was not prior publication, and it was not an attempt to bypass peer review (e.g. Hardy, forthcoming); indeed, free, open access ‘increases critical refereeing’ (Garfield, 2000: 3 – emphasis added). Not only professionals without access to particular academic journals, but also locals, refugees, diaspora – all interested parties, many with the expressive language of Othiseas (2010) – are enabled to access my data. (There have been more than 50,000 visits to my niche interest research blog and site photo blogs in the past six years.)

Opening my work and myself up to such scrutiny demonstrates my commitment to truth, and thus builds trust. Beyond the simple matter of access, it is also far easier for me and my readers to explore my data together, and to share it with others (Moxley, 2001: 63). Simultaneously, I can refine my research subject and my writing style to be appropriate for the affected communities.

It is also valuable for readers to be able to translate, contribute to, or otherwise question my research; but, personally, the greatest opportunity blogging provides is for correction. For example, based upon the mistaken information of a disinterested professional in the field, I misinterpreted 1980s Greek Cypriot military graffiti on an abandoned and destroyed Turkish Cypriot home as 1960s paramilitary graffiti; through a conversation on a bicommunal Cypriot discussion forum, a Greek Cypriot nationalist corrected me (DT, 2009; see also Hardy, 2009b).

I have presented the universal political and ethical difficulties in doing such research, explained the basic range of methods (critique of official and professional public education, retracing of the genealogy of violence, cultural heritage site inspection, and local, refugee, and professional community research), and established the basic reasons for the methods (respect of the human rights of participants and affected communities, professional and ethical commitment to the responsible use of cultural heritage material to protect and promote human rights), as well as demonstrated my commitment to professional and community access (through research blogging, and participation in community forums).

Now it is time to confront the treatment of Cypriot cultural heritage in times of conflict, and to evaluate the politics and ethics of cultural heritage workers in conflict zones. As the most critical methodological issues are highly dependent upon context for understanding, and have a bearing upon the professionalism and ethics of the work, I will address them within the presentation and examination of my research data.
4. International law, bicommunal work, rescue archaeology and the archaeological boycott

After the war of 1974, the Republic of Cyprus Department of Antiquities 'appeal[ed]' to UNESCO to protect cultural heritage in northern Cyprus, but it simultaneously approved of (and supported) foreign archaeological teams who refused to work there (e.g. Karageorghis, 1976: 3). Indeed, born and until 1974 excavating in northern Cyprus, Famagusta district refugee antiquities director Vassos Karageorghis (2007: 118) campaigned for a boycott of any archaeological activity in northern Cyprus, and orchestrated the international blacklisting of any archaeologists associated with work in the occupied areas, even of archaeologists who 'sent a message' to the Turkish Cypriot antiquities department. Since 1974, there has been rescue excavation in northern Cyprus (e.g. Şevketoğlu, 2002), and (albeit chronologically and geographically limited) archaeological survey (e.g. Şevketoğlu, 2000a). However, there have also been interventions preventing (or trying to prevent) research and its presentation, publication or citation (Şevketoğlu, 2000b: 53; 55-56). The Greek Cypriot administration has complained about the 'deserted and abandoned' archaeological sites being destroyed by '[t]he rain, the wind and the weeds... plundering and theft' (ROCPIO, 1997: 35); yet its own archaeologists' boycott and blacklist have prevented even the most basic preservation work, the backfilling of open trenches of discontinued archaeological digs (Şevketoğlu, 2000b: 53), and have thereby forced Turkish Cypriot archaeologists to leave those sites exposed to decay, erosion and looting.

In this chapter, I will review the most important examples of bicommunal cultural heritage work, noting their official receptions and their consequent progress (or lack of it); and then I will explore the key cases of archaeological excavation in northern Cyprus since 1974, considering the ethical and legal arguments for excavations and their boycotts, and studying their effects upon archaeological knowledge through publication and citation.

4.a. Bicommunal work under international law

As before the war (e.g. Karageorghis, 1974: 5), UNESCO continued to provide expert staff and project financing to the Republic of Cyprus (e.g. Karageorghis, 1975: 19; 1980: 5; 1981: 4; 5; 1982: 20-21; 1983: 13-14); but the unrecognised Turkish Cypriot administration, which lacked its own cultural heritage professionals and funding, also lacked international advice or support, so its historic architecture decayed. Greek Cypriot archaeologists claimed that Turkish Cypriot leaders' non-cooperation prevented UNESCO working on cultural heritage throughout the island (cf. Karageorghis, 1982: 5). Yet, there was and is bicommunal cultural heritage work.

4.a.i. The Nicosia Master Plan (NMP)

In 1977, bicommunal work in Nicosia began to address 'humanitarian issues and basic human needs' (Demetriades, 1998: 172), including cultural heritage work; on 24th October 1979, it became the Nicosia Master Plan. Greek Cypriot President Glafkos Clerides and Turkish Cypriot President Rauf Denktaş agreed to informal meetings between Nicosia's Greek Cypriot Mayor Lellos Demetriades and its Turkish Cypriot Mayor Mustafa Akınçi. The mayors echoed the presidents' titles for national negotiations, and met as "representatives" of their city's communities (ibid.: 170-171). In order for the Greek Cypriot state not to recognise the Turkish Cypriot administration (for example, by funding it directly), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) gave money to the World Bank, which gave money to the Turkish Cypriot administration (ibid.: 171-172). This way, the Municipality of Venice (and the Government of Italy) funded the Venetian city walls' restoration (ibid.: 173). After 1983, when the UNDP, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) funded work in the TRNC, 'so that once more nobody recognised anyone', the Central Bank of the Republic of Cyprus paid money through an international employee to a Turkish Cypriot contractor in London, who then paid the Turkish Cypriot workers in northern Cyprus (ibid.: 174), including for historic houses' restoration (ibid.: 175). Then Turkish Cypriot President Denktaş did temporarily 'embargo'
bicommunal work (ibid.: 174); but now there is both the UNDP-funded Nicosia Master Plan and the EU-funded (island-wide) Partnership for the Future.

4.a.ii. The Committee on Missing Persons (CMP)

Indeed, there has even been bicommunal archaeology in northern Cyprus. Inter-communal negotiations between 1974 and 1981 led to the (initially ineffective) establishment of the UN-sponsored bicommunal Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus, in order to learn the fates of Cypriots who disappeared during the conflict (CMP, 2010: 1). Its decisions are reached through consensus between one Greek Cypriot, one Turkish Cypriot, and one International Committee of the Red Cross-chosen, United Nations Secretary-General-appointed international (ibid.). Bicommunal teams of archaeologists and anthropologists exhume and analyse any buried remains of missing persons (ibid.: 2). Again (if only on 31st July 1997), Greek Cypriot President Clerides and Turkish Cypriot President Denktaş (finally) agreed to bicommunal cooperation to solve the ‘humanitarian issue’ (cited in Sant-Cassia, 2007: 194), though on 30th April 1998, the Turkish Cypriot committee member stopped the CMP’s work. Eventually, in August 2006, the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team (EAAF) began preparing the CMP’s Bi-communal Forensic Team (BCFT), and in September 2006, began coordinating its exhumations (EAAF, 2007: 3); since the beginning of 2008, the BCFT has been operating independently.

4.a.iii. The World Monuments Watch (WMW)

When (in 2007) Eastern Mediterranean University’s Profs. Allan Langdale and Michael Walsh won a place for the northern Cypriot historic city of Famagusta on the World Monuments Fund’s (WMF) 2008 World Monuments Watch (List of Most Endangered Sites), the Greek Cypriot antiquities department condemned its listing as ‘adverse’, without explaining why (antiquities director Pavlos Flourentzos, cited in Bahceli, 2007). Journalist Simon Bahceli (2007) noted that the Republic of Cyprus disapproved of ‘any intervention in antiquities which is not officially sanctioned’; however, it seems that Famagusta’s entry into the endangered list was adverse precisely because it would facilitate international support for the city’s conservation. Archaeologists in southern Cyprus told me that the Greek Cypriot antiquities department was not asked for permission; but archaeologists in northern Cyprus told me that they were never given permission for anything, so there was no point asking. Corroborating that judgement, the subsequent attempt at something like a “Famagusta Master Plan” was not approved either. As in Nicosia, the Famagusta plan involved its Greek Cypriot Mayor Alexis Galanos and Turkish Cypriot Mayor Oktay Kayalp as the city’s communities’ “representatives”; the Famagusta initiative was backed by the UN, and the Leventis, Pierides and Thetis foundations, and supported by the European cultural heritage organisation Europa Nostra (Avgousti, 2008). It involved at least some individual Greek Cypriot archaeologists and historians, for example Anna Marangou, who wanted the ‘authorities to work “silently and efficiently”’ (cited in Leonidou, 2007); but seemingly not the Greek Cypriot archaeological community. Remarkably, I know that at least one Greek Cypriot invited to the initiative’s meetings refused to attend on the grounds that no Greek Cypriots had been invited.

4.a.iv. Supporting Activities that Value the Environment (SAVE)

(USAID-funded) Supporting Activities that Value the Environment (SAVE) does have a bicommunal cultural heritage team of archaeologists and art historians, which did compile a less extensive, more intensive Cultural Heritage Database to help preserve Famagusta’s historic landscape. Yet, having worked in the team as a research assistant, I know certain officials or offices tried to frustrate the effort. Aware that I knew researchers working in the Archives when I visited, and that the project was due to finish the following month, an unfortunate junior Greek Cypriot archivist first had to say that they were ‘closed for the holidays’, then ask, ‘could you come back in a few months?’ The Republic of Cyprus State Archives (ROCSA, 2007) are ‘open to the public’, but when a colleague
and I did not follow the state archivist's advice that we 'should go to the Department of Antiquities [instead]' (because we wanted to go to both), we were required to gain permission from the Republic of Cyprus Department of Antiquities to use the State Archives (although they are equal institutions in different ministries). According to the state archivist, the Greek Cypriot antiquities director 'need[ed] some information from [us] before he [could] decide whether to grant permission'. I was informed, via back channels, that it was not the Department of Antiquities, but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that was trying to frustrate the team's work. Yet when other international archaeologists got the World Monuments Fund (WMF, 2007: 10) to list Famagusta as one of the 100 Most Endangered Sites in the world in 2008, it was Antiquities Director Pavlos Florentzos who called its listing an 'adverse development' (cited in the Cyprus Weekly, 2007). (Nonetheless, he also stated that '[t]he Antiquities Department and the Foreign Ministry [w]ere working together to find the best solution' (cited in Cyprus Weekly, 2007); so it is possible that both of them were against the work.)

Two similar projects the Greek Cypriot Department of Antiquities did support were the Famagusta Committee’s (1989) exhibition and catalogue about the history of Famagusta city, and antiquities department archaeologist Sophocles Hadjisavvas's (1991) publication of his 1973 archaeological survey of Famagusta district. Famagusta Committee members included the acting antiquities director Athanasios Papageorgiou, as well as former director Vassos Karageorghis and later director Pavlos Florentzos, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Education, and Minister of Communications and Works (Famagusta Committee, 1989: 2-3), and the exhibition was introduced by then President George Vassiliou (1989: 5). The Famagusta Committee’s (1989) exhibition dated the end of 36 Centuries of Civilization in Famagusta to the 1974 Turkish invasion and expulsion of the Greek Cypriot community, but did not display any artefacts produced after the 1571 Ottoman conquest, except for Orthodox Christian icons (Famagusta Committee, 1989: 65-68). (That history also forgot Greek Cypriot shelling of the Turkish Cypriot quarter of Famagusta (cf. MRG, 1976: 12).) Later antiquities director Sophocles Hadjisavvas (1991: 116-122) documented 397 sites, including standing churches and other buildings from the post-medieval and modern periods, but not one mosque.

4.a.v. Cyprus Temples: unofficial bicommunal cultural heritage work

After the Green Line opened on 23rd April 2003, the southern Cyprus Civil Engineers’ and Architects’ Association and the northern Chamber of Cyprus Turkish Architects worked together to survey religious buildings on the “wrong” side of the Green Line. The Cyprus Temples project was a 31-member team, supported by the UN's Bi-communal Development Programme (BDP)\(^63\), not connected with either Cypriot administration. Explicitly citing the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN, 1948: Art. 18, cited in CCEAA and CCTA, 2005), the bicommunal architectural survey team considered preserving and safeguarding abandoned religious buildings as one of their main priorities ‘as Architects’ (CCEAA and CCTA, 2005 – emphasis added).

The project identified 505 Christian sites in the north, and 115 Islamic sites in the south. As the project created an architectural record, it excluded much archaeological and historical information (critically, it frequently excluded the causes of harm to buildings, and the dates of deliberate harm – though naturally, sometimes, these were simply not known). Also, the northern survey included Christian sites damaged before the conflict (because it included all Christian sites in the north), and simultaneously excluded Islamic sites destroyed during the conflict (because it excluded all Islamic sites in the north); thus, Cyprus Temples incidentally made it easier for manipulative actors to use the project’s survey data in order to overplay harm to Christian sites and underplay harm to Islamic sites.

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\(^63\) The BDP is administered by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), and funded by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).
In addition, as I will discuss later, cultural heritage workers' restoration techniques caused the architects to misunderstand the history and thereby misinterpret the condition of conflict-damaged buildings. Thus, the project produced a record incidentally unrepresentative of the impact of the conflict upon the communities. Still, the team's work was quite comprehensive and its data were quite detailed; it set a standard. Notably, although the architects and civil engineers functioned as cultural heritage workers, their project did not involve archaeologists or other cultural heritage specialists, and cultural heritage workers have not yet done any comparable work; as I will show later, that is indicative of the unique circumstances and politics of the archaeological professional community.

4.b. Rescue archaeology under international law in occupied and secessionist territories

Evidently, there have been other cases of salvage archaeology in northern Cyprus since 1974, for instance the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Department of Antiquities and Museums' 'rescue excavations' in Galinoporni/Kaleburnu in 1983 (Kızılduman ve Ülker, 2008), and Eastern Mediterranean University's abortive emergency conservation at Agios Epiktitos-Vrysi (Şevketoğlu, 2000b: 53); but here I wish to concentrate on three very different examples. I will discuss: first, Cypriot rescue archaeology at Akanthou/Tatlısu; second, Turkish research archaeology at Salamis; and third, a particularly convoluted case of international excavation at Galinoporni/Kaleburnu. Following the archaeological community's treatment of these three digs, I will discuss each of them and their ethical and legal status in increasing detail. These examples show the interplay between (inter)national politics, professional politics, and professional ethics. They show how mutually influencing events, actions and reactions have pushed Cypriot archaeology into a uniquely difficult position (in contrast to all other cultural heritage work), and how the profession has effectively paralysed itself. Southern Cypriot boycotting and blacklisting have not only prevented ethical archaeology in northern Cyprus, and thus forced passive acceptance of environmental and human harm to cultural heritage. The boycott and black list have also directly damaged (professional and public) community relations, and thus reinforced the conflict (and its consequent harms to cultural heritage).

4.b.i. Cypriot rescue at Akanthou/Tatlısu

Akanthou-Arkosyko/Tatlısu-Çiftlikdüzü is one of the earliest archaeological sites on the island, which provides evidence of the Anatolian farmers who first settled the island in the Aceramic (Pre-Pottery) Neolithic; it is on the northern coast of the Famagusta plains (see map 3b). It was found in 1996, when a farmer dug pits for his agricultural waste, and cut through the settlement. Initially, (with her colleagues' assistance) a Turkish Cypriot archaeologist in the Department of Archaeology and Art History, Dr. Müge Şevketoğlu, conducted a 'salvage project' (Şevketoğlu, 2000b: 54), sieving the archaeological deposits the farmer threw away and surveying the area (Şevketoğlu, 2002: 100; 2006: 123). In 1999, the Akanthou/Tatlısu project conducted more spoil heap (dug-up and disposed-of soil waste) sieving (Şevketoğlu, 2002: 101), but also began (ongoing) 'rescue excavations' (Şevketoğlu, 2006: 123).

From 1999 until at least 2004, the Republic of Cyprus Department of Antiquities protested about the 'illegal excavations' to UNESCO and the World Archaeological Congress (Hadjicostis, 2004). In that time, Dr. Şevketoğlu (2000b: 55) learned that northern Cypriot archaeologists were on the Greek Cypriot archaeologists' 'black list', and that they would try to prevent any publication. The year after she achieved publication despite the black list (cf. Şevketoğlu, 2000a), Şevketoğlu attended a conference on Neolithic Cyprus in southern Nicosia. According to Greek Cypriot and/or international archaeologists, then antiquities director Sophocles Hadjisavvas tabled a 'last minute' conference resolution with 'no debate', criticising Şevketoğlu's use of the Turkish Cypriot name for the village (Christou, 2001); the resolution was passed. Hadjisavvas defended that the resolution was
a ‘unanimous decision’, but some anonymous participants were ‘appalled’ (cited in Christou, 2001). This public acquiescence and anonymous dissent highlights how a hard-line faction within the southern Cypriot archaeological community is able to co-opt moderate opinion. In fact, Şevketoğlu merely used the Turkish Cypriot name as well as the Greek Cypriot name; in her book, Şevketoğlu (2000a: 123) had advised that archaeologists ought to ‘record all known place-names’ to preserve the historical information they conveyed. For example, the renaming of Akanthou was not an official Turkish Cypriot or otherwise Turkist nationalist ethnic cleansing of the refugee Greek Cypriot community from their village. Coping with their own displacement from their own homes, the Turkish Cypriot refugees who settled in Akanthou moved as a village and brought their name for their village with them: the southern Turkish Cypriot neighbourhood of Mari/Tatlısu (on the southern coast of Larnaca District, see map 5) became the northern Turkish Cypriot village of Akanthou/Tatlısu (cf. Goodwin, 1978: 60). However, antiquities director Hadjisavvas had himself been under pressure: he pointed out that Şevketoğlu had presented her work at the conference, and that the Department of Antiquities had been ‘attacked because’ it had ‘allowed her to mention illegal excavations’ (Hadjisavvas, 22nd May 2001, cited in Christou, 2001). So, given the resolution came a year after the publication (and it is difficult to believe that no-one in the Greek Cypriot archaeological community had heard of the publication in the meantime), Hadjisavvas may have tabled the “last-minute” resolution to appease criticism of his moderate behaviour, rather than to protest Şevketoğlu’s behaviour.

In a 21st October 2003 press conference (as the curator of an international exhibition about Cypriot Hellenism), in response to a question, antiquities director Hadjisavvas identified two illegal excavations, in Akanthou and Salamis, on the basis of the ICPCPEAC’s 1954 Hague Convention (and that Convention’s 1999 Second Protocol), and its 1956 New Delhi Recommendation (cf. CYNA, 2003). (Due to Hadjisavvas’s phrasing, it is unclear whether he claimed the Akanthou excavation violated the 1999 Protocol, which permitted rescue excavation in occupied territory, or whether he only claimed the dig violated the 1956 Recommendation, which banned any dig.) No-one has denied that Şevketoğlu’s excavation was rescue archaeology (not even those who claimed it was illegal). The first season of work may not have been permitted explicitly by the ICPCPEAC’s 1954(a) Convention (or its 1954(b) First Protocol), and it may not have followed UNESCO’s 1956 Recommendation; however, as will be shown later, the Akanthou/Tatlısu excavation honoured the spirit of the 1954 Convention, and the 1956 Recommendation has been made redundant by the 1999 Second Protocol to the 1954 Convention. Again, the first summer of excavation may have started before the Republic of Cyprus signed the Second Protocol on 19th August 1999; but certainly ever since then, Dr. Şevketoğlu’s archaeology has been a Cypriot rescue excavation in Cyprus, which complies with international law, to which the Republic of Cyprus is a signatory; it has been legal as well as ethical. The same cannot be said for Turkish research at Salamis.

4.b.ii. Turkish research at Salamis

Ancient Greek mythology tells of Trojan War refugees’ foundation of Salamis, Cyprus’s capital city for nearly a millennium; it is on the eastern coast of Famagusta District, a little to the north of Famagusta itself (see map 3b). The archaeological site is considered evidence of the initial ‘hellenization’ of the island over 3,000 years ago (ICOMOS Cyprus National Committee, 2001: 5). From 1952 until the Turkish invasion of 1974, first the colonial then the independent antiquities department excavated the ancient city; throughout that time, the excavation director was Dr. Vassos Karageorghis (antiquities director from 1963 until 1989). The University of Lyon’s French Archaeological Expedition to Salamis also dug there between 1964 and 1974. After the invasion, the antiquities department’s dig-house was ‘seriously plundered’, and according to the ICOMOS Cyprus National Committee (2001: 13), the French expedition’s dig-house became ‘inaccessible’. Yet even southern Cypriot media acknowledged that the site was accessible; the only thing that prevented archaeologists’ access was their ‘fear’ of being ‘blacklisted’ (Tezgor, 2003).
In 1998, the Archaeology and Cultural Heritage Research Centre (AKVAM)65 was established at (northern Cypriot) Eastern Mediterranean University (EMU)66, ‘with the purpose of research into Salamis’s ancient city’67 (AKVAM, 2008); its president was (Turkish) University of Ankara68 Prof. Ahmet Coşkun Özgünel (not Özgüner, as Greek Cypriot sources have repeatedly named him – e.g. Hadjicostis, 2004; ROCDOA, 2005). Since then, the Turkish Embassy has been funding Özgünel’s excavations at the site; they involve Ankara University, AKVAM, and the Northern Cyprus Campus of the Middle East Technical University (METU)69 of Ankara. Prof. Özgünel repeatedly asked the University of Lyon to cooperate, but it refused (ROCPRUN, 2001b); however, the reasons for the University of Lyon’s choice are unclear. Apparently, French foreign policy requires ‘archaeologists not to work in northern Cyprus’ (Shanks, 2002). The excavation director of the University of Lyon’s nearby French Archaeological Expedition to Enkomi, Olivier Pelon, somewhat ambiguously stated that it was ‘impossible... to visit the site officially’ (cited in Shanks, 2002). Nonetheless, even when interviewed in the southern Cypriot media, the Salamis Excavations Project 70 has not offered legal defences. The project has offered professional justifications: Özgünel’s assistant Hakan Öztaner noted they had done preservation work as well as excavation, and insisted that the ‘worst thing’ they could have done to Salamis would have been to ‘leave it to its own fate’ (cited in Tezgor, 2003). Prof. Özgünel almost naively queried: ‘is it illegal to try to preserve a historical site?’ (ibid.). Yet AKVAM’s (2008) stated aim in 1998 was ‘research’. Twelve years later, while he reported the excavation’s restoration architect İrfan Aydınl’s observations of damage from sea salt, sand, sun and heat, Turkish Cypriot journalist Emre Zeytinoğlu (2010: 5) still defined the dig as ‘a “research project”’71.

In this case, interpretation of the law is quite simple, and the southern Cypriot campaign against the excavation appears reasonable. In its official comment upon a Violation of Scholarly Ethics, (written by the refugee excavation director (cf. Karageorghis, 2007: 173)), the Cyprus National Committee of the International Council on Monuments and Sites stated that the University of Ankara had ‘violat[ed] all international conventions and recommendations’ (ICOMOS Cyprus National Committee, 2001: 13); it explicitly cited UNESCO’s 1956 New Delhi Recommendation against excavations in occupied territory (ICOMOS Cyprus National Committee, 2001: 16), and elsewhere, then antiquities director Sophocles Hadjisavvas (2001: 138) cited the ICPCPEAC’s 1954 Hague Convention as well as UNESCO’s 1956 Recommendation. As unlicensed research digs in occupied/secessionist territories, Prof. Özgünel’s excavations do appear to be illegal.

Therefore, the anti-excavation movement had a strong, simple legal case. In 2001, the Karageorghis-directed A. G. Leventis Foundation presented an exhibition about the excavations in Cyprus and Greece; then, in 2003, Karageorghis introduced the exhibition to the European Parliament (where his inaugural speech seems to have had the same wording as his ICOMOS text (cf. Karageorghis, 2007: 174)). The Republic of Cyprus Department of Antiquities appealed to UNESCO and the ‘World Archaeologists’ Association [sic – World Archaeological Congress]’ (Hadjicostis, 2004); yet the excavations continued. The Chair of the Greek Cypriot House Sub-Committee on Cultural Heritage, Christodoulos Taramountas, claimed that Prof. Özgünel had been officially ‘black-listed’ at the World Archaeological Congress (cf. Hadjicostis, 2004; incidentally, I have not found any corroborating source). Yet the excavations continued.

Alongside legal problems, there were professional and personal ones. ICOMOS’s Cyprus National Committee (2001: 14; 13; 13) noted that Prof. Özgünel had ignored the ‘rights’ and ‘lawful interests’ of the Cypriot and French excavators, and had ‘“t[aken] possession” of the sites’. Twenty-four years after he had been displaced from his home and his archaeological site, Karageorghis had been dispossessed of his site. That painful event does not change the ethical or legal arguments over

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65 Arkeoloji ve Kültür Varlıklarını Araştırmalar Merkezi (AKVAM).
66 Doğu Akdeniz Üniversitesi (DAÜ).
67 ‘Salamis antik kentinin araştırılması amacıyla.’
68 Ankara Üniversitesi.
69 Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi (ODTÜ), Kuzey Kıbrıs Kampusu.
70 Salamis Kazıları Projesi.
71 ‘Bir “araştırma projesi”’ (Zeytinoğlu, 2010: 5).
this case; however, it may help to explain the difference between archaeologists' responses to the conflict and other cultural heritage professionals' responses. The (Greek Cypriot and international) archaeological community was dispossessed in a way other cultural heritage workers were not; and that may be yet another cause of the Greek Cypriot archaeological community's unique refusal to cooperate with anyone on anything in northern Cyprus, which stands in contrast to Greek Cypriot historians', anthropologists' and architects' intercommunal work. Nonetheless, that refusal is not only limiting unethical and illegal archaeological work, but also limiting ethical, legal conservation and rescue, and thereby harming both Cypriot archaeology and the Cypriot archaeological profession, as it did through the punishment of Turkish Cypriot archaeological rescue at Akanthou/Tatlısu.

4.b.iii. International excavation at Galinoporni/Kaleburnu

While hiking around Galinoporni/Kaleburnu on 1st July 2004, two academics stumbled upon metal objects on top of the hill of Vasili/Kraltepe; it is on the south-east facing coast of the Karpas Peninsula in Famagusta District (see map 3a). The English literature lecturer and the music lecturer told their archaeologist colleagues at Eastern Mediterranean University. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Department of Antiquities and Museums (TRNCDAM) and the northern Cypriot Eastern Mediterranean University (EMU) recovered 26 bronze artefacts, the largest Late Bronze Age hoard ever found on the island. In July 2005, with (German) Fritz Thyssen Foundation (FTS) funding, the Turkish Cypriot antiquities department, Turkish Cypriot and German archaeologists at the Eastern Mediterranean Cultural Heritage Research Center (DAKMAR) at EMU, and German archaeologists at the Technical University of Freiberg (TUBAF), the Free University of Berlin, and the Eberhard Karls University of Tübingen, its Curt-Engelhorn Centre for Archaeometry (CEZA) began the excavation at Galinoporni-Vasili/Kaleburnu-Kraltepe (King's Hill). (Since the beginning of the dig, archaeologists and archaeology students from Australia, Britain, the Czech Republic, Iran, Nigeria, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine and the United States have also worked on the site or its material.) In August, southern Cypriot cultural heritage workers started a campaign to end the excavation, to boycott and blacklist anyone involved in any way.

Here, I will explore the different interested parties' ethical and legal arguments for the excavation, and the boycott and blacklist. While conducting my research, I discussed this problem with archaeologists and other cultural heritage workers, in a range of settings from formal one-on-one interviews to informal group conversations. Some people spoke as institutional representatives; some people spoke as colleagues (but may have changed their opinions in front of me or others); and some people spoke as friends (and, similarly, may have changed their opinions). Using those discussions in an examination of the ethical dilemmas, however, would present its own ethical dilemmas: some encounters began as research discussions but became friendly chats (and vice versa); and being a member of the archaeological community, my research subject was of obvious professional interest to my circle of friends, and our research experiences were topics of conversation. I would not wish to use material where the consent of the informant was unclear; and I will not "professionalise" my "off-duty" chats with friends. Nonetheless, there are a few public sources; and I may use material from clearly-defined research discussions.

Furthermore, some cultural heritage workers – on both sides – learned of my research interests and, unasked, gave me copies of correspondence between professionals who attacked or defended the King’s Hill project. Obviously, using these papers presents problems, too, because not all of the correspondence was public, or written by the cultural heritage workers who gave me access to it.

72 Fritz Thyssen Stiftung (FTS).
73 Doğu Akdeniz Kültür Mirasını Araştırma Merkezi (DAKMAR).
74 Technische Universität Bergakademie Freiberg (TUBAF).
75 Freie Universität Berlin.
76 Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen (EKUT).
77 Curt-Engelhorn Zentrum für Archäometrie (CEZA).
Indeed, one erased personal information ‘so it can’t be traced’, pointedly told me ‘I don’t know where you got this’, then wryly smiled that it was ‘quite an ethical dilemma you have there’. I will try to solve the problem by addressing it as the product of somewhat distinct sections of the cultural heritage professional community. Those sections of the community do not precisely reflect the partitions of the Cyprus Conflict; they are somewhat different from the groups that produce nationalist archaeologies and histories. So, I will not characterise them as “Hellenist” or “Turkist”. Instead, I will present “Cyprus-based pro-excavation”, “Cyprus-based anti-excavation”, and their associated “international” communities of opinion; I have anonymised them to protect my informants and the correspondents. Where possible, I have shown (possibly) revealing differences in the groups’ behaviours, and the (possible) reasoning behind those differences; for example, the international anti-excavation community’s public protestations and the international pro-excavation community’s private commiserations. I have preserved their errors of fact and citation – for example, the claim that Galinoporni had been recognised as an archaeological site since Hogarth found some tombs there in 1888, when Baker had found those tombs in 1879 (and Hogarth had summarised Baker’s findings). Following archaeologist Kristin Romey’s (2007: 60) precedent for use of this material, I will quote private statements when revealing, and cite public statements where possible. Afterwards, I will correct their claims and sources, analyse their opinions’ legal validity, and attempt to work out an ethical solution consistent with international law and Cypriot cultural heritage work ethics.

4.b.iii.1. Cyprus-based anti-excavation opinion

What follows is the collated opinion of the large, loud, Cyprus-based community against excavation, as I heard it from government officials and cultural heritage professionals, and “overheard” it from their correspondences with the pro-excavation community:

Galinoporni is an archaeological site, or collection of sites, which has been known since 1888 at the latest (when British archaeologist David Hogarth (2008 [1889]: 74-76) observed tombs in the village of Galinó-porni). Since 1974, the site has been in the occupied part of Famagusta district, and subject to UNESCO and ICPCPEAC conventions and recommendations on archaeological work in occupied territories. Unavoidably, archaeology in occupied territories is political; and any resulting (free or compulsory, explicit or implicit) recognition of a secessionist regime is a political act, for which the archaeologist(s) must accept the professional consequences.

While Eastern Mediterranean University is built upon property stolen from Greek Cypriot refugees, it is tolerable that northern Cyprus-based academics teach and research archaeology, and it is tolerable that they and others publish northern Cyprus-based academics’ work (upon legally-produced and legally-accessed source materials). Nevertheless, cultural heritage workers must not conduct any archaeological work in northern Cyprus. Even if archaeologists requested an excavation to salvage cultural heritage, the Turkish Cypriot authorities would only permit an excavation to get false legal legitimacy from the archaeologists’ acknowledgement of the authorities’ political control. (If the Turkish Cypriot authorities were sincere, they would not have refused to share information about the mass graves of missing persons.) In addition, the Republic of Cyprus Department of Antiquities cannot monitor, inspect, or otherwise visit any excavations in northern Cyprus, because the puppet regime of the illegal pseudo-state demands ‘the show of a passport’ for Greek Cypriot archaeologists ‘to visit [their] own homes... and [their] archaeological sites’. The King’s Hill project is ‘arrogant’, and is in ‘blatant violation’ of both ‘international law and scholarly ethics’. Moreover, other ‘hints’ lead anti-excavation opinion to perceive a hidden agenda.

In accordance with the International Conventions of UNESCO (1954 [sic], 1970 and 1972), the three major safeguards of the world’s cultural and natural heritage, it is illegal to conduct excavations or any other archaeological fieldwork in the occupied territory of the Republic of Cyprus.
The only legally recognised state on the island is the Republic of Cyprus. United Nations Security Council Resolutions 365 and 367 recognise that the Republic of Turkey invaded and occupied 38% of the Republic of Cyprus; United Nations Security Council Resolution 541 requires ‘all States not to recognize any Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus’; and United Nations Security Council Resolution 550 again requires ‘all States... not to facilitate or in any way assist the aforesaid secessionist entity’. In Cypriot archaeological affairs, the competent national authorities are the Republic of Cyprus Department of Antiquities. Only the Department of Antiquities may license archaeological excavation, artefact collection in archaeological survey, material sampling, and the export of archaeological materials. Until the excavations at Galinoporni, only the University of Ankara had violated those laws, through its excavations at Salamis; and those excavations had been ‘denounced, not only at international fora but also at the UNESCO General Conference, as a blatant violation of scholarly ethics and of the [1956] New Delhi recommendation (Section VI)’.

Cyprus-based anti-excavation opinion recognises that the ICPCPEAC’s Second Protocol to the Hague Convention permits rescue excavations in occupied territories, but reminds that it must be ‘in close cooperation with the competent national authorities of the occupied territory’ (1999: Art. 9, Para. 2); in addition, that opinion states that only UNESCO and/or its agents may do cultural heritage work in occupied territories. Thus, lacking the permission of the Republic of Cyprus Department of Antiquities, the King’s Hill project is illegal under both Cypriot and international law. Consequently, it is a misappropriation of cultural property, and therefore a ‘serious violation’ of the Second Protocol (ICPCPEAC, 1999: Art. 15, Para. 1(e)). Moreover, the King’s Hill project is not a rescue excavation, because it is a large, long-term, international dig. Furthermore, even if it were a rescue excavation, pro-excavation opinion could not appeal to the ICPCPEAC’s (1999) Second Protocol, because Turkey is not a signatory to that protocol. Cyprus-based anti-excavation opinion points out that the 15th General Assembly of the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) ‘condemn[ed]... the illegal excavations and the change of names’ at Galinoporni. (It also notes that the erasure of the Greek-language name was part of the destruction of the intangible heritage of Cyprus.)

Hence, it is illegal for the King’s Hill project or any associates to excavate archaeological materials, to take samples of archaeological, archaeobotanical, archaeozoological, geological, or mineral materials, to export any finds or samples, and to produce any derivative work from the illegal data. In addition, Cyprus-based anti-excavation opinion warns that anyone ‘using the illegal airport in the occupied part of the island... will find difficulties coming back to Cyprus’ as they will ‘have used an illegal port of entry’. There will be ‘serious repercussion[s]’ for all archaeologists and institutions involved in the King’s Hill project, and for all archaeologists of the same nationalities as the archaeologists involved (unless they denounce their compatriots). Their permits for the export and/or study of Cypriot archaeological materials will be withdrawn; they will be forced to return previously licensed materials in their possession; they will be denied permission to publish present or future analyses of previously-studied materials. Cyprus-based anti-excavation opinion holds that German colleagues deserve to be singled out and recognised for their contributions to the campaign, which were some of the strongest of all of the international protests.

4.b.iii.2. International anti-excavation opinion

What follows is the collated opinion of the equally large, loud, international community against excavation, as I heard it from cultural heritage professionals, and “overheard” it from their correspondences with the pro-excavation community. To be clear, I have only quoted authors of published sources from their published works; they may not agree with the other claims that constitute the majority opinion of the anti-excavation community. According to international anti-excavation opinion:

Anti-excavation internationals ‘fully support’ their Cyprus-based colleagues (and genuinely believing in the cause, or fearing the black list, the international anti-excavation community tends to show its support publicly). They include international archaeologists who believe that, had the King’s Hill Project ‘approached the legitimate competent national authorities at the University of
Cyprus [sic] before the excavations, ‘some discreet and acceptable “diplomatic” solution could have been found that would have resulted in some sort of legitimacy’. Association with the excavation is ‘academic suicide’, and all associates will be pariahs for years. It is illegal and unscholarly – and against regional archaeological tradition – to conduct any archaeological excavation in occupied territories. Since the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is not recognised, its Department of Antiquities and Museums is not recognised either; thus, the northern Cypriot antiquities department cannot constitute the competent national authorities referred to in the ICPCEAC’s Second Protocol (1999: Art. 9, Para. 2); thus it cannot license archaeological work. Archaeologists are ‘political pawn[s]’ in the TRNC’s battle for de facto recognition; and excavations establish a precedent for that practical recognition.

International anti-excavation opinion believes that pro-excavation opinion uses international law selectively, because it appeals to Article 9, Paragraph 1(b) of the Second Protocol to defend rescue archaeology in Turkish-occupied territories, when the Turkish occupying forces have violated Article 9, Paragraph 1(a) of the same protocol through illicit export of archaeological materials, and Article 15, Paragraph 1(c-e) through systematic destruction of Greek cultural heritage. As archaeologist Ioannis Georganas (2005) phrased it,

The [individuals and institutions associated with the King’s Hill project] are in direct breach of the International Conventions of UNESCO (1954 [sic], 1970 and 1972). According to the latter, it is illegal to conduct excavations or any other archaeological fieldwork in the occupied territory of the Republic of Cyprus.

International anti-excavation opinion believes that cultural heritage workers associated with the King’s Hill project should be denied licences for archaeological research abroad as well as in Cyprus; and they should be refused publication of their archaeological research; indeed, they should be ‘banned from publishing and publicizing the results of the digs’. Anyone enabling or otherwise facilitating their work would be condoning the King’s Hill team’s law-breaking. International archaeologists, but foremost German archaeologists, wish to acknowledge their continual, friendly collaboration with the Republic of Cyprus Department of Antiquities and the University of Cyprus Department of Archaeology.

4.b.iii.3. Cyprus-based pro-excavation opinion

What follows is the collated opinion of the small, quiet, Cyprus-based community for excavation, as I heard it from government officials and cultural heritage professionals, and “overheard” it from their correspondences with the anti-excavation community. Again, to be clear, I have only quoted authors of published sources from their published works; they may not agree with the other claims that constitute the majority opinion of the pro-excavation community. According to Cyprus-based pro-excavation opinion:

The King’s Hill is a new archaeological site in Kaleburnu. As soon as it was found, the site became endangered: it has suffered ‘considerable damage’ from looting; and it continues to suffer ‘heavy erosion’. This legal and professional dig salvages an endangered cultural heritage site; it also supports and trains the local cultural heritage professional community. The Cyprus-based pro-excavation community is ‘not interested in politics’, and sees ‘no legal or moral problem’. On the contrary, the other side, the ‘purely politically motivated’ Greek Cypriot archaeological community, has ‘refused’ to see the good of the project; its refusal to work in occupied territories is a political act, and an unethical acceptance of the loss of the site. Pro-excavation opinion says that the illegal excavations are the looters’ thefts, not the archaeologists’ digs, which prevent the site’s looting. Contrary to anti-excavation opinion’s belief that the King’s Hill project is a ‘political pawn’ in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’s games, pro-excavation opinion believes that ‘cultural heritage [i]s a pawn’ in the Republic of Cyprus’s ‘political games’.
In Eastern Mediterranean University attorney Kaya Arslan’s view, northern Cyprus is a ‘de facto, independent, democratic entity’ (2005: 2), not an ‘invaded/occupied territory’ (2005: 10). Yet even if it were, rescue excavation in occupied territory would still be legal under Article 9 of the ICPCPEAC’s (1999) Second Protocol to the Hague Convention (Arslan, 2005: 10). According to Arslan, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 365 (1974d), 367 (1974e), 541 (1983) and 550 (1984) do not contradict the Turkish Cypriot community’s ‘right of self-determination... based on... the 1960 Constitution’, which recognises communal ‘autonomy [competence]’ over questions of religion, education, culture and personal status (2005: 2; cf. ROC, 1960: Art. 87). As Arslan (2005: 3) observed, the United Nations Secretary-General has called upon ‘all States... to eliminate unnecessary restrictions... isolating the Turkish Cypriots and impeding their development’ (UNSG, 2004: 2).

Cyprus-based pro-excavation opinion thinks that, ‘[a]ccording to international law’, it was not necessary to ask the Republic of Cyprus Department of Antiquities for permission, because its permission would have been ‘worthless’ in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Government and academic archaeologists in the south were quietly asked about excavations in the north, but the southern Cypriot archaeological community did not consider it. The King’s Hill project works ‘in close co-operation with the Department of Antiquities of Northern Cyprus as the competent authority’ under Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the ICPCPEAC’s Second Protocol, which ‘explicitly allows rescue excavations in occupied territories’ and has been ‘legally binding’ upon the Republic of Cyprus since before the recovery of the hoard and the excavation of the site. The ‘local Cypriot authorities’ license the excavation. Cyprus-based pro-excavation opinion points out that Cypriot and international archaeologists can freely visit Kaleburnu and inspect the work. International colleagues have been ‘threatened’ that, if they entered the island through the north, they would not be able to enter the island again; however, the Council of the European Union’s (EUC, 2004) Green Line Regulation requires the Republic of Cyprus to allow entry to anyone who has the right to enter it (even if they entered the island through the north). So, anti-excavation opinion’s ‘legal arguments... are not applicable’.

4.b.iii.4. International pro-excavation opinion

What follows is the collated opinion of the even smaller, quieter, international community for excavation, as I heard it from cultural heritage professionals, and “overheard” it from their correspondences with the anti-excavation community:

Pro-excavation internationals ‘fully agree’ with their Cyprus-based colleagues (though, in fear of the blacklist, they tend to affirm this agreement in private). They note that the change in the official name was not a political act: the original name of the village was (Ottoman) Turkish, Kaleburnu (kale burnu, the fortress of the cape) (cf. Goodwin, 1978: 312); in fact, the official Greek-language name of the village was a corruption of the Turkish-language name, intended to ‘insult’ the villagers, Galinoporni (galíni pórni, the tranquil prostitute)78.

4.b.iii.5. Factual accuracy and legal validity of archaeological opinion

Historical toponymist Jack Goodwin (1978: 312) did identify and translate “Kaleburnu” as the original name of the village, which had ‘prob[ably]’ been Turkish Cypriot throughout its existence; but he did not translate the Greek-language corruption, “Galinoporni”. The “correct” corruption was in the local dialect: it was not the Greek Greek for “tranquil prostitute (pórni (with an omicron))”79, but the Cypriot Greek dialect for “tranquil morning (pōrni (with an omega, from proiní))”80. Nonetheless, the novel corruption is now a popular translation; indeed, it was the first one I was told

78 Γαλήνη πόρνη.
79 Πόρνη.
80 Πωρνή/Πρωινή.
in the village, by the laughing villagers (in Greek). The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has changed some Greek-language place-names in artificial ways that appear to be deliberate attempts to erase the memory and evidence of the Greek Cypriot community; but it is difficult to conceive of the TRNC’s (and the King’s Hill project’s) official use of the original name of the village, in the historic language of the village, as a crime against culture.

Galinoporni/Kaleburnu has been known as an archaeological landscape since at least 1879 (when not David Hogarth but British traveller Samuel Baker (2003 [1879]) documented ruins and tombs in and around the village of Gallibornu); categorising it as one site or many is a theoretical game. For example, Paul Åström (1960: 123) published a tomb ‘from Galinoporni’, found ‘outside the village’, ‘on the mountain slope’, ‘before reaching the Moslem cemetery’, which could be understood to have mentioned one site or five: the tomb could be an isolated burial site; Kaleburnu village could be a site of inhabitation; the area outside the village could itself be a locale, a place between the village and the mountain; the zone on the mountain slope could be a particular site of action (e.g. herd-grazing); the Muslim cemetery could be another burial site (or part of a single funereal landscape); and/or the Galinoporni/Kaleburnu area could be a single archaeological landscape.

The Cyprus-based anti-excavation community considered the King’s Hill Project to be ‘excavations... at the site of Galinoporni’, while the Cyprus-based pro-excavation community considered the project to be ‘excavating the Late Bronze Age site of Kaleburnu-Kraltepe/Galinoporni-Vasili’. So, when the pro-excavation community stated that ‘the place was never registered as an archaeological site’ before the academics found the hoard and the King’s Hill Project excavated the site, the outraged anti-excavation community perceived at least wilful ‘ignorance’, if not calculated ‘disrespect of the scholarly field of Cypriot archaeology’. (These miscommunications increased not only the points of disagreement, but also the intensity of the personal and professional conflict.) Yet no earlier evidence of archaeology specifically on King’s Hill has been presented, so the project’s excavated site must be assumed to be a new archaeological site.

After the Green Line was opened in April 2003, Greek Cypriot parliamentarian Tassos Mitsopoulos insisted that showing a passport to enter northern Cyprus ‘under no circumstances constitute[d] recognition’ (cited in the Cyprus Mail, 2003b); indeed, Mitsopoulos argued that crossing the border was precisely ‘disput[ing] the division’ of the island (ibid.). (Demonstrating that the Greek Cypriot public agreed with Mitsopoulos, by July 2008, the majority of the Greek Cypriot community had visited northern Cyprus (Pissa, 2008).) So, the Republic of Cyprus Department of Antiquities can visit, inspect and monitor excavations in northern Cyprus. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, missing persons’ exhumations and the Nicosia Master Plan show that, when politically convenient for the states and the relevant professional communities, bicomunal archaeological and other cultural heritage work is possible, even in the secessionist territory of northern Cyprus. The situation is more complicated for foreigners, however. It is true that the Council of the European Union’s (EUC, 2004) Green Line Regulation protects internationals’ legal right to freedom of movement; but they may still find professional ‘difficulties’ if they enter the island through the north. I and others have been repeatedly asked about our port of entry, and warned that if it had been in northern Cyprus, ‘we could not have helped you’.

As for the recovery of missing persons’ remains, in the past, the Greek Cypriot authorities had engaged in ‘fabrication’, a ‘partial falsification of reality’, in its presentation of the information to its own community (Sant-Cassia, 2007: 90; 91); the authorities prolonged missing persons’ families’ suffering to promote the state’s agenda. The year after the (accurate) criticism of the Turkish Cypriot authorities’ uncooperativeness, both sides began collaborating on internationally-supervised, bicomunally-run forensic archaeological exhumations.

It is relatively easy to examine the anti-excavation claim that the 15th General Assembly of ICOMOS condemned the King’s Hill project as illegal: it is not true. Indeed, even though the text was proposed by the (Greek) Cypriot National Commission of ICOMOS, the resolution neither categorised the excavations at Galinoporni as illegal, nor condemned them; it only ‘[c]ondemned[ed]... the name change of Galinoporni [sic]’ (ICOMOSGA15, 2005: Art. 7). Neither the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), nor the UNESCO advisory International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), have declared the excavation either legal or illegal (Romey, 2007: 60; 62).

It is far more difficult, however, to assess the validity of the general claim that it is illegal to conduct archaeological fieldwork in the occupied north of Cyprus. Anti-excavation opinion attacks the dig as illegal according to the ICPCPEAC’s 1954 Convention, and UNESCO’s 1970 and 1972 Conventions and 1956 Recommendation; pro-excavation opinion defends the dig as legal according to the ICPCPEAC’s 1999 Protocol. UNESCO’s 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage never once mentions excavations or occupied territories. It is difficult to find any relevant clause: Article 6, Paragraph 1 ‘fully respect[s]’ state sovereignty over its cultural heritage sites; but the same paragraph simultaneously ‘recognize[s]... the duty of the international community’ to protect those sites. UNESCO’s 1970 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property does not mention occupied territories. Apart from recognising archaeological materials as cultural heritage, the 1970 Convention’s only reference to archaeological excavations is Article 5(d), in which states commit to undertake excavation where necessary for the ‘protection’ of cultural heritage.

As already mentioned, Article 5, Paragraph 1 of the ICPCPEAC’s 1954 Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict limits occupying powers to ‘support[ing] the competent national authorities of the occupied country’. Article 5, Paragraph 2 of the 1954 Convention requires that, ‘should the competent national authorities be unable to take such measures [to preserve cultural property], the Occupying Power shall, as far as possible, and in close-co-operation with such authorities, take the most necessary measures of preservation’; but the Convention does not define acceptable measures of preservation. Article VI, Paragraph 32 of UNESCO’s 1956 New Delhi Recommendation on International Principles Applicable to Archaeological Excavations explicitly cautions against archaeological excavations in occupied territory. As northern Cyprus-based underwater archaeologist Matthew Harpster (2008: 7) observed (when looking at the 1954 Convention), these post-Second World War laws and recommendations presume a ‘minimal degree of co-operation’ between the groups in conflict, where cultural property protection staff have diplomatic-style ‘immunity from the surrounding political conflict’.

Anti-excavation opinion may be correct in saying that archaeologists in Turkish-occupied territory cannot use international laws that the Republic of Turkey does not recognise. However, equally, anti-excavation opinion cannot ignore or distort international laws that the Republic of Cyprus does recognise. When the anti-excavation community acknowledges the existence of the ICPCPEAC’s Second Protocol to the Hague Convention, the community states that Article 9, Paragraph 2 is inapplicable anyway, because it only ‘permits excavations “in close co-operation with the competent national authorities of the occupied territories”; but that opinion is an apparently deliberate distortion of the law. Article 9, Paragraph 2 states that rescue excavations in occupied territories should, ‘unless circumstances do not permit, be carried out in close co-operation with the competent national authorities’ (ICPCPEAC, 1999: Art. 9, Para. 2 – emphasis added). Like the 1954 Convention, the 1999 Second Protocol still presumes the authorities’ willingness to co-operate when circumstances do permit, and when it refers to circumstances permitting or not permitting an action, it means military circumstances.

In fact, this is made clear earlier in the Protocol, in Article 6, which states the conditions under which cultural property may be destroyed as a matter of military necessity: a junior officer can make the decision instead of a senior officer, ‘where circumstances do not permit otherwise’; and the force must forewarn the military targets in the cultural property, ‘whenever circumstances permit’. It is also made clear later, in Article 13, which states the conditions under which cultural property under enhanced protection may be destroyed as a matter of military necessity: the ‘highest operational level of command’ must give the order, and the targets must be forewarned, ‘unless circumstances do not permit, due to requirements of immediate self-defence’. Thus, since the competent national authorities of Cyprus refuse to cooperate, archaeologists do not require their cooperation for rescue excavations in the north.
At the same time, the Cyprus-based pro-excavation community cannot distort the international laws it wants to use in its defence (specifically, Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the 1999 Second Protocol). The 'competent national authorities of the occupied territory' are not the 'local Cypriot authorities', and the required 'close co-operation' is not between the archaeologists and the occupying power. This claim is particularly absurd because, as discussed, that paragraph requires the occupying power's 'co-operation' with those authorities, which (within the Cyprus-based pro-excavation community's logic) would be itself. Furthermore, if the pro-excavation community insists upon interpreting that paragraph as rule for the relationship between archaeologists and occupying powers, then (il)logically it is stating that it would conduct archaeological excavation without the cooperation of the occupying power if 'circumstances do not permit'.

The legality of any excavation in the north is dependent upon the validity of the excavation's claim to be rescue. Unfortunately, the King's Hill excavation's claim is disputed (even within the anti-excavation section of the archaeological community; some believe in the 'necessity of rescue excavation at Galinoporni', but others do not). The Republic of Cyprus Department of Antiquities refuses to inspect the site; and the boycott prevents international archaeologists from inspecting the site. Furthermore, even after the excavation, the black list prevents any examination of its necessity, because the black list prevents peers from reviewing any publication of the excavation (either during the publication process or after any publication's entry into public record). Thus, currently, it is practically impossible to work out the validity and legality of the King's Hill excavation at Galinoporni/Kaleburnu.

Whether or not it is legal, the excavation is boycotted. Since the Fritz Thyssen Foundation (FTS) froze its funding after the first season, and Eberhard Karls University of Tübingen withdrew its offer of funding, the King's Hill project has only received funding from the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Eastern Mediterranean University. All other potential funding bodies know that they must 'help to avert' any 'possible harm' to other archaeologists: they must avoid the project to avoid their own and other archaeologists' guilt by association and collective punishment. As it is impossible to work out the legality of the excavation, so it is impossible to work out the ethics of its boycott. However, the precautionary principle not to ease or enable work of uncertain legality is different from a choice to hinder or prevent legal cultural heritage work, or to exclude cultural heritage workers not proved guilty of any crime. Hence, it is necessary to explore the blacklisting of archaeologists who have worked in northern Cyprus.

4.b.iii.6. Martin Bartelheim, İşık Atay, and blacklisting

In 2006, one of the King's Hill project’s archaeologists, Dr. Martin Bartelheim, was expecting an archaeology lectureship from Oxford University (with encouragement to continue work on the project). At the same time, Oxford University was expecting a million-pound donation from the (Greek Cypriot refugee family) A. G. Leventis Foundation. Ultimately, Bartelheim got not a job contract but a pre-written confession that he ‘apologise[d]’ for working on the King's Hill project and promised 'no longer [to] work on this site or anywhere else in northern Cyprus', 'not [to] prepare or be associated with any publication... nor... any other work on these results' (cited in Romey, 2007: 62). Bartelheim refused to sign the confession, and was still searching for a job in 2007 (though he is employed now).

In 2009, one of the project’s students, a Turkish graduate of Eastern Mediterranean University, İşık Atay, applied for work experience at the A. G. Leventis Gallery of Cypriote Antiquities in the Museum of Mediterranean and Near Eastern Antiquities (Medelhavsmuseet), Stockholm, Sweden. Museum curator Dr. Kristian Goransson rejected his application because the Medelhavsmuseet 'cannot in any way be associated' with ‘excavations... considered illegal by UNESCO' (cited in Cyprus Today, 2009). As already noted, UNESCO has not commented upon the dig; and UNESCO/ICCP/CEAC law has not been interpreted convincingly by either side.

It must be remembered that both of these cases are examples of archaeologists not proved guilty of any crime, applying to do lawful work and get lawful training. Yet in both cases, they were excluded because of their association with archaeological work in northern Cyprus. Together, these
cases show that it is, if not impossible, at least very difficult for the northern Cypriot archaeological community to maintain contact with the international archaeological community. Archaeologists must choose (if they are allowed any choice at all) to work either in northern Cyprus (and Turkey) or in the rest of the world (including Turkey). Together, Bartelheim’s and Atay’s cases demonstrate that the archaeological community will hinder (and if possible, prevent) any archaeological fieldwork in northern Cyprus, even if it is legal rescue excavation.

Apart from its immediate harm to Cypriot cultural heritage, the black list harms the Cypriot cultural heritage profession. While it does not automatically and completely prevent expert teaching, training and (non-invasive) archaeological research in northern Cyprus (e.g. by Turkish Cypriot archaeologists who choose not to migrate in order to work), isolation does severely limit the northern Cypriot community’s access to education, skills, technology, and staff. Moreover, it deters legal rescue archaeology, and limits the ability of the archaeologists to do the rescue work. Furthermore, it deters the Turkish Cypriot community (especially already-under-represented groups) from training in cultural heritage, and thus threatens the functioning of an effective cultural heritage professional community in northern Cyprus. Critically, the membership of the black list is not limited to archaeologists who have conducted invasive archaeological fieldwork in northern Cyprus.

When responding to Eastern Mediterranean University Department of Archaeology and Art History claims that archaeologists in southern Cyprus suffered ‘political pressure not to share data or collaborate in any way’ with archaeologists in northern Cyprus (paraphrased by Romey, 2007: 60), then antiquities director Pavlos Florentzos implicitly admitted it. Florentzos dismissed the indiscriminate blacklisting and general boycott as not being the ‘main point’ (2007: 8), which was that universities in northern Cyprus were unlicensed, and therefore unlawful. Indeed, in the article that elicited Florentzos’s reply, Kristin Romey (2007: 60) had published former antiquities director Vassos Karageorghis’s private threat to German archaeometallurgist Ernst Pernicka: his laboratory work for the King’s Hill project would have ‘serious repercussion[s] not only on [his] university [Tübingen], but also on all German archaeologists working in Cyprus and Greece’. The same year, the Medelhavsmuseet published Karageorghis’s (2007) memoirs of a Lifetime in the Archaeology of Cyprus; and the boycott and black list became undeniable facts in the public record. In his memoirs, Karageorghis (2007: 118) recorded how an unnamed French archaeologist, who had worked at Enkomi before the invasion, wrote a letter to the Turkish Cypriot antiquities director after the invasion, and was therefore internationally blacklisted. The French archaeologist required (and, years later, received) Karageorghis’s personal ‘consent’ to be allowed to work in Greece (ibid.). Notably, the French archaeologist’s blacklisting was an ‘example to other prospective “profiteurs”’ (Karageorghis, 2007: 118 – emphasis added): the boycott is also a punishment for archaeological thought crimes.

Theoretically, pre-1974 excavations in northern Cyprus, which could not rescue their finds, samples and notes before the north’s occupation, and thus have not been able to use their research materials since 1974, face a novel ethical dilemma: to publish their sites (necessitating official cooperation with the Turkish Cypriot authorities in order to study their research materials in northern Cyprus or to transfer their research materials out of northern Cyprus to the south or abroad); or to refuse to lend legitimacy to the Turkish Cypriot authorities (necessitating the non-publication of their data and thus being responsible for the effective destruction of the site). However, that is not a practical dilemma. Firstly, the Republic of Cyprus has politically and financially supported, and participated in, archaeological and other cultural heritage work in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (e.g. the Committee on Missing Persons, and the Nicosia Master Plan): so, there is no need to choose; if the Republic of Cyprus Department of Antiquities permitted, the foreign archaeological teams could use the same methods to conduct their work. Secondly, if any foreign archaeological team chose to ignore the boycott, they would be blacklisted themselves: the Department of Antiquities (and all other associated individuals and institutions) would withdraw their excavation and research licences to access their research materials; thus, they would be under a legal obligation not to publish their sites.

4.b.iv. Academic publication, academic citation
One of the primary reasons for non-partisan archaeologists to compromise themselves is the academic black list of cultural heritage workers who have somehow contradicted the wishes of the Hellenist archaeological community. Naturally, the black list is not normally acknowledged, let alone studied. First of all, its primary victims are themselves blacklisted, and even if the blacklisters cannot prevent the publication of blacklistees' work, they can demand that blacklistees' published 'work should not be cited' (Şevketoğlu, 2000b: 55). Moreover, would-be publishers and citers of blacklistees' work have been warned that they 'risk losing permission to do their own work in Greece and Southern Cyprus' (Şevketoğlu, 2000b: 56). To be crystal clear, I have not discussed, or tried to discuss, the black list with any of my cited sources. The following sources have not even acknowledged the existence of a black list. However, there are very few comments upon the process of citation, and I personally find it instructive to compare archaeological citation practice with other cultural heritage professions' citation practices; I personally believe that institutional practice reflects community understanding.

Bernard Knapp and Sophia Antoniadou (1998: 34n1) 'could never support or substantiate any details emerging from northern Cyprus', and did not cite (and, thus, did not address) any official Turkish Cypriot sources in their study of Archaeology, Politics and the Cultural Heritage of Cyprus. In a study of the Manipulation of Roman Archaeology in Politically Fractured Landscapes, Jody Gordon (2008: 12n31) did include official Turkish Cypriot sources, 'because it is only possible to explain the political manipulation' by citing official sources; but '[d]ocuments produced by the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” were listed separately from the rest of the bibliography (Gordon, 2008: 34). Knapp and Antoniadou did cite a Turkish Cypriot community source on the destruction of cultural heritage in northern Cyprus (i.e. Yaşın, 1982, cited by Knapp and Antoniadou, 1998: 24), but Yaşın's (1982) articles had been cited in official Greek Cypriot sources (e.g. ROCPIO, 1997: 5; 21; 29; 32; 34; 36; 37; 56; 61; 62; 66-67; 70; 71), and it is difficult to judge how much that made these "illegal" sources acceptable, and how much it made these originally Turkish-language sources simply accessible.

Either way, that material had been critically filtered: the material was reduced to the selection the Greek Cypriot administration found it politically beneficial to translate. So, the Republic of Cyprus Press and Information Office (ROCPIO, 1997) translated extracts of Yaşın's (1982) articles on Turkish Cypriot looting in northern Cyprus after the Turkish invasion in 1974, but it did not report on Greek Cypriot paramilitaries' looting and burning of Yaşın's home in Nicosia in 1963 (affirmed in Durduran, 2001; Hussein, 2009). More generally, the Greek Cypriot administration did not relay politically inconvenient reasons for neglect of cultural heritage in northern Cyprus, like poverty making conservation and restoration unaffordable, and academic and professional isolation – the boycott and black list – making work difficult or impossible (cf. Şevketoğlu, 2000b: 56).

Strongly discouraged from conducting fieldwork research into the treatment of cultural heritage in southern Cyprus, greatly limited in researching that treatment in northern Cyprus, independent archaeologists were reduced to library research; but, unable to access contrary (Turkish-language) community sources and informally banned from citing contrary (English-language) official Turkish Cypriot sources, archaeologists could only reproduce official Greek Cypriot narratives. It was not like this in other disciplines. In conversation, archaeologists and historians commented upon historians' relative freedom to cite Turkish Cypriot sources, and even to work with Turkish Cypriots. Once, when I mentioned CAARI without clarifying the acronym (the Cyprus American Archaeological Research Institute), one anthropologist explained to another, 'you know, the place where the Turkish Cypriot books are locked in a cupboard'. Unlike Knapp and Antoniadou (1998), anthropologist Julie Scott cited official Turkish Cypriot sources (cf. 2002: 107n34; n36; 109n43; n44; n45; 110n49), and semi-official ones (cf. 2002: 114n66); so did political scientists Costas Constantinou and Mete Hatay (cf. 2010: 1). And unlike Gordon (2008), neither Constantinou and Hatay nor Scott showed any concern to defend or explain their citations.
4.b.iv.1. Copping out

Some archaeologists made concessions, and self-censored their concessions from their publications; but their concessions preserved their data and their ability to do the censored work in any peaceful future. In addition, a few of them told me about their compromises (always on condition of anonymity, sometimes on condition of not mentioning even anonymised versions of them in my work). Thus, relatively unfree archaeologists managed to resist nationalist intimidation indirectly; and that nationalist intimidation was documented.

For example, once, I prefaced a question with, 'since we’re not in the conference now I can ask you this’, then I asked about archaeological evidence of remaining residents’ destruction of a refugee community’s cultural heritage. Unfortunately, I do not have permission to examine that case study, and can only state that nationalist locals explained to archaeologists that ‘we’ do not talk about it, and that the archaeologists ‘copped out’ and complied.

4.b.iv.2. Pirate publication

One source I found elsewhere was Turkish Cypriot poet Mehmet Yaşın’s (1982) series of articles on looting and destruction-by-development in Perishing Cyprus. I had read and used English-language extracts published in Greek Cypriot propaganda (e.g. Mehmet Yaşın, 26. Nisan-17. Mayıs 1982, translated and republished in ROCPIO, 1997: 37; 62; 70; 71; cf. Hardy, forthcoming). But when I tried to find the complete original Turkish-language newspaper articles, I learned that, in 1989, the Republic of Cyprus Press and Information Office had translated and published a ‘pirate edition’ of Yaşın’s articles in a booklet (Mehmet Yaşın, 6th December 1989: Press Statement; cf. ROCPIO, 1989a); the English-language extracts were from the pirate edition.

In a press statement on 6th December 1989, Yaşın said that:

This pirate book, which does not belong to me, has been distributed to the world’s libraries in my name. I protest the Greek Cypriot Press and Information Office responsible for my publications being used so disrespectfully.

Unable to access Yaşın’s (1982) own work, I had to choose between using the ROCPIO’s (1997) translation, and excluding some of the rare, absolutely reliable information that I had. Agreeing with Yaşın (and exceptionally appalled by the Republic of Cyprus Press and Information Office’s continued pirating of Yaşın’s work after his protest), I have refused to use any of the illegitimately-published material.

81 To cop out is to make a concession (parachoro (παραχωρώ); ödün vermek).
82 Tükenen Kıbrıs.
5. The subversion of scholarship

When the Turkish Cypriot administration made the 1983 Unilateral Declaration of Independence, Greece and the Greek Cypriot administration began a ‘co-ordinated worldwide campaign’ to undo it (Joseph, 1997: 53). In 1985, semi-official Hellenist institutions produced the first comprehensive propaganda about cultural destruction (cf. CPCHC, 1985); and, in 1986, official Turkist institutions responded (cf. TRNCSCS and TRNCDAM, 1986). Since then, each side has operated a cottage industry of official and semi-official books, articles, museums and exhibitions, and websites, produced by government ministries and municipalities, village and refugee associations, and other nationalist individuals and groups. All of those official and semi-official works distinguished themselves from non-partisan work by subverting scholarship. They claimed to present the whole problem but consciously showed one unrepresentative part, or neglected relevant actions and events – even if they used the relevant sources fairly, they still narrated misleading histories to the public. They excluded, or even avoided collecting, (potentially) inconvenient data – thus manipulating their information to enable them to write politically convenient histories. They simply misstated facts; or they actively misrepresented archaeological, historical and/or community sources (by commission or omission) – thus falsely claiming that sources produced certain evidence or proved certain interpretations. Here, I wish to explore how these cultural heritage workers subverted scholarship, and how their unscholarly behaviour influenced the cultural heritage profession and its work.

These problems are manifested in the official Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus book about the Cultural Heritage of Northern Cyprus: its Protection and Preservation (TRNCSCS and TRNCDAM, 1986), and in the official Republic of Cyprus (ROCPIO, 1989b) book about the Destruction of the Cultural Heritage in the Turkish-Occupied Part of Cyprus (as well as many other official and semi-official interpretations on both sides). However, those documents’ institutional authorship, their “popular” style of citation, and their lack of discussion of their own and others’ sourcing of information and narration of history, may mask responsibility and hide the process of the manipulation of academic and public understanding. Thus, first, I will explore international journalist Michael Jansen’s work, because it is exemplary of the subversion of scholarship. Afterwards, I will examine other professional and community cultural heritage practices, which further demonstrate the corruption of knowledge and understanding of the Cyprus Conflict, and hence the community capacity to resolve the conflict.

Apparent impartiality and investigative, Jansen has presented her book in the British Parliament, and at an event partly organised by the New York Foreign Press Association; she has testified at the European Parliament’s Public Hearing on the Protection of the Cultural Heritage in Cyprus; and she has published in international journals (e.g. Jansen, 2008). She has reported on the illicit antiquities trade for Archaeology magazine for at least twenty years. Her book was favourably reviewed by a cultural heritage expert in the Friends of Cyprus Report (Clark, 2006: 56-58); her work was discussed in (albeit Hellenist) community newspapers, magazines and blogs (e.g. grhomeboy, 2006; Klok, 2007; Yiannis, 2006), and that discussion was reproduced in international academic conversations (e.g. Meadows, 2006). Indeed, initially, I myself unquestioningly accepted Jansen’s interpretation of Dalibard’s report and UNESCO’s censorship (e.g. Hardy, 2008a; cf. Hardy, 2009c).

Jansen (literally) wrote the book on looting and destruction of cultural heritage in Cyprus; at least, it was the only book not published by official or semi-official institutions. Nonetheless, when she wrote it, she had lived in southern Cyprus since 1976, had help from Greek Cypriot archaeologists, art historians, politicians and diplomats (2005: xiii-xiv); she also used maps and photographs provided by the Greek Cypriot Department of Antiquities and Department of Lands and Surveys, and the Press and Information Office (2005: figs. 1-30), including two ‘[p]repared specially… by the Cyprus Department of Antiquities’ (2005: figs. 2-3), as she had had one ‘produced by the Cyprus Antiquities Department at [her] request’ for her review of the Hellenist catalogue of the Plundering of a 9000-year-old Civilization (1986: 316), to which antiquities director Karageorghis (1985) had contributed; former antiquities director Sophocles Hadjisavvas ‘reviewed the text’ of her book for her (2005: xiv). As Republic of Cyprus spokesperson Kypros Chrysostomides (2006) observed, editor and publisher Prof. Theofanis Stavrou ‘has used a prominent academic forum at the
university of Minnesota to spread Mrs. Jansen's and other people's passionate message for the protection, preservation and respect of our cultural heritage.

Any last doubt of Jansen's position is dispelled by her patrons: the American Hellenic Institute (AHI), the American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association (AHEPA) and the Embassy of the Republic of Cyprus sponsored her 2006 speech to the United States National Press Club (NPC); the Onassis Foundation and the Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the United Nations sponsored her 2006 speech to the New York Foreign Press Association (FPA); and the Government of the Republic of Cyprus sponsored her 2007 article in an international policy journal, *Europe's World*. Unfortunately, Michael Jansen can only be considered a Hellenist source.

5.a. The bowdlerisation of Jacques Dalibard's UNESCO reports

As mentioned earlier, after the Turkish invasion in 1974, UNESCO visited a sample of sites around the island, then appointed an Advisor for the Cultural Heritage of Cyprus to help with cultural property conservation and restoration. The advisor, Canadian restoration architect Jacques Dalibard, inspected a set of sites in 1975 and submitted a report. (It had some inevitable flaws: for example, a 'friendly policeman' told Dalibard that rain had washed out a road, so he did not visit, and thus did not record, the newly pillaged Monastery of Antifonitis (Fielding, 1976b: 13); but it was as thorough as possible in the circumstances.) UNESCO suppressed, then published Dalibard's research, very heavily-edited, in 1976. The original report became a legend: its suppression has been cited in general histories of Cyprus and global histories of the censorship of historical thought. Telling Cyprus's history – unfortunately without citing even an anonymous source – in 1997, Christopher Hitchens (1997: 113) wrote that UNESCO kept the report 'confidential – in the hope of avoiding a rupture with Turkey' (but, apparently, not with Greece or the Greek Cypriot administration). Previously an Amnesty International monitor, historian Antoon de Baets followed Hitchens. Citing him when presenting a global history of the censorship of historical thought in 2002, de Baets (2002: 146) grounded Cyprus's place in that history in UNESCO's suppression of information about the 'many Christian and Hellenic monuments… destroyed and archaeological sites desecrated' (but, apparently, not Islamic or Ottoman monuments). They are a couple of examples of the continuing influence of the suppression of the report upon public discourse; notably, they are both genuinely, demonstrably independent authors; however, their works were incidentally biased. Yet, remarkably, contemporary accounts of the suppression explicitly stated that Dalibard's report had been 'suppressed for fear of upsetting both Greeks and Turks' (Fielding, 1976a: 13). The Committee for the Protection of the Cultural Heritage of Cyprus only blamed 'probably' Turkish pressure (Leventis, 2000: 150); and deliberately misrepresenting the newspaper article quoted above, the Republic of Cyprus Press and Information Office only reminded its readers of the 'Turkish Cypriot's calculated disregard for the truth' (Fielding, 1976a: 13, cited in ROCPIO, 1997: 53); but still, neither of those source's brief comments would fully explain contemporary public understanding. Another figure appears to have been key to the presentation and promotion of the suppressed report, and to its influence upon academic and popular public understanding.

Journalist Michael Jansen first accused UNESCO of 'giving the [Turkish Cypriot and Turkish] looters and smugglers both license and immunity' in 1986 (Jansen, 1986: 315; she attributed her opinion to Fielding's (1976a: 13) newspaper article). In her recent book, Jansen (2005: 27) said that Dalibard's original report's 'contents still remain a carefully guarded secret to all but the few who manage to obtain a copy'. Jansen included the original report in her bibliography (2005: 75), and spoke with authority about what would have happened if it had been publicised (2005: 27-28), so it seems that she was one of the few who did manage to obtain a copy. Like most people, I did not; but I did have a copy of the censored one, and Jansen got worryingly simple details about the censored report wrong. For example, Jansen said that Dalibard's censored report was five pages long (2005: 28), but the part on northern Cyprus was over six pages long, and the whole was nine pages. She said he spent two months on the island (Jansen, 2005: 24); but he spent more than three there (Dalibard, 1976: 1). Jansen said that 'there was massive pillage and destruction in the north and none in the south' (2005: 45); but even the one-and-a-half pages about southern Cyprus in Dalibard's censored
report recognised that the fourth-holiest Islamic site in the world (in Larnaca District, just to the south-west of Larnaca itself (see map 5)), Hala Sultan Tekke, had been damaged (1976: 2), and recorded that Ömeriye Mosque was in ‘very bad condition’ and Bayraktar Mosque had been ‘totally vandalized, the minaret pulled down, the windows blocked, the roof in a state of collapse’ (1976: 3). The numerical mistakes could be dismissed as forgetfulness or thoughtlessness; but the claims about destruction are different. Jansen’s representation was not a result of the problems inherent in doing this kind of fieldwork research, and it was not a result of poor or lazy scholarship; others had done the fieldwork research, and she had studied their results in detail. Her representation could only be a deliberate misrepresentation of the facts. Jansen (2005: 27) alleged that UNESCO ‘bowdlerized [censored]’ Dalibard’s original report, and the loss of 90% of the text demonstrates that it did; but she bowdlerised both his original report and even the already-censored one.

More than two decades after the alleged “bowdlerisation” of his report and “exposure” of UNESCO’s appeasement of Turkey, Dalibard discussed the events, but neglected to mention either of those things. He explained that he had had ‘to go from one side to the other and try to convince the armies’ – note the plural – ‘… not to blow up the heritage buildings… and to stop the looting and all these things’ (Dalibard and Donaldson, 1999 – emphasis added; notably, Dalibard explained this years before Jansen published her revised, extended study, which still did not even acknowledge the destruction documented by Dalibard three decades earlier). Yet Jansen’s representation of Dalibard’s work and its treatment is now more influential than his own.

5.b. Ymenus van der Werff and Robin Cormack’s downplayed PACE report

When Michael Jansen exclaimed that there had been no destruction in southern Cyprus, she had been using UNESCO’s investigation to criticise the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe’s one. Jansen (2005: 45) believed that because PACE’s Senator Ymenus van der Werff and Consultant Expert Robin Cormack also inspected cultural heritage sites in southern, as well as northern, Cyprus, their report ‘would lean over backwards to minimize criticism of the Turkish side’ (as she felt the UNESCO report had done).

Yet Jansen appears to have leaned over backwards to minimise criticism of the Greek side: Michael Jansen cited John Fielding’s work as support for her argument, even when Fielding had stated in his opening paragraph that Dalibard’s report had been ‘suppressed for fear of upsetting both Greeks and Turks’ (Fielding, 1976a: 13 – emphasis added; see fig. 1). Similarly, Jansen must have read Fielding’s (1976a: 13) one-page report, in which he casually referred to ‘the 103 Turkish villages destroyed by Greeks’ as if it was an uncontroversial fact; but Jansen (1986) did not even acknowledge it as an allegation.

![Almost two years after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, a UNESCO report on looting and vandalism of Greek churches in the occupied north of the island has been suppressed for fear of upsetting both Greeks and Turks.](image)

Figure 1: Fielding’s (1976a: 13) opening paragraph.

Jansen judged that ‘the two situations [north and south] were not in any way comparable’, dismissed ‘Cormack[s]... show of even-handedness’, and concluded that ‘[b]y taking a balanced approach,… [they] played down Turkey’s role’ in the looting and destruction of Cypriot cultural heritage (Jansen, 2005: 48; 50; 51). Jansen must have read van der Werff’s (1989) and Cormack’s
Jansen's ellipsis following ‘1977 and 1982’ erased:

Public opinion, through the Turkish Cypriot press, is now increasingly aware of the problem. The south is also vulnerable as the theft of the Leda and Swan mosaic from the Paphos museum shows. Unfortunately, the international art market is now well aware of the existence of a well-funded market in the south for items coming from the north (van der Werff, 1989: 11).

She had passed over the parallel trade in antiquities from southern Cyprus, and the Greek Cypriot administration’s equal inability to suppress it. She cannot be accused of hiding Greek Cypriot collectors’ involvement in the trade, as she had acknowledged it earlier, even if she did present it as reactive and patriotic (2005: 19-20), rather than proactive and greedy. Nevertheless, the end of her quotation should have been:

Some damage was however clearly caused for no other purpose than destruction. In the south, we visited the site of the main Paphos mosque that had been entirely razed and saw damaged graves (van der Werff, 1989: 11).

She had distorted a condemnation of pre-1974 Greek Cypriot destruction of Turkish Cypriot cultural heritage to make it sound like a condemnation of post-1974 Turkish Cypriot destruction of Greek Cypriot cultural heritage. That is an appalling and inexcusable traducing of sources.

5.c. The corruption of scholarship

Initially, it appeared that Michael Jansen’s most recent work was different from her previous writings: having previously criticised others for ‘taking a balanced approach,… [which] played down Turkey’s role in the plunder, pillage, and destruction of the heritage of the island’ (Jansen, 2005: 51), she began her presentation to the American National Press Club by discussing the treatment of
cultural heritage on both sides of the island (cf. Jansen, 2006). Yet, Jansen (2006) summarised the
Cyprus Temples project’s results thus: ‘a majority of mosques in the south are in fair to good repair
while most churches and monasteries in the north…. have been looted of icons and stripped of wall
paintings and mosaics’. Very simplistically, statistically, this may have been true. The Cyprus Civil
Engineers’ and Architects’ Association and Chamber of Cyprus Turkish Architects’ website, Cyprus
Temples (www.cyprustemples.com), features 96 of 115 mosques in southern Cyprus, and many were
in fair to good condition. However, despite unpublished sites, and uninformatively or incorrectly
recorded sites, the Cyprus Temples project still identified 16 mosques and tekkes that had been
reduced to ruins or razed to the ground.

Ktima Paphos’s 1902 New Mosque ‘was demolished on 9th March, 1964…. The site is now a park
and parking place’ (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007no). Turabi Tekke ‘was pulled down and a gasoline
station was built’ in its place (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007cq). Kantou’s Muslim shrine86 ‘is vanished’,
replaced with a ‘car mechanic workshop’ (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007mi). ‘Nothing exists’ of
Goshi/Koşşî Mosque anymore: ‘[i]t was demolished before 1974’ (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007hc).
Phalia/Gökçebel Mosque ‘no longer exists. Probably demolished after the village was abandoned’
(CCEAA and CCTA, 2007dc). Kidasi Mosque ‘does not exist any more’ either (CCEAA and CCTA,
2007mw). Loukrounou/Olukönü Mosque’s place was known, but it was ‘[n]ot found’ there (CCEAA
and CCTA, 2007oz), as Fasli/Faslı and Magounda/Yakacık Mosques ‘[c]ould not be found’ (CCEAA
and CCTA, 2007qj; 2007tf). The only remains of the mosques of Deneia/Denya, Pano
Koutraphas/Yukari Kutrafa, Korakou/Coraci, and Flasou/Flâsu are ‘ruins’ (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007el;
2007em; 2007en; 2007eo); and a local Greek Cypriot specifically told me that Korakou/Coraci Mosque
had been ‘destroyed’. In Maroni/Marova, ‘the mosque, the school…. are all ruins’ (CCEAA and
CCTA, 2007kp); Tremithousa Mosque is ‘a ruin’ (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007ot). Hasan Ağa Masjid and
Tekke had a mosque, a masjid, a tekke, a medrese, a hamam, and other buildings, but the only things
left are the hamam and one of the mosque’s interior walls (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007nu). There was
also partial destruction: for instance, Polis-tis-Chrysochou Mosque’s ‘minaret and [its] stone stairs…
do not exist’ any more (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007qj); and Famagusta’s Sinan Paşa Mosque’s minaret
was ‘half demolished’ (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007bb).

There are many understandable reasons for absences, errors, or confusing information in these
data. For example, the Cyprus Temples project did not know the location of the mosque in
Aksylou/Aksu and was ‘[u]nable to find’ it (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007tr). Fortunately, an elderly
Greek Cypriot local showed it to me: it was painted blue outside and gutted inside (see figs. 2 and 3).

86 The bicomunal architectural survey did not list individual cemeteries, only buildings associated with
cemeteries, like cemetery churches; so this cemetery must have been a shrine.
Accordingly, even in the bicomunal team’s outstanding work, there were errors that hid other destruction. For instance, Evdimou/Evdim Mosque was said to be in ‘very good’ condition (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007tl), when it had been demolished then ‘virtually… rebuilt’ (van der Werff, 1989: 13). Similarly, Nicosia’s Tahtakale Mosque was ‘restored’ (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007ar), when it
had been restored from the ‘ruins’ of the destroyed mosque (Greek Cypriot refugee, cited in Papadakis, 2005: 145). While the team recognised that all of (now inaccessible) Tymbou/Ercan’s Kirklar Tekke’s ‘lodging rooms had been demolished’, they observed that the mosque’s ceiling had ‘fallen in’ (seemingly naturally) by 1987 (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007np); apparently, they were unaware that the mosque had been burned in 1958 (cf. Yüksel, 1958: 1). Tophane Masjid in Nicosia-within-the-Walls was said to be in ‘[g]ood’ condition, though its ‘Map [sic – mihrap] seems to have been demolished’ (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007ao). Koilani/Ceylan Mosque was generally said to be in ‘[f]air’ condition, though its minaret was ‘partially ruined’ and its mihrab was ‘missing’, while its façade was categorised first as in ‘[f]air’ condition, then as in ‘[r]uin’ (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007mu); similarly, Zuhuri Tekke and Mosque’s structure was said to be in ‘[v]ery [g]ood’ condition, though the top half of the minaret was ‘missing’ (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007cp). Souksiou/Susuz Mosque’s decoration was said to be in ‘[f]air’ condition, but the photograph showed half of the mihrab’s decoration was missing (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007cw). And Nicosia’s Nebet Khane Masjid ‘[m]ight be demolished’, but its site had been inaccessible to its inspector (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007ap). These and other problematic records make it difficult to use the Cyprus Temples project as a near-complete religious cultural heritage survey, or to use its findings to assess untrustworthy sources.

Nonetheless, without considering the categorisation of harm as “significant” or “severe” damage, “severe damage” or “partial destruction”, Jansen had apparently reviewed records documenting the complete destruction of 16 Islamic/Turkish Cypriot cultural heritage sites, and significant harm to 7 sites87; yet she only acknowledged that a minority of mosques were not in ‘fair to good repair’ (Jansen, 2006). Particularly in light of Jansen’s explicit recognition of the looting of Orthodox Christian/Greek Cypriot buildings, her omission of the razing of Islamic/Turkish Cypriot ones is telling. It is consequently unsurprising that Jansen evidently did not visit harmed Islamic/Turkish Cypriot cultural heritage in southern Cyprus. Nevertheless, it is worth acknowledging some of the archaeological and historical evidence that both Michael Jansen and her sources excluded from their public and private narratives. Contemporary news reports confirmed that in 1964, unknown persons ‘wrecked’ Trapeza/Beşparmak’s mosque (Fellows, 1964: 3); and Greek Cypriot paramilitaries – Nikos Sampson’s right-wing nationalist Green Berets and Dr. Vassos Lyssarides’ left-wing nationalist Red Berets – first ‘damaged’ Sellain t’Appi/Selçuklu’s mosque, then reduced every building to ‘burning ruins’ (British United Press, 1964: 1; see also Spiegel, 1964: 55). Although site visits to flat earth or a mass of ruined buildings could have been uninformative to Jansen, dissident Turkish Cypriot journalist Hasan Karaokçu’s (2003) reports documented the razing of Agios Epifanios/Aybifan Mosque, and the ruination of Agios Sozomenos/Arpalı Mosque. (I have visited both villages, but photographs of the razed ground are uninformative.)

It is apparent that Jansen, and her archaeologist informants and editors, either did not show, or did not look for, the archaeological evidence either (or the community explanation of the lack of visible evidence). I could not find Anglisides/Aksu Mosque when I visited the village, but one Turkish Cypriot refugee has testified how local Greek Cypriot nationalists ‘pulled [it] down’ ‘stone by stone’ (Denizaksulu, 2008a), and built a playground in its place (Denizaksulu, 2008b). Similarly, another Turkish Cypriot refugee has described how Kato Deftera/Aşağı Deftera Mosque was ‘totally demolished’ (Halil, 2008a), Kolossi/Yunus Mosque was ‘completely destroyed’, and Softades/Düzova Mosque was ‘razed’ (Halil, 2008c). As I surveyed the cropmarks in the grass, a local Greek Cypriot confirmed to me that Arediou/Aredyu Mosque had been ‘demolished’ (see fig. 4). If Jansen and/or her archaeologist informants and editors had visited, they would have found the remains of Eliofotes/Alifodez’s mosque (see fig. 5), which was either ‘demolished’ during ‘road improvement’ in 1977 (Goodwin, 1978: 283), or ‘demolish[ed]’ as ‘a danger and an eyesore’ in the 1980s (Constantinou and Hatay, 2010: 13).

87 As shown above, my research has established that at least 19 of the 96 southern Cypriot mosques had been completely destroyed, and 7 significantly harmed (excluding Bayraktar and Ömeriye Mosques, which were harmed by Turkish Cypriot paramilitary attacks (Levent, 2008)).
Figure 4: A cropmark outline of the mosque razed to the ground in Arediou/Aredyu.
My fieldwork and library research (including the Cyprus Temples project’s corrected records) have established that at least 29 of the 115 southern Cypriot mosques have been completely destroyed (while the Church of Cyprus Synodical Committee for Monuments and Art (CCSCMA, 2009) lists 19 of the 505 northern Cypriot churches as ‘demolished’). Thus, Jansen (2006) may have been correct in stating that ‘most’ northern Cypriot churches have been significantly harmed, whereas the ‘majority’ of southern Cypriot mosques have not; yet more southern Cypriot mosques have been destroyed than northern Cypriot churches (indeed, more than 25% of those mosques, less than 4% of those churches). The absence of this information from archaeologists’ information on destruction, and from Jansen’s history of cultural heritage in conflict, cannot even be blamed on the boycott and the black list, or excused by the Turkish military occupation. Even while Greek Cypriots could not access northern Cyprus, Greek Cypriot cultural heritage workers managed to document destruction of Christian cultural heritage there (e.g. CPCHC, 1985; 1998; ROCPIO, 1997); yet they failed to document destruction of Turkish Cypriot cultural heritage in their own free areas; indeed, as I will show later, Greek Cypriot archaeologists produced work exclusively about Islamic cultural heritage that still did not acknowledge any destruction (e.g. ACA, 1990; 2008), and so could only be described as denial by omission. Jansen’s semi-official history of cultural heritage destruction demonstrates the manipulation of publicly accessible information, the exclusion of politically inconvenient data, what can only be considered the refusal to collect inconvenient data, and the unscholarly distortion of professional texts.

5.d. The growth of a myth

Presenting evidence of ‘ethnic cleansing’ of (Greek) Cypriot cultural heritage (Hadjisavvas, 2000: 13), then Director of the Republic of Cyprus Department of Antiquities Sophocles Hadjisavvas (2000: 14) alleged that Cyprus’s only World Heritage Site (in 1974), ‘the famous Paphos mosaics were bombed, even though no battles were fought with the invading army in that area’. As international law Prof. George Tenekides (1985: 48) observed (in a publication that noted the Paços mosaics’ bombing), such deliberate destruction of cultural heritage, in an act of international violence, is

One international archaeologist challenged that 'it was all out in the open, to begin with, but it's become this big myth'. It is possible to identify a few of the points in the spread of the myth. Already in the Annual Report of the Director of the Department of Antiquities (ARDA) for the year of the Turkish invasion, then antiquities director Vassos Karageorghis (1974: 3) relayed that 'the mosaic floors of the Roman Villa of Dionysos at Kato Paphos... suffered damage as a result of [Turkish army] bombing' (see also Karageorghis, 1974: 10; 21; figs. 29-36). Cyprus Museum Curator and antiquities department archaeologist Kyriakos Nikolaou reported 'considerable damage as a result of bombing and machine gunfire from Turkish aircraft’ in the American Journal of Archaeology (1976a: 31) and 'severe damage as a result of bombing by Turkish aircraft’ in the international Archaeological Reports (1976b: 34; see also Nikolaou, 1981: 49). In the CPCHC's original catalogue, Greek Cypriot presidential under-secretary Stavrour (1985: 35) repeated the allegation; and both the Committee itself (CPCHC, 1994: 83), and then antiquities director Sophocles Hadjisavvas (2000: 14), maintained the myth in later editions. At some point, the myth became part of public memory. For example, historian Christopher Hitchens (1997: 21) averred that '[o]ne has to recall the Turkish shells that fell on the mosaic floor'. There is an explanation for how the mosaics were bombed despite the Greek Cypriot National Guard not fighting the Turkish Army near them. The international archaeologist explained that, in fact, the damage to the Paphos Mosaics 'happened during the coup… it was done by coupists, but they say, “oh, it was the Turks”’. Due to a loophole only closed by the ICPCPEAC’s Second Protocol to the Hague Convention (1999: Art. 22, Para. 1), an act of intracommunal violence (or negligent destruction) was not against the letter of the ICPCPEAC’s 1954 Convention, but it was still against the spirit (cf. UNESCO, 1999).

It is possible to find motives for the myth. UNESCO helped the Department of Antiquities to restore the site (Karageorghis, 1975: 3), and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) funded the entire project (Karageorghis, 1977: 18). Accordingly, the United Nations might not have been quite so generous if they had known the collateral damage had been inflicted by Greek Cypriot nationalist extremists long backed by the very administration appealing for their help. Nonetheless, that would be a big myth for a small sum. The only apparent alternative motive would have been simply to mask (albeit accidental) cultural heritage damage from Greek Cypriot intracommunal violence, thus to absolve Greek Cypriot forces of responsibility and (literally) to produce evidence of Turkish ethnic cleansing of the Greek Cypriot community.

5.e. The restoration and reuse of Turkish Cypriot cultural heritage

Here, I will examine the ethics of Greek Cypriot cultural heritage workers' restoration of, and public education about, Turkish Cypriot cultural heritage in southern Cyprus. The Republic of Cyprus and the Greek Cypriot community make a lot of political capital out of their impartial conservation and restoration, their care for both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot, both Christian and Islamic historic sites. And they make even more political capital because of their perceived innocence, their professional treatment of Turkish Cypriot Islamic sites, unlike and despite provocative Turkish/Turkish Cypriot behaviour in the north. There, the Hellenist cultural heritage community allege, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and the Turkish Cypriot and Turkish settler communities, wilfully neglect and actively violate Christian/Greek Cypriot cultural heritage sites. However, the treatment of cultural heritage on both sides of the Green Line is far more complex. Not only are the ethics of contemporary cultural heritage work questionable, but also public education about those sites and their treatment is deceptive; and that unscholarly cultural heritage work actually inhibits or prevents professional and community protection of cultural heritage.

Once, in discussion with a Greek Cypriot archaeologist, I noted that 'we discussed the (103) villages that were abandoned between 1963 and 1974, but I have been unable to find a list of those sites', and asked, 'do you know which villages the 103 are? Has any record been made of those sites?' The archaeologist explained that 'the Department of Antiquities does not have such information'.
Another Greek Cypriot archaeologist complained that archaeologists were ‘simply not allowed to become involved with abandoned… [Turkish Cypriot] villages in the free area’, because they were controlled by the Republic of Cyprus Turkish Cypriot Properties Management Service (ROCTCPMS). Yet Greek Cypriot cultural heritage professionals have restored Islamic/Turkish Cypriot cultural heritage in the south; and they have produced public education material about Islamic/Turkish Cypriot cultural heritage on the island (e.g. ACA, 1990; 2008). Through the treatment of religious and secular Turkish Cypriot cultural heritage, it is possible to establish Greek Cypriot cultural heritage workers’ freedom to act; hence, it is possible to identify areas where ethical archaeologists are unable to act, and where irresponsible cultural heritage workers do unprofessional work, and narrate histories that mislead scholarly and public communities.

5.e.i. The rebuilding of Evdimou/Evdim Mosque, and the misdirection of its history

As I noted before, in a tangible example of the more difficult-to-document problem of the perversion of scholarship, the bicommmunal architectural survey team recorded Evdimou Mosque’s structure, façade, roof, interior and decoration in ‘[v]ery [g]ood’ condition (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007t); but it had had to be ‘virtually… rebuilt’ first (van der Werff, 1989: 13). The history of the mosque’s destruction has been buried beneath its rebuilding. Greek Cypriot cultural heritage workers have not only conducted restoration in a way that prevented neutral cultural heritage workers from seeing damage to and destruction of mosques; they have also written supposedly scholarly publications in a way that misled the academic community and the public by omission or commission.

In the first edition of its book, Muslim Places of Worship in Cyprus, the Association of Cypriot Archaeologists spoke of the Greek Cypriot administration’s ‘maintenance’ of ‘abandoned’ mosques (ACA, 1990: 10), without any acknowledgement of any deliberate damage or destruction; and amongst many other photographs of many other mosques, the ACA printed three decontextualised photos of the restored Evdimou Mosque (ACA, 1990: 32 – figs. 55–57), implicitly suggesting that it had been maintained in that state, rather than rebuilt to it. In the third edition of the book, the ACA spoke of ‘maintenance’ of ‘unattended’ mosques (in ‘abandoned’ villages), admitting not only ‘natural damage due to the passage of time’, but also deliberate damage due to ‘random acts of vandalism’ (ACA, 2008: 21). A child graffiti tagging the wall of a mosque, or throwing a pebble through an abandoned building’s window, is a “random act of vandalism”. A semi-literate bigot scrawling ‘fuck Torkey [sic – Turkey]’88 on the wall of Evdimou Mosque is vandalism (see fig. 6). A nationalist mob or a paramilitary gang demolishing a mosque is not "vandalism": it is destruction.

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88 ‘Γάμω την Τορκία [sic - Tourkia] [γαμώ την Τορκία [sic - Τουρκία]]’
Moreover, the third edition of the book cannot be played down or dismissed as a publication of a private professional faction: it was ‘[p]ublished by the Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus… in cooperation with the Association of Cypriot Archaeologists’ (ACA, 2008: back cover). The authors of the texts are unknown, but at least now, the Administrative Council of the Association of Cypriot Archaeologists includes antiquities department archaeologists. Written by Greek Cypriot archaeologists, published by the Greek Cypriot administration (in Arabic, English, Greek, Russian, and Turkish, and possibly other languages), the book was an attempt to establish and control an academic and public history of the treatment of Islamic/Turkish Cypriot cultural heritage. It must be remembered that, due to the international archaeological boycott of Turkish Cypriot publications, these Greek Cypriot texts are normally the only texts available in libraries. Again, the third edition of the book presented three decontextualised photos of the restored Evdimou Mosque (ACA, 2008: 57 – figs. 91-93). Naturally, it is difficult to know how many other mosques’ damage and destruction has been hidden this way. But it is known that this restoration was so complete and so careful that the Cyprus Temples project’s bicomunal architectural survey team, which was looking for damage and destruction, found none. Indeed, the architects and civil engineers who inspected the mosque did not even note that it had been restored. It could not have been an accident.

As long ago as 1931, in the Athens Charter for the Restoration of Historic Monuments, the First International Congress of Architects and Technicians of Historic Monuments (FICATHM) deemed that, for ‘ruins, scrupulous conservation is necessary, and… the new materials used for this purpose should in all cases be recognisable (FICATHM, 1931: Ch. 6, Para. 2). And in 1964, the Second International Congress of Architects and Technicians of Historic Monuments (SICATHM) passed the International Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites (the Venice Charter), which explicitly stated that:

> Replacements of missing parts must integrate harmoniously with the whole, but at the same time must be distinguishable from the original so that restoration does not falsify the artistic or historic evidence (SICATHM, 1964: Art. 12).
Manifestly, the restoration of Evdimou Mosque violated both the 1931 Athens Charter and the 1964 Venice Charter. Indeed, although the antiquities department did not control the restoration of Evdimou Mosque, Greek Cypriot cultural heritage professionals did the work, and such restoration contradicted the antiquities department’s principle that a monument should be an ‘open book’, so that ‘someone can read the history of the monument and consequently the history of Cyprus’ (cited in the Financial Mirror, 2010). Subsequently, both as “independent archaeologists” and as “state representatives”, Greek Cypriot archaeologists presented the immaculately-restored Evdimou Mosque as implicitly merely “maintained”. This constituted a perversion of scholarship, an adulteration of knowledge with implicit misrepresentation. The restoration perverted the results of the bicommunal architectural survey; and that directly polluted academic and public knowledge, and indirectly polluted them too, through Jansen’s (e.g. 2006) misrepresentations, which infected Hellenist newspapers (e.g. Yiannis, 2006), which in turn infected not only Hellenist community conversations (e.g. grhomeboy, 2006), but also professional discussions (e.g. the Museum Security Network, cf. greek_news, 2006); there have even been bicommunal community conversations that (seemingly spontaneously) combined the bicommunal architectural survey and Michael Jansen as sources (e.g. CY, 2006).

5.e.ii. The restoration of mosques in Episkopi/Yalova and Polis/Boli, and the conversion of mosques in Klavdia/Alaniçi

The Republic of Cyprus Department of Antiquities is responsible for the 17 southern Cypriot mosques that are listed monuments (11 of which were originally churches, converted into mosques under Ottoman rule). When they restored Episkopi/Yalova Mosque, antiquities department staff revealed historic Christian frescoes; consequently, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) judged that the building was ‘hardly… suitable’ for use as a mosque in any future bicommunal Episkopi (van der Werff, 1989: 13; this was because of a traditional objection to iconic art on religious objects and buildings). The restoration of Klavdia/Alaniçi Mosque and Polis/Boli Mosque also exposed Christian art. Furthermore, despite Hellenist complaints about conversion of churches (e.g. CPCHC, 1985; 2000; ROCPIO, 1997), Klavdia Mosque has been converted into a museum (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007ha).

Despite the Venice Charter having insisted that ‘revealing’ older phases of the building could ‘only be justified in exceptional circumstances’ (SICATHM, 1964: Art. 11), the exposure of Christian art was and still is antiquities department policy. As one of the archaeologists responsible for the 17 listed mosques explained, ‘[t]he aim is not to eliminate any part of our history, on the contrary, all the phases of the monuments must be visible’ (cited in the Financial Mirror, 2010). Yet given its contradiction of international cultural heritage restoration ethics, and its prevention of Islamic practice at the site, this antiquities policy more closely resembles a statement of the site’s “natural” Christianity. It could ultimately constitute a violation of the displaced Turkish Cypriot community’s right to religious freedom.

5.e.iii. The reuse of Turkish Cypriot cultural heritage in Goshi/Koşş and Petrofani/Esendağ

There are two other examples of the treatment of Turkish Cypriot cultural heritage in southern Cyprus; they are very different, but equally instructive. After the war of 1974 and the displacement of communities left on the “wrong” side of the Green Line, Greek Cypriot refugee and economist Dr. Iakovos Aristidou encouraged resettlement of southern Turkish Cypriot homes ‘as much to prevent them being destroyed as to house refugees’ (paraphrased in the Times, 1976: 13). Unfortunately, for many reasons, that frequently did not happen; whole villages have decayed or been destroyed. For

89 Its establishment proposed by UNESCO and approved by SICATHM, ICOMOS is an international NGO, and an official world heritage adviser to UNESCO.
example, I could not tell which ruin had been which building in Goshi/Koşşî; but a Turkish Cypriot refugee identified the mosque’s ruin and observed its use as a ‘burn [sic – barn]’ (Halil, 2008b). It must be remembered that the village was already destroyed when the Greek Cypriot economic migrants arrived: the farmers did not know and could not have known that they had reused the remains of the mosque (see fig. 7). The Greek Cypriot farmers were innocent victims of the Cyprus Problem; but economically trapped, they were forced to contribute to the disappearance of Turkish Cypriot cultural heritage. Contrarily, the Greek Cypriot National Guard chose to use the village as a military exercise site (see fig. 8), and thus will have wilfully contributed to the ruination of the village. (To be clear, any damage would be the responsibility of the Guard as an institution, not of the guardsmen as individuals.) Due to the bureaucratic division of labour, the Greek Cypriot antiquities department had no power to protect either the unlisted mosque, or the vernacular architecture of the village.

After the Turkish invasion, all but six of about a hundred Turkish Cypriots fled from Petrofani/Esendağ to nearby enclaves; an unspecified ‘group of nationalists’ massacred the remaining six (Drousiotis, 2009). Although the shared mosque-and-school building survived (see fig. 9), the Greek Cypriot nationalist extremists looted all of the homes, which decayed to ruins afterwards, and were then converted into sheep-folds and goat-pens (see fig. 10). Again, cultural heritage workers had no power to protect anything. In this case, however, the surviving mosque had political value. The Cyprus Temples project made a point of observing that the village was ‘in ruins’, but recorded the very good condition of Petrofani/Esendağ Mosque (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007k). So, Hellenist sources were able to restrict their discussion to religious heritage, ignore the explicit recognition of damage to tens of domestic buildings, and count the treatment of the one mosque towards that well-treated “majority” in the south, which so contrasted with the treatment of “most” churches in the north.

Figure 7: the ruins of Goshi/Koşşî Mosque, reused as a barn by Greek Cypriot farmers.
Figure 8: the ruins of a home in Goshi/Koşş, reused as a military exercise site by the Greek Cypriot National Guard.

Figure 9: the surviving mosque-and-school building in Petrofani/Esendağ.
5.f. Desecration, conversion and reuse of Greek Cypriot cultural heritage

There is no question whether or not there has been damage and destruction of Christian/Greek Cypriot cultural heritage in northern Cyprus. International cultural heritage organisation Europa Nostra (1987: 1) has recognised ‘damage and destruction’ in northern Cyprus, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has admitted ‘evidence of destruction’ and ‘desecration’ (van der Werff, 1989: 7; 8), and the European Parliament (EP, 1988) has found ‘continued destruction and pillaging’. Thus, the significant questions are who is doing it and why, and how cultural heritage workers are dealing with the destruction in practical work, and research and educational publications. The Greek Cypriot archaeological community narrates a monolithic history of destruction, wherein an interchangeable Turkish state, Turkish army, Turkish Cypriot administration, and/or Turkish settler community wilfully neglects and aggressively violates Christian/Greek Cypriot cultural heritage in northern Cyprus.

As noted in the discussion of the archaeological boycott and black list, the Turkish Cypriot cultural heritage professional community lacks staff, materials, expertise, and ultimately the legal or political freedom to conduct adequate cultural heritage work. As may be expected in occupied territories, where ultra-nationalist extremist organisations continue to operate quite freely, neither cultural heritage professionals nor local communities can act similarly freely. Nevertheless, archaeological and historical study, and community research produce a convoluted picture of neighbouring communities acting very differently from each other, of veneration misunderstood as violation, and of protection misunderstood as desecration. At the same time, circumstantial material evidence corroborates an emerging understanding that the systematic looting and destruction of cultural heritage in northern Cyprus has not been a Turkish state programme, but an ultra-nationalist Turkish deep state campaign; it has been an attempt to create and perpetuate conflict and division in Cyprus, and thus to establish ultra-nationalist control there. This historical understanding is key, because the false nationalist construction of history reinforces community division and conflict, and thereby intercommunal non-cooperation; and non-cooperation facilitates the looting and destruction of Cypriot cultural heritage. The cultural heritage of Cyprus is evidence of historic coexistence in
Cyprus, of the reality of heterogeneous community in the past, and of the possibility of heterogeneous community in the future; thus, the false nationalist narrative of history encourages behaviour that destroys evidence for alternative narratives, and in facilitating looting and destruction, it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.

5.f.i. From joking to destruction in Agia Eirini/Akdeniz, Ardana/Ardahan, Davlos/Kaplıca, Flamoudi/Mersinlik, and Gerani/Yerani

In Agia Eirini/Akdeniz (on the west coast of Kyrenia District (see map 4), the formerly Turkish Cypriot majority mixed community’s ‘sick joke’ had been that they ‘hadn’t known they were supposed to dislike each other until they got the “news” on radio [and] TV [television]’ (Goodwin, 1978: 136). However, Turkish Army ‘pressures’ drove out the last Greek Cypriot villagers in 1976 (ibid.); and the Church of Agia Eirini ended up gutted and ruined, its altar and iconostasis removed and its interior reused as a store (see fig. 11). This history supports the official Greek Cypriot narrative of the Cyprus Conflict.

Yet the different treatments of churches in three evacuated Greek Cypriot villages, each within 10kms of the others (on the north-west facing side of the Karpas Peninsula in Famagusta District (see map 3a)), illustrate the range of damage and destruction; they hint at an equal range of (publicly unknown) actors, motives and logics. In Davlos/Kaplıca, the Church of Agios Georgios has been ‘desecrated’ (ROCPRUN, 2001a: 20), but left ‘almost undamaged’, while its cemetery has been utterly ‘demolished’ (Fielding, 1976b: 13); meanwhile, outside Davlos, the Chapel of Agios Sozomenos has had its doors, windows and roof tiles ‘removed’, and its altar ‘demolished’ (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007ke). In Ardana/Ardahan, the Church of Agios Georgios has been ‘desecrated’ (ROCPRUN, 2001a: 17), while the Chapel of Agios Demetrios was left standing, but ‘empt[ied]’ and its altar ‘fouled with human excrement’ (Fielding, 1976a: 13; also cited in ROCPIO, 1997: 24). The Church of Agios Georgios in Flamoudi/Mersinlik has been ‘converted into a mosque’ (ROCPRUN, 2001a: 27), while the cemetery chapel (and its graveyard) has been completely destroyed (see fig. 12; see also ROCPIO,
Similarly, recently, in equally nearby but formerly Greek Cypriot majority mixed Gerani/Yerani, the Church of Agios Georgios has been ‘converted into a mosque’ and the Chapel of Panagia Evangelistria has been ‘desecrated’ (ROCPRUN, 2001a: 19), while the Church of Agia Katerina and its cemetery have been first ‘desecrated’ (ROCPRUN, 2001a: 19), then ‘completely destroyed’ (Christou, 2008a).

5.f.ii. Interpreting documented facts: conversion as restitution in Melanarga/Adaçay

In 2001, the Republic of Cyprus Permanent Representative to the United Nations complained that under a state policy of ‘Turkification’, the Church of Agios Polychronios in Melanarga/Adaçay had been ‘desecrated’ (ROCPRUN, 2001a: 1; 23; it is in the middle of the Karpas Peninsula (see map 3a)). (Again highlighting the unreliability of the Cyprus Temples project’s records, they listed the church in good condition in every way (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007pk).) Then at some point between 2001 and 2007, the church was converted into a mosque (see the loudspeaker in fig. 13). Yet at least the conversion was neither a state act of Turkification, nor a nationalist action of the local community: Agios Polychronios was converted because the old mosque had been destroyed during the conflict (see fig. 14). Indeed, when the local community converted the church, they left its Christian architecture intact (see the bell in fig. 13), which contradicts the official Greek Cypriot insinuation of desecration and Turkification. Further complicating the situation in Melanarga, the Turkish government has committed to building a new mosque (Ernur, 2009), which will enable the local community to undo its temporary conversion of the church.
Figure 13: the Church of Agios Polychronios after its conversion into a mosque in Melanarga/Adaçay – note the bell and the loudspeaker.
Like so many others, the gutted Chapel of Agios Sozomenos in Davlos/Kaplıca has become a site of romantic dedications; but exceptionally, its graffiti hints at yet more divisions within Cypriot society, through the anonymous red crossings-out of Serkan and Murat’s pink paintings and inscriptions. Serkan and Murat are both male names, and their wall-writings are the only pink wall-writings on the chapel, indeed, on any wall on the island that I witnessed; explicit LGBT\(^{90}\) graffiti, like ‘gay pride, wake up\(^{91}\), in the old town of Nicosia was written in green and black (see fig. 15), and even ‘pink triangle’ was written in red (see fig. 16). (It is possible that both of the names were written by one lovestruck female graffiti artist, which would also be exceptional; but it is unlikely in the context.) On the west wall, were painted Serkan’s name and an address to ‘my baby’\(^{92}\) (see fig. 17). On the south wall, were painted Murat’s name and a heart pierced by an arrow, a love-struck heart, with an “M” on the plaster above left and what looks like the top of an “S” below right (but most of the plaster missing) (see fig. 18). (In addition, there was the first letter of an unfinished but nonetheless crossed-out word to the right of Murat’s name tag, which was a “B”; the word may have been another inscription to “my baby”.)

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\(^{90}\) Lesbian/Gay/Bisexual/Transgender.

\(^{91}\) ‘Gay Pride ξυπνάτε [Gay Pride ξυπνάτε].’

\(^{92}\) ‘Bebişim’; the term is only used romantically.
Figure 15: a colour-saturated photograph of ‘gay pride, wake up’ graffiti in the old town of southern Nicosia.
Figure 16: a colour-saturated photograph of 'pink triangle' graffiti in the old town of southern Nicosia.
Figure 17: a colour-saturated photograph of the inscription of Serkan’s name and the address to ‘my baby’ upon the Chapel of Agios Sozomenos in Davlos/Kaplica.
Figure 18: a colour-saturated photograph of the inscription of Murat’s name and the painting of a love-struck heart on the Chapel of Agios Sozomenos in Davlos/Kaplıca.

So, the inscriptions to Serkan and Murat are very suggestive of homosexual love; moreover, neither of their names, but all of their romantic declarations, were crossed out in red. It appears that it was neither Serkan nor Murat at the end of the romance, but someone else, a homophobe, who wanted to deny the relationship, who crossed out its public statements. This apparent conflict within northern Cypriot society does have a relevance to study of the treatment of cultural heritage (beyond being a material expression of a social division). This is not merely further evidence of how nonsensical and unjust are accusations of collective guilt, the conflating and blaming of moderate members of a community with the extremist elements who repress those moderate insiders as well as all outsiders.

Religious Cypriots may perceive any and all graffiti on religious buildings as sacrilege, especially the graffiti of people of other faiths; but it is clear from the content of this graffiti that it was not intended to desecrate the Greek Cypriots’ chapel, but to consecrate the Turkish Cypriots’ or Turkish settlers’ love. It may seem like a meaningless difference, but it is a significant distinction: it may still be mindless vandalism, but it is not mindless aggression; and that applies to much of the (name-)tagging that scars many of the disused buildings on both sides of the Green Line.

Similarly, there are official Greek Cypriot propaganda photographs of damage to an unspecified ‘chapel in the area of Morphou’ (ROCPIO, 1997: 64; 65; thus, near the west coast of Nicosia District (see map 7)), including the apparent smashing or ripping out of a window, which had left the interior of the church permanently exposed to weather and animals; and graffiti. However, the graffiti in the second photograph is a couplet from a famous Turkish poem by Sait Faik Abasıyanık. Next to the void of that destroyed window, the graffiti artist had appealed to his or her readers, ‘beauty will save the world, everything begins with the love of one person... 5.10.87 MA’93 (see fig. 19). Turkist nationalists had considered Greek Cypriot Christians outside their moral universe, had neither venerated their sacred sites nor respected their religious beliefs, and had violated the Greek Cypriot site. Yet a Turkish Cypriot or Turkish settler had considered Greek Cypriot Christians to be part of their moral community, had venerated the church and/or shared values of respect for churches as sacred places, and had empathised with the victimised community. Thus, the Turkish Cypriot or Turkish settler had used the only means available – graffiti – to reprimand the Turkist nationalists on their own terms, with reference to Turkish culture, Turkish values, which themselves exalted respect, love, community.

Intriguingly, the head of the University of Cyprus Department of Turkish Studies and Middle Eastern Studies, Prof. Ioannis Theocharides, has stated that ‘most’ of his department’s graduates – cultural heritage workers trained in Turkish language, history and literature – worked ‘for the Foreign Ministry, the Press and Information Office, or at research centres’ (paraphrased in the Cyprus Mail, 2003a). So, it is possible (if not probable) that the Republic of Cyprus Press and Information Office knew the meaning of the graffiti when it published the photograph, but chose not to translate the graffiti for its readers. Regardless, the meaning of the graffiti shows the complexity of a phenomenon that cultural heritage workers reduce to “damage”, and reveals the resistance of a community to destruction and division.

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93 ‘Dünyayı güzellik[ler] kurtarak / Bir insanı sevmekle başlayacak her şey... 5.10.87 MA.’
Figure 19: a Turkish Cypriot/Turkish settler appeal that ‘beauty will save the world’ in a Greek Cypriot church in Morphou/Güzelyurt (cropped from © ROCPIO, 1997: 65).

5.f.iv. Clues to the perpetrators of destruction in Agridaki/Alemdağ

At some sites of destruction, there is convincing circumstantial evidence of the perpetrators of the crimes. By not recognising, or not reporting, this evidence in any of its cultural heritage publications, the Greek Cypriot cultural heritage community does not merely simplify, but significantly misrepresent the conflict; and through this misleading public history, cultural heritage professionals lead Cypriot communities into conflict. For example, the Republic of Cyprus Press and Information Office noted that ‘[n]ot a single object ha[d] been left inside’ an unnamed church (possibly Agios Gordios) in Agridaki/Alemdağ (ROCPIO, 1997: 25; it is in the western half of Kyrenia District (see map 4)); and its Permanent Representative to the United Nations petitioned that Agios Charalambous Church had been ‘desecrated’ (ROCPRUN, 2001a: 9). Unknown persons have removed the bells of both churches, gutted their interiors, and wrecked their altars (e.g. figs. 20 and 21); but there may be clues to the identity/identities of the perpetrators.

The interior of Agios Charalambous is a massive palimpsest of graffiti, but two paintings stand out from the name tags and the notes that ‘Esat was ‘ere [was here]’. There is a (Turkish) Nationalist Action Party/Nationalist Movement Party ‘MHP’ inscription and MHP flag drawing (see fig. 22); and there is a ‘Komando’ graffito and Turkish flag painting (see fig. 23), with an ambiguous red flag painting on their left, which appears to have been an unsuccessful attempt at another MHP flag.\(^94\) The MHP are ‘ultra-nationalists’, ‘extremists’ with a ‘paramilitary’ wing, the Grey Wolves\(^96\) (Lee, 1997); and at least elements within them have been part of a ‘Turkish secret army’, sometimes called the “Counter-Guerrilla”\(^97\) or the “Deep State”\(^98\), which operates outside and beyond the control of the Turkish state, and which has undertaken ‘special operations in Cyprus’ since 1984 (Ganser, 2005: 226; see also Çelik, 1994).

Thus, this desecration appears not to have been any act of the Turkish state, or of the Turkish Cypriot or Turkish settler community; it appears to have been an act of a Turkish ultra-nationalist paramilitary, in an attempt to violate Greek Cypriot cultural heritage, thereby to fuel conflict

\(^{94}\) Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP).
\(^{95}\) We know that the desecration of the church occurred by 1\(^{st}\) July 1999, because the ‘komando’ painting is post-dated by the note on top of it: ‘Öz Bodrumlu / 78/2/S.120 / Date 01.07.99 / I love you / Turkey’\(^95\) (see fig. 23).
\(^{96}\) Bozkurtlar.
\(^{97}\) Kontrgerilla.
\(^{98}\) Derin Devlet.
between the communities on the island, thereby to perpetuate Turkish control of the north and Turkish nationalist suppression of the moderate Turkish Cypriot and Turkish settler communities. Critically, by not explaining this to the Greek Cypriot and international communities, by instead blaming the Turkish state and/or the Turkish settler community, Greek Cypriot cultural heritage workers themselves fuel false conflicts between communities on the island, and reinforce the Cyprus Problem. In the following example, I will present corroborating evidence for a reappraisal of communities’ roles in the conflict, and thus for a rewriting of cultural heritage workers’ public education about the desecration and destruction of cultural heritage.
Figure 20: the bell has been removed from the Church of Agios Gordios(?) in Agridaki/Alemdağ.
Figure 21: the gutted interior of the Church of Agios Gordios (?) in Agridaki/Alemdağ.
Figure 22: the Nationalist Action Party/Nationalist Movement Party’s ‘MHP’ inscription and MHP flag drawing in the Church of Agios Charalambous in Agridaki/Alemdağ.

99 Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP).
5.f.v. Overturning received wisdom: conversion as protection in a Cypriot village

There is a church in one northern Cypriot village, which has been converted into a mosque, but which I cannot identify in any way. Its caretaker spoke to me in confidence, and someone could work out his identity if I gave any details unique to him, the mosque, or the village. Touring cultural heritage sites, I visited this mosque. I met and talked with its caretaker while he showed me around, then, once I had earned his trust, he took me to a secluded spot to talk more openly. The detail, consistency and risk of the caretaker's revelation convinced me of its truth. He was a non-nationalist Turkish settler. His settler community had previously lived in villages in Turkey with Christian sites. When that community arrived on Cyprus, in the first wave of settlement in 1975-1976, local Turkish Cypriot nationalists had damaged and/or destroyed Greek Cypriot places in the village. The Turkish settlers were appalled and resolved to save one church by converting it into a mosque, which they subsequently did. (There is circumstantial evidence for these politics amongst Turkish settlers. I will not say whether or not this village was used in his study, but Mete Hatay (2005: viii-ix) revealed that, historically, the majority of settler communities supported the non-nationalist opposition rather than the nationalist government in northern Cyprus. Thus, Turkish settlers would have tended to support this settler community's act.)

So, contrary to the left-wing Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot myth that they had lived together happily until foreign powers split them apart, local nationalist extremists of each community had tried to eliminate the memory of the other community, and the possibility of coexistence with it. And, contrary to the right-wing Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot myth that (Cypriot) Greeks/Christians and (Cypriot) Turks/Muslims were eternal enemies, they could live together happily. Exquisitely, the Turkish deep state transferred the Turkish Muslim settlers to northern Cyprus to secure its hold on the territory, but when they arrived, the settlers disproved the deep state's myths, countered its urbicide, and preserved the built environment essential to the re-establishment of heterogeneous community. In the final example, I will identify an internal
northern Cypriot conflict, which has incidentally caused the destruction of Greek Cypriot cultural heritage.

5.f.vi. Overturning received wisdom: Greek Cypriot collateral damage in Turkish Cypriot-Turkish settler struggles in Kato Kopia/Zümrütköy

Kato Kopia/Zümrütköy had been an approximately 1,198-member Greek Cypriot village (Goodwin, 1978: 441), which would have had about 240 homes; it is on the northern side of the Green Line, in the western half of Nicosia District (see map 7). After the Greek Cypriots’ evacuation, Turkish Cypriot refugees settled the abandoned village; and before 2003, about 60 Greek Cypriot homes had been destroyed. Neither the Greek Cypriot community nor Greek Cypriot memory had been the target, however; in fact, the destroyed Greek Cypriot homes had been collateral damage in struggles between the Turkish Cypriot and Turkish settler communities. As a Greek Cypriot refugee explained to me:

Our ancestral home was bulldozed some years before the checkpoints were open. The TCs [Turkish Cypriots] who live in the adjacent houses told us they had demolished all houses that to them seemed old in order to prevent mainland settlers from being moved there. My cousin who has been to the village several times told me that he estimates about a quarter of the houses have met a similar fate.

The Greek Cypriot community recognises and highlights the tensions between the Turkish Cypriot and Turkish settler communities, because those tensions support the official Greek Cypriot displacement of all blame for the Cyprus Problem onto Turkey, and its demand for the expulsion of Turkish settlers; but in none of its publications has the Greek Cypriot cultural heritage community ever acknowledged that any of its cultural heritage has been destroyed by Turkish Cypriots in their attempts to prevent Turkish settlement. The absence of this information in Greek Cypriot cultural heritage workers’ narratives may be because they have not gathered it in the first place; however, that itself would a reflection of their non-cooperation with their Turkish Cypriot colleagues, their refusal to conduct site visits in northern Cyprus, and also an apparent choice not even to gather such information from Greek Cypriot refugees in southern Cyprus. This willful avoidance of complicated data – inconvenient truths – which may confuse or disprove the established history is unscholarly; and the consequent reproduction of nationalist narratives contributes to the reproduction of nationalist conflicts. Now, I will turn to explore the ethics of archaeologists’ and antiquities police’s efforts to combat the illicit antiquities trade.
6. Cypriot antiquities rescue from the Turkish deep state

Since the Greek-backed EOKA-B coup and the TMT-supported Turkish invasion of 1974, Greek Cypriot officials have estimated the theft of 'several dozen' wall paintings and mosaics and '15,000-20,000 icons' (Georgiou-Hadjitofi, 2000: 225), and possibly 'more than 60,000 ancient artefacts' (Hadjisavvas, 2001: 136), from northern Cyprus. Yet the structure of the illicit antiquities trade after 1974 was created before then, critically between 1963 and 1974. Thus, I will show how the intercommunal conflict and the illicit antiquities trade evolved together; and the methods and consequences of cultural heritage professionals' responses. I will show how Greek Cypriot archaeological policy has incidentally contributed to Turkish nationalist criminal networks' domination of the northern Cypriot illicit antiquities trade since 1974.

6.a. The early history of the illicit antiquities trade

The digging up and collecting of Cypriot antiquities has a much longer history, however. An 'alarmingly lively' antiquities trade developed in Cyprus under late Ottoman rule, driven by foreign officials collecting antiquities, and driving local patriots like Demetríos Pierides to try to collect and keep antiquities on the island (Leriou, 2008: 3). Ironically, British consul Pierides introduced antiquarianism to his vice-consul, Robert Hamilton Lang (Goring, 1988: 8), who then excavated without permission and collected thousands of antiquities. Worse, Lang introduced antiquities collecting to the notorious American consul, Luigi Palma di Cesnola, who then dug up or bought tens of thousands of illicit antiquities, smuggling and selling thousands of artefacts to the Metropolitan Museum, the British Museum, the Louvre, and even the Ottoman Museum of Constantinople (Myres, 1974 [1914]: xvii), the museum of the very state from which he had taken the artefacts.

These problems continued during the British administration of the Ottoman territory. For example, underfunded British Museum and Cyprus Museum archaeologist Max Ohnefalsch-Richter funded himself by selling his own excavated artefacts and others' looted antiquities (Bröninger, 2001: 198; Fivel, 1996: 29). Also, during the same period, two accidentally found silver hoards, later named the first and second Lambousa treasures (after the ancient site on the northern coast of Kyrenia District, just to the north-east of Karavas (see map 4)), were semi-legally or wholly illegally traded by Greek Cypriot antiquities dealers, and illegally smuggled off the island by foreign antiquities collectors. The British Museum 'turned a blind eye to the manifest impropriety' and bought part of the first Lambousa Treasure (Merrillees, 2009: 13), while the Metropolitan Museum of Art accepted part of the second Lambousa Treasure as a donation from an American antiquities collector (Merrillees, 2009: 3-4).

By the early Twentieth Century, the illicit antiquities trade had become a 'widespread evil' (Markides, 1914: 3); but before the outbreak of violence in 1955, the British colonial administration had established the Department of Antiquities, thus ending the 'treasure-hunting' of the Cyprus Museum Committee (Wilfrid Jerome Farrell, cited in Merrillees, 2005: 197), and Cypriot society had become 'increasingly favourable to the protection' of its cultural heritage (Megaw, 1951: 3). Indeed, after the outbreak of violence, (employment and) the increased security activity actually nearly stopped illicit excavation (Megaw, 1955: 4). Nevertheless, within a decade, intercommunal violence, destruction of community places and looting of archaeological sites exploded together.


6.b.i. Impoverishment and looting

Former United Nations peacekeeper and political geographer Richard Patrick (1976: 79) observed that after the outbreak of intercommunal violence in December 1963, and the consequent mass displacement of 25,000 members of the Turkish Cypriot community, their 'abandoned homes were looted and often burned-out ruins'. Both sides refusing to acknowledge any responsibility for the troubles, neither side tried to re-establish the burned neighbourhoods and villages, and with them
the previous, bicomunal society; so, the Turkish Cypriot community languished in ever greater poverty. Development specialist Prodromos Panayiotopoulos (1995: 23) stated that:

By 1965 nearly half of all Turkish Cypriots were crammed in Gaza-Strip fashion, into a minuscule 1.6 per cent of the island's land-mass (Attalides 1979: 90). Many were living in over-crowded and squalid conditions in the ghettos of old Nicosia and were dependent on mainland Turkish aid as their only means of economic survival.

The enclaved Turkish Cypriots were trapped, both by the Turkish Special Warfare Department-backed Turkish (Cypriot) Resistance Organisation, TMT, that controlled those enclaves, and by the Greek Cypriot administration and paramilitaries that controlled everywhere outside, and sometimes blockaded the enclaves themselves. Because there was a market for it, one of the enclaved Turkish Cypriots' means of subsistence was selling antiquities. And because they controlled the enclaved Turkish Cypriots' access to the market, and the market's access to the looted antiquities, one of TMT's funding sources was the illicit antiquities trade.

Enclaved Turkish Cypriots were looting and selling antiquities to be able to subsist, but TMT were trading and smuggling antiquities to be able to fight; and according to then antiquities director Vassos Karageorghis (2007: 102), the looted antiquities 'were bought mainly by Greek Cypriots and by diplomats'.

Karageorghis (1964: 4) acknowledged that the 'anomalous conditions in the island did not make it possible to achieve' the elimination of the illicit excavation of and trade in antiquities. In fact, those conditions made it possible to industrialise the illicit antiquities trade. Sites and museums within the enclaves were inaccessible to the Department of Antiquities (Karageorghis, 1964: 3). Journalist Michael Jansen (2005: 19) recorded 'widespread' looting, theft, smuggling and dealing in and around the enclaves. Journalist Peter Hopkirk (1971: 4) said that thousands of tombs had been looted.

6.b.ii. Antiquities, heroin, and terrorism

It is not clear whether, before 1974, TMT fighters were smuggling and dealing themselves, or whether they were taxing or taking bakşış (bribes) from smugglers and dealers. (Certainly, members of the Turkish National Intelligence Organisation, MIT, were looting and trading antiquities (Jansen, 2005: 20; 23; see also Aşkın, 2006).) Either way, by buying artefacts from the enclaves, antiquities dealers and collectors outside – notably, Greek Cypriot antiquities dealers and collectors – were incidentally funding Turkish Cypriot TMT's terrorism against both the Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot communities, managing to make a terrible situation even worse.

Antiquities smuggler and dealer Michel van Rijn (1993: 25) stated that Greek Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios III collected 'icons…. which must have been looted from churches'. He should know: Makarios did not prosecute one of van Rijn's icon restorers for theft of icons, but instead employed him as his own icon restorer, and van Rijn's dealing and smuggling operation was, in his words, 'allowed to continue' (1993: 26). Whether protection was given by the upper levels of the state, for whom some of van Rijn's gang worked, as van Rijn (1993: 26; 2003) claimed, or whether protection was given by the lower levels of the state, who knew that some of van Rijn's gang worked for their superiors, the result was the same: his international operation continued for another two decades (van Rijn, 2003).

One of Michel van Rijn's suppliers was Aydan Dikmen, a Turkish smuggler of both antiquities and drugs (Jansen, 2005: 21). Since the Turkish heroin trade is largely controlled by elements within the Turkish National Intelligence Organisation (MIT) (Nezan, 1998: 13), and the greatest smuggler of Cypriot antiquities, Dikmen, was also a smuggler of heroin, it is reasonable to assume that the Turkish antiquities trade was and is also largely controlled by elements within MIT. Indeed, Dikmen's Turkish Cypriot dealer and smuggler, "Tremeleşli" Mehmet Ali İlkman, was first a TMT fighter and then a MIT officer (Jansen, 2005: 20; 23; see also Aşkın, 2006). Thus, there was and still is
a dual heroin-and-antiquities trade in Cyprus, controlled by the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot deep state(s).

6.b.iii. A silent accord with greedy collectors

Later antiquities director Sophocles Hadjisavvas (2001: 135) said that the illicit antiquities trade was ‘so intense that there was even close collaboration between Turkish [Cypriot] looters and Greek [Cypriot] mediators and collectors’. Remarkably, given the structure of the Turkish Cypriot part of the trade, the collaboration of Greek Cypriot collectors was the policy of the Department of Antiquities and the rest of the Greek Cypriot administration. Karageorghis (1999b: 17) revealed that, with the Ministry of Communication and Works’ ‘agreement’, the Department of Antiquities established a “silent accord”, allowing [Greek] Cypriots who had access to the Turkish [Cypriot] enclaves to buy ‘looted antiquities’ (see also Karageorghis, 2007: 102). In fact, the Department of Antiquities itself collaborated.

In his memoirs, Karageorghis (2007: 102-103) explained that:

> During the period from 1970 to 1974, under the pretext of supervising the work of the UNESCO experts at St. Sophia, I would often cross the “border” in the car of [UNESCO conservator Dr.] Carlo Musso…. I bought for the Cyprus Museum a good number of important objects [‘illegal antiquities’]…. I did not pay cash… I would bring them a government cheque from the Central Bank.

Not only were Greek Cypriot collectors and dealers incidentally funding TMT’s terrorism, but also the Greek Cypriot administration was so, and the Department of Antiquities was underwriting the looting of archaeological sites. Disastrously, in yet another attempt to reduce the illicit antiquities trade, in the second half of 1973, the Department of Antiquities declared an amnesty on antiquities collections (Karageorghis, 1973: 4), such that collectors could not only declare their antiquities to the state without being prosecuted for acquiring them, but they could even keep them.

After the amnesty, the Department of Antiquities put on record ‘the prompt collaboration of the collectors’ (Karageorghis, 1974: 5). It was unsurprising. During the amnesty, antiquities looting and trading had increased. According to Hadjisavvas (2001: 135), ‘greedy’ antiquities collectors had used the amnesty to expand their collections, and more than a thousand greedy people had taken the opportunity to begin collections, too. Karageorghis (1999b: 17) had noted that the ‘most important’ collections formed under the “silent accord” and registered during the amnesty were the Severis Collection in Nicosia, the Pierides Collection in Larnaca, and the Hadjiprodromou Collection in Famagusta.

Hadjisavvas (2001: 135) did not say which ‘well-known collector in the Famagusta District’ had hired looters ‘to obtain rare antiquities of a specified date’. Ownership of looted artefacts had been temporarily legalised, but looting of artefacts had not, and any collection formed by looting would, thus, still be illegal; but nothing happened to that unidentified collector. Indeed, after the Turkish invasion, the Department of Antiquities complained that ‘a number of important registered collections of Antiquities’ had been looted (Karageorghis, 1975: 3). In some cases, it was complaining that thieves had been robbed of their stolen goods.

6.c. Greek Cypriot government policy and Turkish Cypriot organised crime since 1974

When the Turkish Special Warfare Department-directed invasion established the Turkish military occupation of northern Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriot deep state survived and was institutionalised: before 1974 president of the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber and vice-president of the Republic of Cyprus, after 1974 TMT leader Rauf Denktaş became president of the autonomous Turkish Cypriot administration, then of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (and later
of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus); TMT itself was reformed as the Turkish Armed Forces' (TSK) local auxiliaries, the Turkish Cypriot Security Forces Command (GKK); and they had their own auxiliaries in the Civil Defence Organisation (SST) (Akınçi and Düzel, 2007; Irkad, 2000; Kanlı, 2007).

Antiquities looting and trading continued after 1974 as well. Since the only economy was the black market and the export trade, inactive archaeological sites were looted across the North (Pollis, 1979: 98). Again, most of the Turkish Cypriots who looted did so because they were poor, but the trade was still controlled by the Turkish/Turkish Cypriot deep state. Instead of funding TMT’s fight against Akritas or EOKA-B, however, the illicit antiquities trade funded the repression of everyone in the North. Moreover, despite the apparent challenges, the bicomunal nature of the northern Cypriot illicit antiquities trade survived the partition of the island (van der Werff, 1989: 7; van Rijn, 1993: 27).

According to official Greek Cypriot estimates, ‘several dozen’ wall paintings and mosaics and ‘15,000-20,000 icons’ have been stolen (Georgiou-Hadjitofi, 2000: 225), and between ‘several thousand’ (Georgiou-Hadjitofi, 2000: 225) and ‘more than 60,000’ (Hadjisavvas, 2001: 136) artefacts have been looted from northern Cyprus.

As Hadjisavvas (2001: 136) observed, there are a ‘large number’ of Cypriot antiquities in international auctions, some of ‘obviously illegal provenance’; and as art journalist Peter Watson (2006: 94) explained, publicly auctioned antiquities are only ‘a fraction’ of the market, primarily used to ‘set prices’ for the larger underground market, and by some dealers to ‘“launder” illicit objects’. It is that antiquities market that drives and funds the looting of the cultural heritage of Cyprus.

Furthermore, churches have been ‘demolished’ (CCSCMA, 2009) and, strikingly, there is evidence that the Turkish Deep State has used money from its heroin-and-antiquities trade to pay for “contracts” to destroy cultural heritage sites (e.g. Armenian Genocide memorials in France, cf. Nezan, 1998: 13). Moreover, they have looted well-known artefacts, which they knew they could not sell elsewhere, with the ‘expectation’ that the Cyprus government – or a proxy – ‘would buy [them] back’ (Herscher, 2001: 148 – original emphasis; see also Van der Werff, 1989: 11).

Both the Greek Cypriot antiquities department and cooperative Greek Cypriot individuals (and later Greek Cypriot foundations), like A. G. Leventis (and his Foundation), have bought back looted antiquities from dealers (Karageorghis, 1990: 6; 1998: 15; 2000: 217). Indeed, there is evidence that Greek Cypriot ‘officials had already had dealings with Dikmen’ (Hofstadter, 1994: 62), long before they used the German police to catch him.

Since 1974, there have also been clandestine activities, the Greek Cypriot secret service employed to “rescue” artefacts and smuggle them from the areas under Turkish Cypriot administration to the areas under Greek Cypriot administration. This became public knowledge when agent Stephanos Stephanou was caught by Turkish Cypriot police, during their raid on Turkish Cypriot antiquities smugglers (Christou, 2007a; 2007b); Stephanou had been ‘retrieving’ icons and artefacts for Church and State (Christou, 2007c; 2007d). In the final section of the thesis, I will explore this case in detail.

This research has shown how the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot paramilitaries’ conflict caused the explosion of looting on the island, and enabled the Turkish/Turkish Cypriot deep state’s use of the illicit antiquities trade once it had exploded. It has also shown how the Greek Cypriot administration, Greek Cypriot archaeologists and Greek Cypriot private antiquities collectors’ collaborative “rescue” of looted artefacts actually funded the looting between 1963 and 1974 (as well as more generally funding the fighting).

Moreover, the evidence has demonstrated that the structure of the trade has remained fundamentally the same since 1974. The Church-and-State, collector-and-archaeologist collaboration has ultimately funded those Turkish nationalist extremist organisations destroying Greek Cypriot homes and churches, and repressing Turkish Cypriot resistance.

More evidence needs to be gathered to understand the communities’ roles in the trade, and to expose clandestine antiquities acquisition and its human cost; but the most important response to the available evidence is for archaeologists and collectors to stop funding looting and destruction by “rescuing” looted artefacts.
6.d. Undercover rescue of looted antiques, 1974-2010

Arrested during a Turkish Cypriot police raid on Turkish Cypriot antiquities smugglers on 18th November 2007, sixty-four-year-old Greek Cypriot Stephanos Stephanou had been detained without charge for two weeks when he had a fatal heart attack on 1st November (Christou, 2007c). This tragic case appears to involve: theft, illicit trading and smuggling of antiques; illegal undercover antiques police work; deep state criminal activity; possible police brutality; and a cover-up by Church and State.

6.d.i. The detention and death of Stephanos Stephanou

Turkish Cypriot police must notify detained suspects’ families ‘at the earliest possible time’ (CATRNC, 1985: Ch. 2, Art. 16, Para. 4); but they did not notify Stephanou’s relatives, and he was only allowed to contact his family on 22nd October, four days after his arrest. As antiques smuggling is a serious crime, Turkish Cypriot police were legally able to detain Stephanos Stephanou without charge.

Yet the (Turkish Cypriot) Kibris Star (2007a) newspaper and Bayrak Radio and Television Corporation (BRTK, 2007) reported that they charged Galip Arnavut, Mehmet Asvaroğlu and Turgut Göztaş with antiques smuggling, then held them for three days; and the Kibris Star (2007b) later reported that, on 20th October, they also charged Yılmaz Göktas and Atalay Hıçkırkmaz with antiques smuggling, then held them for three days.

Nevertheless, all the charged Turkish Cypriot smugglers were released afterwards; only Stephanou remained. Turkish Cypriot police caught Stephanou with three people already suspected of antiques theft and smuggling (whom they arrested), with illicit antiquities, and with three photographs of illicit antiquities on his own mobile phone, but they did not arrest or charge him (Christou, 2007a; 2007d). Instead, Turkish Cypriot police held Stephanou as a ‘flight risk’ (someone likely to flee Turkish Cypriot police jurisdiction if released on bail).

The family contacted then Greek Cypriot Communist Party (AKEL) leader Demetris Christofias, who personally guaranteed left-wing Turkish Cypriot President Mehmet Ali Talat that Stephanos Stephanou would return to northern Cyprus for his trial, but Christofias could not win Stephanou’s release. The family asked Stephanou’s DIKO Party comrade, then Greek Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos, for help. Apparently, he then put his aide, peace envoy Tasos Tzonis on the case, but nothing happened.

When the family went to the Greek Cypriot police, they found out that the Cyprus Police had known and contacted the United Nations Force In Cyprus (UNFICYP) about Stephanou’s detention on 18th October (Christou, 2007d). Thus, it is inconceivable that the Greek Cypriot leadership did not also already know about the former politician and former consul’s detention when the family asked for its help. If the Greek Cypriot government or police did try to secure Stephanou’s release, it did it very quietly, and equally unsuccessfully. As a member of his family commented, ‘[e]veryone knew and they did nothing, but they’ll say they tried’ (Christou, 2008b). Still, UNFICYP did not secure Stephanou’s release either. Nevertheless, UNFICYP were trying to secure the release from Turkish Cypriot custody of someone believed to have tried to steal and smuggle cultural heritage from northern Cyprus.

Heart disease sufferer Stephanou had to be taken to hospital at least twice during his detention, and he may have been taken for treatment for violent injuries. The last time his family saw him conscious, Stephanou had told them that ‘his entire left side was severely bruised and he could neither walk nor breathe in comfort….  [H]e was in great pain’ (Christou, 2007d). His daughter, Katerina Liasis, relayed that Stephanou had said that ‘he had been “beaten heavily and interrogated”’

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100 Bayrak Radyo ve Televizyon Kurumu.
After he slipped into a coma, the family tried to get him to a specialist in southern Cyprus, but the Turkish Cypriot police first refused, then agreed but, ‘as soon as the okay was given’, the Turkish Cypriot Ministry of the Interior told the family that Stephanou had died (Christou, 2007d).

6.d.ii. Denial

After the initial police raid, both communities’ media reported that a Greek Cypriot had been arrested, but not whom or why (Christou, 2007a); and according to Cyprus Mail journalist Jean Christou, even that was not widely reported in Greek Cypriot media. Christou (2007c) noted that there had been ‘no comment from the [Greek Cypriot] government’, that ‘his detention received no attention or condemnation in the government-controlled areas’. Christou (2007d) believed that Greek Cypriot officialdom had been ‘strangely quiet’. Neither the government nor the police even told the family about the official inquest (Christou, 2008b); they found out by accident.

6.d.iii. Illicit antiquities trading, illicit antiquities police work

Greek Cypriot media had claimed that Stephanou was an antiquities expert (Christou, 2007d), ‘retrieving icons and other artefacts looted’ in northern Cyprus (Christou, 2007b). (Greek Cypriot) Antenna TV reported that a former police officer, who had recruited Stephanou ‘to help return stolen Greek Cypriot artefacts to the Church’, said that he ‘was working under cover for the state’ (cited by Christou, 2007c). Christou (2008b) judged that ‘[a]ll of the evidence’ suggested Stephanou was recovering antiquities ‘on behalf of the Church and state’. His daughter, Katerina Liasis, said that ‘the church had sent him’ to meet ‘his contact [who] was the son of a Turkish general’ (ibid.).

Both the public information and my personal sources suggest that the Greek Cypriot state was recovering antiquities from the Turkish deep state. Daughter Liasis believed Stephanou was caught in a Turkish/Turkish Cypriot criminal counter-sting operation against the Greek Cypriot police sting operation. It seems like the Turkish Cypriot police arrested all of them in good faith, but the Turkish deep state used its power to free Arnavut, Asvaroğlu and Göztaş and later Göktas and Hiçkorkmaz, while the Greek Cypriot administration did not use its knowledge to free Stephanou.

The fact that Greek Cypriot undercover antiquities police were caught in Turkish Cypriot police raids on antiquities smugglers challenges former Greek Cypriot antiquities director Vassos Karageorghis’s (2000: 217) claim that the Greek Cypriot administration must ‘salvage’ artefacts, and undermines colleague Maria Anagnostopoulou’s (2000: 37) assertion that ‘an official state, Turkey, plunders… Cyprus’ (see also Leventis, 2000: 146). The plunderers are Turkish and Turkish Cypriot nationalist gangs, which form a Turkist deep state, which operates outside and beyond Turkish state control. Thus, when Turkish Cypriot journalist Kutlu Adalı reported the Civil Defence Organisation’s ‘illegal raid’ of St. Barnabas’s Monastery, the Turkish deep state assassinated him, and no-one was held responsible (Irkad, 2000).

6.d.iv. Illegal undercover antiquities police work

This has not been discussed at all in the media coverage of the Stephanou case. It is possible that they are simply unaware; and it is possible that Stephanos Stephanou was unaware; but it is impossible that the state was ignorant of the fact: in Cyprus, undercover antiquities police work was, and is, illegal. In 2008, the police had specifically requested the legalisation of undercover police work on ‘[i]llegal trading in cultural goods, including antiquities and artefacts’ (cited by J. Theodoulou, 2008). But it was ‘unanimously rejected by Parliament’ (J. Theodoulou, 2008). If the state was using Stephanou for undercover police work, it was breaking its own law. Embarrassment

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101 Turkish Cypriot media claimed that Stephanou had had cancer, and Turkish Cypriot police claimed that he had caught pneumonia and died of septicaemia, but the (multiple) post-mortems disproved these claims (Christou, 2007d).
and fear of prosecution would be powerful incentives for Church and State to deny, or to avoid confirming, their involvement in the matter. I have had independent confirmation that Stephanou was indeed conducting undercover police work.

6.d.v. The “Syriac Bible”

When I first read that Stephanou had been trying to recover an early Bible (Christou, 2008b), I assumed it was just one of the many Hellenic and Byzantine artefacts looted from northern Cyprus (Christou, 2007a; 2007b). But after I blogged about the Turkish Cypriot police’s recovery of a Syriac Bible (cf. Hardy, 2009a), I was contacted by a very well-placed Greek Cypriot source. Over several exchanges, the well-placed Greek Cypriot told me that

That bible was what lured… Stephanos Stephanou into the north after he had worked with police to catch a gang of TC [Turkish Cypriot] smugglers by posing as a buyer in the south. He was tricked.

The well-placed Greek Cypriot detailed that,

The [Greek Cypriot] CID [Criminal Investigations Department] had him posing as a businessman interested in antiquities. The team of smugglers that got arrested 3 years ago by the police realised that [Stephanou] was behind the setup and 2 years later they placed another call to him telling him about an ancient bible.

But as I will show in a moment, it was not that Bible. Greek Cypriot police had warned Stephanou and his partner ‘not to cross again because they “would be killed’” (Christou, 2008b). Yet the well-placed Greek Cypriot told me that Stephanou ‘called the CID [o] inform them that he’[d] got another project and they told him that he’[d] need to go alone to determine whether all this [wa]s for real’. So, despite Stephanou’s police handler warning him, the police had sent him.

Moreover, it was probably not for real; Stephanou probably died trying to save a fake. According to Aramaic and Syriac scholars and translators, there are ‘a large number of fake Syriac manuscripts’ (Taylor, 2009), a ‘consistent pattern of forgeries’ (Caruso, 2009), from Turkey. There are a couple of photographs of the supposedly ancient Syriac Bible found in Cyprus (see China Daily, 2009; Ktisti and Bahceli, 2009), which was dismissed at least as a post-medieval reproduction (e.g. Caruso, 2009), if not a modern copy (e.g. Hunter, 2009), or an outright forgery (e.g. Taylor, 2009); and it was a far better work than the Bible offered to Stephanou. I have not had physical access to Stephanou’s Bible, and I have not heard of any scientific analysis of his Bible; but from Stephanou’s photographs, it looks like gold marker pen writing on black sugar paper. If it was a modern forgery, and if Stephanos Stephanou was caught in a Turkish deep state counter-sting, it is possible that the fake Bible was made specifically for the counter-sting.

Regardless, this story exposes the consequences of stolen and looted Cypriot antiquities’ rescue: apart from the individual tragedy of Stephanou’s death, the money goes to, and thus partially funds the activities of, the Turkish deep state, which include the murder of Greek Cypriot police agent Stephanou when he tried to rescue looted antiquities, and the assassination of Turkish Cypriot dissident journalist Kutlu Adalı when he exposed paramilitary looting (cf. Irkad, 2000). Perversely, the Greek Cypriot state’s purchasing of looted antiquities from northern Cyprus is incidentally funding both the Turkish deep state’s continued looting, and its repression of Turkish Cypriot resistance in northern Cyprus.

102 I have independently confirmed his access to this information.
7. Conclusion: the responsibilities of archaeologists

Having explored the conduct of bicomunal work under international law, the practice of rescue archaeology in the occupied areas (under a secessionist administration), the production of professional and public archaeological knowledge through work and publication (under the boycott), and the efforts to combat the illicit antiquities trade, it is possible to tease out the connections between those areas of cultural heritage work and to recommend ways to proceed towards more responsible archaeology in conflict zones.

It was clear how, in Greek Cypriot archaeologists’ legal attempts to assert the recognised legal authorities’ control over all archaeological work, they prevented legal, ethical Turkish Cypriot conservation work, and thus shared responsibility for the consequent decay of the unprotected sites. As other cultural heritage professions’ work demonstrated, that closing down of work was unnecessary and counter-productive; furthermore, its disempowerment of the Turkish Cypriot archaeological community will have long-term negative effects for the cultural heritage that both sides value.

As demonstrated by the arguments over the legality and ethics of archaeological excavations in northern Cyprus, archaeologists on both sides of the Green Line misinterpreted international law to promote their own freedom to work and to disempower the archaeologists on the other side of the border. This conduct devalued international law and archaeological ethics, and soured what weak relations there were between the two archaeological communities. Trust both within and between the communities was damaged or destroyed, and the indiscriminate use of the boycott and the black list again impaired the functioning of the Turkish Cypriot archaeological community. Moreover, the use of the black list to prevent publication of work not proved illegal, which thus made it impossible for the archaeologists’ professional peers to judge their claims and their work, devalued the black list itself; it came to resemble a tool for maintaining professional power, rather than a tool for censuring unprofessional conduct.

The production of archaeological knowledge of the conflict proved worrying. Already limited by linguistic barriers between the authors and relevant sources, and by political barriers between the authors and their colleagues, much archaeological writing unambiguously perverted its sources and histories. There was simple lack of research, but there was also refusal to use available data, refusal to try to access potentially contrary data, refusal to share contrary data with colleagues who might make it public knowledge, and deliberate abuse and pollution of information already in the public record. The research and narration were so unscholarly as to bring into question the professionalism of the authors (or to undermine it completely). These false histories not only produce convenient material for nationalist propaganda within the community and internationally; but also, since the other side is well aware of the treatment of its own cultural heritage, false histories destroy any trust between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot cultural heritage communities.

The most troubling aspect of archaeological work, however, was undoubtedly looted antiquities’ rescue. The Cyprus Conflict did spontaneously generate an explosion in looting, and an ideal environment for smuggling and illicit trading, and for the paramilitary takeover of the illicit antiquities trade. Yet archaeologists’ policies created a destructive cycle of ultimately government-underwritten, paramilitary-funding looting of archaeological sites. In the end, the Turkish deep state killed a Turkish Cypriot struggling to expose and end the looting of Christian/Greek Cypriot cultural heritage sites, and a Greek Cypriot trying to rescue Cypriot cultural heritage before it disappeared into the international art market.

The only comfort to be taken from all of these examples of practices is in the commitment of many archaeologists and communities to respect and coexistence; however, they urgently need help. Undercover antiquities rescue must end immediately; and it must be replaced by cooperation between both sides’ archaeologists and police in a united fight against organised crime. Equally, both sides’ archaeologists must follow in the footsteps of historians and architects in cooperating to produce true histories that dispel nationalist myths and establish the intercommunal historical understanding necessary for any reconciliation and return to bicomunal life.
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Appendix A. Political legal context: Cypriot state sovereignty

Whether they jumped or whether they were pushed, on 22nd December 1963, Turkish Cypriot officials left the government; they set up the Autonomous Turkish Administration\(^{103}\). The constitutional dilemma’s practical implications for cultural heritage are now for antiquities trading laws and illicit antiquities trade policing on a divided island. However, the dilemma was produced through political violence, including that against community property; and the ending and prevention of that violence was only made possible by the resolution of the dilemma.

Two professors of international law, George Tenekides (1985) and Constantine Economides (2000), are prime examples of the Hellenist line on the Cyprus Problem. It is worth examining their political legal claims because they made them, as well as cultural legal claims, in official cultural heritage propaganda; their interpretation of the legal political situation is relevant and instructive. Neither of them mentioned the violent breakdown of the bicomunal state in 1963-1964, or the consequent separate ethnic administrations, Turkish Cypriot enclaves and UN peacekeeping operation, or even the EOKA-B coup that triggered the Turkish invasion.

In official cultural heritage propaganda, legal scholar George Tenekides (1985: 49) stated that ‘[t]he Republic of Cyprus is recognized as sovereign’. Yet, as public international law scholar Stefan Talmon (2002: 40) observed, after intercommunal violence broke out and Turkish Cypriots left parliament in 1963, there had been ‘no alternative: if the United Nations had not treated the Greek Cypriot rump government as “the Government of Cyprus”, there would have been no legally competent state to consent to the UN peacekeeping operation in 1964 (cf. the conditions of Article 4 of Resolution 186 (UNSC, 1964)).

Cruelly, it was precisely the Greek Cypriot para-state’s usurpation of the partnership state, and the violence it initiated, which necessitated the United Nations’ recognition of the para-state as the legitimate state, in order to reduce the Greek Cypriot para-state’s violence, and the Turkish Cypriot deep state’s reactive violence. The United Nations had to legalise the Greek Cypriot para-state’s annexation of power before the para-state could and would allow the United Nations to intervene to try to restore peace and the partnership state.

\(^{103}\) Özerk Türk Yönetimi.
Appendix B. Political legal context: aggression, invasion, occupation

Again, official cultural heritage propaganda discussed the political legal context. Prof. George Tenekides (1985: 48) acknowledged but did not explain Turkey’s ‘pretext of… the restoration of “constitutional order”’ (the Greek junta-backed Greek Cypriot nationalist extremist paramilitary coup of 1974), but otherwise presented the invasion as an unprovoked attack ‘after 10 years of preparation’.

Notably, that claim would date Turkey’s first plan to invade to 1964, the year the Greek Cypriot para-state consolidated its exclusive control of the Cypriot state and destroyed Turkish Cypriot villages, neighbourhoods, and mosques. Moreover, the UK and later the UN intervened to restore order and keep the peace, and Turkey did not implement its plan to invade. That claim actually demonstrates that Turkish state policy was responsive to events and circumstances, and not merely to Turkish nationalist ideology.

Despite never saying so explicitly, by denying the Turkish justification for its invasion, Tenekides implicitly accused Turkey of aggressive war. He stated that ‘the “third parties”…, the guarantor powers, especially Great Britain, the United Nations and the Superpowers, did not move dynamically to halt the invader’ (Tenekides, 1985: 48-49). Yet the three guarantor powers were Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom; the Greek Junta had supported EOKA-B’s coup; and the United Kingdom chose not to intervene. So, the only state with both the explicit legal right to intervene, and the will, was Turkey.

However, international lawyer Constantine Economides was more direct: Economides (2000: 135) explicitly stated that the invasion violated the UN Charter. It is interesting to study the words of one prominent judge, Loukis Loukaides; then Deputy Attorney-General of the Republic of Cyprus and Member of the European Commission of Human Rights, Loukaides was equally direct. Loukaides alleged ‘aggression’ and ‘illegal war’ (1995: 115).104 Indeed, Loukaides claimed that ‘the U.N. General Assembly ha[d] expressly demanded “the immediate withdrawal of all invading forces from the Republic of Cyprus’” (1995: 114-115 – original emphasis; see fig. 24); but the UN had not. Loukaides – then a member of the European Commission of Human Rights, who later became a senior judge for the European Court of Human Rights – did not only change the emphasis of the demand: he changed the demand itself. Predictably, the words Loukaides (1995: 115) felt important enough to emphasise, the words he had alleged left ‘no doubt’ that the invasion ‘amounted, according to international law, to “aggression”’, were ones he had inserted himself. The United Nations actually demanded ‘the immediate withdrawal of all occupation forces from the Republic of Cyprus’ (1983: Art. 8 – emphasis added; see fig. 25).

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<th>Expulsion of Settlers</th>
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<td>ed “the immediate withdrawal of all invading forces from the Republic of Cyprus”25 (emphasis added).</td>
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Figure 24: Loukaides’ (1995: 115) misquotation of UN Resolution 37/253 (1983).

8. **Demands the immediate withdrawal of all occupation forces from the Republic of Cyprus**;

Figure 25: Article 8 of 1983 United Nations Resolution 37/253.

As a legal professional, Loukaides had to know the difference between the two statements. He frequently talked about the two acts of invasion and occupation as one compound act of invasion-and-occupation, but he also repeatedly demonstrated his knowledge of the legal and political differences between the two acts, for example by arguing that Turkey undermined its legal justification for invasion by maintaining the occupation after ‘order had been restored’ (Loukaides,

104 Not only Hellenists argued this: human rights and international law scholar Prof. Eyal Benvenisti accused Turkey of ‘illegal aggression’ (2004: 180), and stated that its invasion was contrary to the UN Charter and the Cypriot Treaty of Guarantee (2004: 180n105).
1995: 114) – more frankly, after the Greek Cypriot coup regime had collapsed. Moreover, he demonstrated his conscious intention to use those specific words by emphasising them. Thus, it appears that Deputy Attorney-General Loukaides deliberately misquoted and misrepresented the United Nations’ opinions.

Loukaides (1985: 114) alleged that the Turkish invasion was ‘forbidden by’ and Economides (2000: 135) that the ‘illegal military occupation… [was] established in violation of Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the United Nations’ Charter; Economides went as far as to say that the paragraph ‘outlaw[ed] the use of force in international relations’ (2000: 135). The United Nations’ Charter insists that

Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations (UN, 1945: Ch. I, Art. 2, Para. 4).

It does not outlaw any use of force, only those uses ‘inconsistent’ with the aims of the UN. Indeed, Chapter VII, Article 51 specifically legalises ‘individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations’.

Loukaides stated that ‘any interpretation of the right of “action” in the Cypriot Treaty of Guarantee “as a right to use force, was legally impermissible and the actual use of such force was illegal’ (1995: 114). Yet the United Kingdom, the Kingdom of Greece, the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus’s Treaty of Guarantee insisted that its members ‘guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus’ (UK, KOG, ROT and ROC, 1960: 4 – Art. 2), while the UK, Greece and Turkey ‘reserve[d] the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty’ (UK, KOG, ROT and ROC, 1960: 6 – Art. 4). There are two primary reasons for accepting that both of these clauses complied with the UN Charter and gave the right to use force. The first reason is derived from the logic of the law: if those clauses had not given the right to use force, they would have been meaningless. The second reason is derived from the logic of former European Commission of Human Rights member Tenekides’ argument: if those clauses had not given the right to use force, Tenekides’ (1985: 49) complaint that the United Kingdom ‘did not move dynamically to halt the invader’ would have been a complaint that the UK did not commit a criminal act of aggression.

Both the United Nations’ Charter’s and the Republic of Cyprus’s Treaty of Guarantee’s bans on interference with Cypriot independence would have applied equally to the Greek Junta-backed EOKA-B coup. EOKA-B’s violation of both would have established a justification for the Republic of Turkey to intervene to end the Greek Junta’s use of force against the Republic of Cyprus’s political independence. Moreover, neither Tenekides nor Loukaides nor Economides once mentioned the Treaty of Alliance between Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, the treaty in which they explicitly agreed that they were acting in ‘conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter’ and ‘under[took] to resist any attack or aggression, direct or indirect, directed against the independence or the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus’ (KOG, ROT and ROC, 1960: 289 – Preamble, Para. 2; 289 – Art. 2). Obviously, it did not excuse the human rights abuses during the invasion or the abuses and occupation after it, but like the UK, Turkey did have a right and a duty to intervene. As the United Kingdom’s own House of Commons Select Committee on Cyprus later stated,

 Britain had a legal right to intervene, she had a moral obligation to intervene, she had the military capacity to intervene[, but s]he did not intervene for reasons which the government refuses to give’ (UKHCSCS, 1976: x – Para. 22).

In fact, the reason was that the United States refused joint UK-US intervention, and the United Kingdom feared individual failure, either by its own tactical error or through the United States’ interference (O’Malley and Craig, 1999: 184-186). Yet it was only because the third parties “did not
move dynamically to halt” the coup that there was any invasion to halt. It was only after the United States rejected the Soviet Union’s appeal for joint UK, US and Soviet action to prevent EOKA-B’s coup (O’Malley and Craig, 1999: 167), and after the United Kingdom did nothing individually, that EOKA-B held the coup. It was only after the UK rejected Turkey’s appeal for joint British-Turkish intervention to end the coup that the UK then had to appeal for joint British-American action to prevent a unilateral Turkish invasion; and it was only after the United States had rejected the United Kingdom’s appeal that Turkey invaded (O’Malley and Craig, 1999: 167; 174; 184-186).

Like Deputy Attorney-General Loukaides, Prof. Economides was outspoken. Economides (2000: 135), who was a Member of the International Law Commission at the time, stated that

> The armed attack, invasion, capture and occupation of Cypriot territory by Turkey constitutes [sic] the most serious violation known of the international legal order. The International Law Commission of the United Nations, in its bill on the international responsibility of states, calls the armed attack an “international crime” (article 19 paragraphs 2 and 3a), while decision no. 3314 of the 1974 General Assembly of the United Nations [UN, 1974b]… considers it “a crime against international peace” [article 5, paragraph 2].

He made it sound like the ILC or the UN had ruled upon Turkey’s intervention. But a former Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations, Andrew Jacovides (2001: 260), complained precisely that the legality of the Turkish invasion had not been judged. In the judgment of Greek Cypriot Titina Loizidou’s case against Turkey at the European Court of Human Rights, Judge Pettiti’s dissenting opinion mentioned ‘the United Nations not having designated the intervention of Turkish forces in northern Cyprus as aggression’, and noted ‘the Court did not examine the question whether that intervention was lawful’ (in ECHR, 1996; see also Fuad in ECHR, 2001). In fact, the International Law Commission (ILC, 2002 [1996]: 352: Art. 19, Para. 2) had decided that

> An internationally wrongful act which results from the breach by a State of an international obligation so essential for the protection of fundamental interests of the international community that its breach is recognized as a crime by that community as a whole constitutes an international crime.

But that was a generic, draft article on state responsibility. Economides had quoted the ILC’s definition of an ‘international crime’, and the United Nations’ definition of a ‘war of aggression’ (cf. UN, 1974b: 144 – Annex, Art. 5, Para. 2), and applied them himself. That could have been an acceptable thing to do, had he done it openly, but he had not. As a Member of the International Law Commission, he may have had a greater authority to pronounce upon the article’s application; but he also had a greater responsibility to state that it was his personal interpretation, rather than the Commission’s official judgement. Furthermore, the International Law Commission itself had deemed Article 19, Paragraph 3 ‘defective’ because, amongst other problems, ‘it failed to define crimes; [and] its obscurity made it impossible to know what, if anything, was a crime’ (ILC, 1998: 118 – Ch. VII, Para. 243).

As a Member, Economides must have known this. If he had poorly phrased his personal interpretation, that would have been a careless mistake. Yet: he repeated the phrase ‘the armed attack’, both ‘by Turkey’ and ‘called… an “international crime”’ by the ILC (Economides, 2000: 135 – emphasis added), which made it sound as if the ILC had judged that particular armed attack; the term “armed attack” was absent from the clause he cited, Article 19, Paragraph 3a, which warned against ‘a serious breach’, such as… aggression’ (ILC, 2002 [1996]: 352 – Art. 19, Para. 3a), when according to the United Nations, aggression was not any armed attack but specifically ‘[t]he first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter’ (UN, 1974b: 143 – Annex, Para. 2), whereas the Turkish invasion was a reactive use of armed force to end the Greek Junta’s first use; and, most damningly, (by the date of the first edition of the CPCHC’s (1998) book) Commission Member Economides chose to cite Article 19, Paragraphs 2 and 3 at the very same time that the Commission
itself was warning the international community that Paragraph 2 was "problematic" and Paragraph 3 "defective" (ILC, 1998: 18 – Ch. VII, Paras. 242; 243). These points suggest Economides wilfully misused the Commission's articles on state responsibility.

(The Greek Junta-backed EOKA-B coup constituted aggression in various ways, including 'invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State' (UN, 1974b: 143 – Annex, Art. 3, Para. a); 'use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement' (UN, 1974b: 143 – Annex, Art. 3, Para. e); and 'sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein' (UN, 1974b: 143 – Annex, Art. 3, Para. g.).

Economides' misuse of UN Resolution 3314 was in some ways even more obvious. Economides (2000: 135) alleged that 'decision no. 3314 of the 1974 General Assembly of the United Nations, which includes the definition of attack, considers it [the Turkish invasion] “a crime against international peace”'. “Decision” 3314 did not include the definition of attack: Resolution 3314 was the definition of attack, titled "[the] Definition of Aggression" (UN, 1974b: 142).

It is also notable that, though Economides inappropriately cited the generic Resolution 3314, neither Economides nor Tenekides cited any United Nations or Security Council resolution on Cyprus. Loukaides, however, cited several, including three from 1974, Security Council Resolutions 355 and 360 and United Nations (UN, 1974a) Resolution 3212. Conspicuously, the earliest Resolution he cited, 355, was not the first after the invasion, but the third. Resolution 355 was passed on 1st August 1974, a week after the coup regime had collapsed and a democratic Greek Cypriot administration had returned, so it could be seen to refer only to the Turkish invasion forces (although Greek military forces were still on the island and Greek Cypriot paramilitaries were still active). It seems telling that Resolution 355 merely asked the United Nations Secretary-General to work towards and report upon the 'full implementation of Security Council resolution 353' without saying what that involved (UNSC, 1974b: 8 – Preamble). (Resolution 360 'disapproved' of the Turkish Armed Forces' second operation (UNSC, 1974c – original emphasis).) By contrast, the Republic of Cyprus Permanent Representative to the United Nations at the time cited initial Resolution 353 (ROCPRUN, 1974: 2).

Resolution 353 was passed on 20th July, on the day of the Turkish invasion, when EOKA-B was still in power. The Resolution referred to 'the statement of the President of the Republic of Cyprus' (UNSC, 1974a: 7 - Preamble), in which the deposed president had stated that the Greek Junta had converted the Greek Cypriot National Guard into an 'instrument of subversion' and 'created and supported the terrorist organisation “EOKA B”' (Makarios, 1974b: 1; 6), then the 'aggressors' ‘callously violated the independence’ of and ‘extended [their] dictatorship’ to Cyprus (ibid.: 5; 1; 1), by ‘invasion’ (ibid.: 3; 4; 6; 7). The Resolution requested ‘the withdrawal… of foreign military personnel’ on the island illegally, specifically 'including those whose withdrawal was requested by the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, in his letter of 2 July 1974’ (UNSC, 1974a: 7 – Art. 4), in which Makarios (1974a) had asked Greek Junta President Faedon Gizikis to recall the Greek officers in the Greek Cypriot National Guard, which the Junta had used to usurp control of the force and to ‘support and direct the activities of the terrorist organisation “EOKA B”… to dissolve the state of Cyprus’. From the available evidence, it seems that the only reason to cite the later, uninformative Resolution 355 would be to avoid citing the earlier, detailed Resolution 353, which made it clear that the Greek Junta and its Greek Cypriot para-state had committed aggression against the Republic of Cyprus, and that the Turkish state had a legal justification for military intervention. Notwithstanding the legality of the Turkish invasion, any and all abuses during and after that invasion were illegal; likewise, any and all deep state activity was illegal, though it is important to remember that the Turkish government did not control and was not responsible for deep state activity.